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This thesis explores how symbolic ideas embedded in an accounting instrument 
come to be enacted in practice: detailing the processes through which they are real-
ised by actors. It draws on theories of governmentality and the institutional logics 
perspective to develop a holistic theorisation of how programmes, ideas or ‘logics’ 
come to be enacted in practice as individuals interact with a performance appraisal 
process. It seeks to develop a theorised narrative that unpicks the various realities 
which actors construct in a particular assemblage. The story is informed by an 
abductive case study of one branch of John Lewis Department Stores. It develops a 
model which details the factors which influence the effective performativity of the 
accounting instrument. As such it explores how governance occurs as non-local ideas 
are prescribed to, and then enacted in, a local domain. The model describes how 
actors interact with a ‘mediating instrument’ and thereby constitute multiple realities 
based on three moderating factors: underlying ties to existing logics, self-interest and 
others’ influence. In outlining these moderating factors the thesis also highlights that 
multiple logics are more likely to be enacted when they are added or merged to 
existing sense making, in comparison to when they are framed or reframed according 
to those existing framings. As such it contributes to governmentality by detailing the 
process of governing and unpacking the factors which influence whether a mediating 
instrument is effectively performative. Additionally it contributes to institutional 
theory by providing a more nuanced understanding of how the symbolic elements of 
logics come to be enacted in practice through interactions with such material 











This thesis takes seriously the argument that accounting practices (such as a 
performance appraisal process) do more than describe a pre-existing reality, but are, 
rather, fundamentally involved in creating, influencing and maintaining such a 
reality: that they are constitutive of that reality. It asks how the ideas embedded in 
accounting practices (by senior management) come to be enacted in practice by 
shop-floor workers, and with what effects. To answer this question it distinguishes 
between symbolic/ideational aspects of ideas and their material enactment in 
practice. By exploring interactions around performance appraisal between managers 
and their subordinates, it describes the processes through which symbolic ideas come 
to be realised in practice. The model expands current understanding by highlighting 
the influence of three factors which moderate how closely aligned the material 
practices are in comparison to the symbolic underlying ideas. It thus contributes to 
knowledge by outlining a clearer picture of how symbolic ideas are materialised in 
practice, the role of accounting as a governance tool within such a setting and how 
individuals come to recognise and engage with alternative perspectives in contrast to 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
We followed the birth and the activities of many of these little engineers of the 
human soul, and their mundane knowledges, techniques and procedures […] 
For it was only through their activities that states […] could govern at all.  
(Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 5) 
 
This thesis is interested in the processes of such government: the making real of 
engineered ideas through mundane activities. Specifically it considers how and why 
individual actors respond in the multiple ways that they do to these attempts to 
govern, control, influence, alter and direct their behaviour. It recognises the variety 
that arises as such ideas are (attempted to be) made real in practice and seeks to 
theorise the factors which moderate this variation.  
 
Contemporary society provides a daily onslaught of attempted governance: from the 
clothes we put on in the morning (Jeacle, 2015), across the rankings of the 
organisations we commute to (Espeland & Sauder, 2007), through the technologies 
we employ whilst at work (Millo & MacKenzie, 2009) and in the round-up of the 
economy’s performance on the evening news or in the next morning’s paper (Miller 
& Rose, 1990), we are constantly encouraged to perform in a certain manner. In 
other words we are under constant attempts to be governed. From public, through 
organisational and to the most private spheres of life individuals are increasingly 
under the influence of attempted governance (Miller & Rose, 2008; Power, 1999).  
 
However, such encouragement to perform in a certain manner is not always well-
received and there are, similarly, often multiple sources of encouragement and ways 
of sense making which suggest different directions. In other words, engineers’ 
models are translated, rather than diffused, into reality and much variation occurs as 
these ideas are made real in practice (Busco & Quattrone, 2014; Czarniawska, 2008). 
This thesis seeks to build on these notions of governance and sense making by 
theorising the factors which moderate actors’ responses to such attempted 
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governance: it asks what factors influence actors to perform in a manner which is 
aligned with, which alters or which ignores the engineered ideas? 
 
Understanding the factors which moderate responses to such attempted control 
remains important for individuals, for organisations and for society. Whether 
interested in being able to engineer and govern the performances of others (as in 
organisations), or being aware of and therefore potentially able to resist such 
attempts (as for individuals) or in whether or not such reflexivity is ethically and 
morally just and desirable (as for society), governance remains an important topic. 
 
In order to consider these moderating factors, this thesis requires a conceptualisation 
of two sides of the same coin. The first side of the coin theorises how such attempted 
control is presented to actors. This conceptualises the ways in which government is 
manifest in contemporary society. The second side of the coin theorises how actors 
might interpret such attempted governance. This conceptualises how actors make 
sense of their world and the barrage of governance attempts that they are faced with. 
Such a combination of theoretical lenses allows the research to contribute by 
exploring the process and doing of governance (Moll & Hoque, 2011): treating it as a 
verb rather than a noun, by theorising the factors which moderate actors’ responses 
to governance.  
 
In order to theorise the first side of this coin, the thesis draws on the governmentality 
literature (Miller & Rose, 2008). This literature highlights the important role of 
seemingly mundane ‘calculative practices’ (Miller, 2001, p. 379) which act as 
“technologies of government” (Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 175). Such practices, it is 
argued, do much more than merely describe a pre-existing reality but are instead 
actively involved in the on-going construction of that reality (Hacking, 1999; 
MacKenzie, Muniesa & Siu, 2007; Miller & O’Leary, 2007). For example, Miller 
and Rose (1990) document the contingent and arbitrary development of calculative 
technologies such as Gross Domestic Product which are shown to instil and 
disseminate theories and concepts of economics into the private lives of individuals: 
to govern them by encouraging them to perform an engineered idea of what 
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contemporary citizens should do. These theories and concepts are not a ‘natural’ 
progression but rather represent the successful alignment of various parts of a 
contingent assemblage or network which, in part at least, is successful because of 
these calculative technologies. As Hoskin and Macve (1986) highlight, it was the 
pedagogical technology of examination, and particularly the exam mark, which 
facilitated a step from being able to monitor products to being able to monitor 
individuals. Such a step, they show, invented the notion of ‘controlling’ individuals 
through measurement which thereby exerts pressure to conform to a certain, 
standardised value system. Indeed their argument is that such technologies were 
fundamental in the development and spread of accountancy as a profession. Thus 
they show how an examination technology successfully aligns and governs 
individuals according to certain principles. 
 
Because these calculative technologies afford comparison and ranking, this induces, 
at least a pressure for, a behavioural response. It is argued that without such 
technologies as GDP, an ‘efficient economy’ would be unthinkable: thus these 
technologies are fundamentally involved in actively constituting the reality which 
they purport to describe (Callon, 2007). Similar findings have been documented, for 
example, in the construction of option markets and option pricing theory (MacKenzie 
& Millo, 2003) and in the construction of the realities of Deans of US Law Schools 
(Espeland & Sauder, 2007). Building on Foucault (1973, 1977), Miller and Rose 
(1990) argue that it is only through such methods that advanced liberal democracies 
enact government: rather than through threat of force, seemingly mundane expertises 
and technologies exert a powerful force which coerces individuals to conform.  
 
Accounting acts as one such calculative technology of government (Miller & Rose, 
2008). In fact, accounting seems particularly well suited to such governance (Miller 
& Power, 2013). It is one of the most taken for granted aspects of organizing and one 
of the most pervasive forms of rationality (Bromley & Powell, 2012). Such 
pervasiveness arises because of its perceived neutrality, objectivity, functionality, 
adaptability and communicability (Busco & Quattrone, 2014; Cruz, Scapens & 
Major, 2011; Mennicken & Miller, 2012; Miller & Power, 2013). It seems able to 
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mediate between: ideas and practices (Burns & Scapens, 2000; Gawer & Phillips, 
2013); remote and local domains (Kurunmäki & Miller, 2011); competing 
imperatives (Miller & O’Leary, 2007), and much else besides. As such it enrols 
actors into its practices with relative ease: even across geographically remote 
domains (Mennicken, 2008) and in “interrupted” networks of loose ties (Dambrin & 
Robson, 2011, p. 428).  
 
Governmentality focuses attention on these technologies or ‘mediating instruments’ 
(Miller & O’Leary, 2007) which act to both bring together domains and then to 
govern them by engineering practices (Thomson, Grubnic & Georgakopoulos, 2014). 
Where those governed act in the manner in which those governing desire, then 
accounting can be described as demonstrating ‘effective performativity’ 
(MacKenzie, 2006; MacKenzie, Muniesa & Siu, 2007; Miller & Rose, 2008). But 
does it always? And when it does, is that which is made real in practice equal to the 
abstract ideas of those governing? Or does it differ? Might we see ‘ineffective 
performativity’ where those being governed do not respond in the desired manner? 
Understanding governance as a process rather than an outcome suggests this might 
be the case; it suggests that ideas are translated, rather than diffused, into reality 
(Czarniawska, 2008) and can therefore be varied and even multiple (Mol, 2002). 
Similar to Moll and Hoque’s (2011) exploration of the processes of legitimating, this 
thesis seeks to understand the processes of governing: asking what factors moderate 
this construction to be more or less ‘effectively’ translated into practice. In other 
words, it seeks to theorise the factors which moderate the degree of effective 
performativity of a mediating instrument: the “felicity conditions” of performativity 
(Bourdieu, 1991, p. 71). Such a theorisation is currently underdeveloped in our 
understanding of governance through mediating instruments (Espeland & Sauder, 
2007, p. 34; MacKenzie, 2007, p. 69; Revellino & Mouritsen, 2015, p. 47). 
 
In order to provide such a theorization this thesis must conceptualise the second side 
of the aforementioned coin. Whilst governmentality provides a lens to analyse how 
attempted governance works through mediating instruments, we still require a 
second lens to conceptualise how actors interpret and make sense of such instruments 
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and their prescriptions on behaviour. A theory which has similar interests in control, 
a practice-focus, elements of structure and agency (Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin & 
Suddaby, 2008) and which provides a conceptualization of how actors interpret, 
frame and make sense of their world (Ocasio, 1999) is Institutional Theory. 
Accordingly, institutional theory provides a broad spectrum of theoretical insights 
which can be drawn upon to complement governmentality (Miller & Power, 2013). 
Whilst this thesis draws on notions from within Institutional Theory more broadly, it 
mainly focuses on recent work in the Institutional Logics Perspective (Thornton, 
Ocasio & Lounsbury, 2012) which is arguably more attentive of the socially 
constructed nature of ‘logics’ than Institutional Theory is of ‘institutions’ and thus 
can complement the first lens of governmentality (see Section 2.4 for more details on 
the compatibility of these two theories). 
 
The ‘practice turn,’ evident in work on mediating instruments (Miller & Power, 
2013; Miller & Rose, 2008), has also been taken up, wholeheartedly, by 
institutionalists (Barley, 2008). They are similarly interested in how socially 
constructed, remote and ‘macro’ value-systems, or ‘institutional logics’, come to be 
enacted (i.e. made real) in the practices of individuals at the ‘coalface’ (Barley, 2008) 
or ‘on the ground’ (McPherson & Sauder, 2013). In other words, they are also 
interested in how symbolic, yet engineered, ideas become material practice and the 
process of governance by which this reification occurs. Institutional logics are the 
shared, taken for granted social norms and prescriptions which both enable and 
constrain action by defining legitimacy and rationality (Thornton et al., 2012). They 
are “the rules of the game” (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, p. 112) which are constituted 
in both symbolic ideas and material practices (Thornton et al., 2012).1  
 
Existing logics, through socialisation, can become deeply embedded in the cognitive 
capacity of individuals to make sense of their world (Thornton et al., 2012) to the 
																																																								
1 Additionally, it is important for the logics perspective to note this distinction of 
logics as being both symbolic and material since it parallels the analytical distinction 
in governmentality between programmes of government (ideas) and their 
technologies (material instruments) and highlights their similar interests in 




point that they only see the world through that particular lens so that “alternatives 
can become literally unthinkable” (Zucker, 1983, p. 5). In other words, existing 
logics can frame what is socially accepted, legitimate or rational within a particular 
assemblage (Smets, Jarzabowksi, Spee & Burke, 2015) and this can cause serious 
conflict between alternative framings (Friedland & Alford, 1991). For example, a 
humanitarian aid worker’s perspective of a situation is likely to be very different to 
that of a Wall Street banker. The institutional logics perspective provides a theory to 
argue why such different perspectives, framing and sense making arise and helps to 
explain why actors make sense of the same governing prescriptions in different 
ways. 
 
The institutional logics perspective has, by definition, focused on such heterogeneity 
in rationality or legitimacy because of the seminal framework conceptualised under 
the ‘inter-institutional system’: the existence of multiple ‘institutional orders’ which 
can produce an infinite number of framings, or ‘logics’ (Friedland & Alford, 1991). 
Such a focus on ‘pluralism’ or ‘complexity’ (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, 
Micelotta & Lounsbury, 2011) provides insight into how actors make sense of the 
world under competing rationalities and how this influences the reality which they 
construct. Such a focus on multiplicity expands the singular focus on neo-liberalism 
and the homogeneous outcome of governance within governmentality and thus 
highlights a number of issues in how actors make sense of, manage, respond to and 
enact multiple framings of rationality: a common trait of organizational and daily life 
(Greenwood, et al., 2011). It thereby helps to theorise the second side of the coin: 
conceptualising how actors make sense of attempts to govern them and thereby 
helping to explain the factors which moderate the effective performativity of 
mediating instruments. 
 
Thus this thesis argues that current understanding allows us to conceptualise, firstly, 
how governance is attempted through mediating instruments and, secondly, that 
actor’s respond in a multitude of ways because of how they interpret information 
based on the logics in which they have been socialised. However, the thesis goes on 
to argue that this understanding is limited; particularly in the factors which moderate 
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these responses. There remains a paucity of understanding on the factors which 
contribute to the ‘effectiveness’ of attempted governance (MacKenzie, Muniesa & 
Siu, 2007; Revellino & Mouritsen, 2015; Thomson, Grubnic & Georgakopoulos, 
2014), particularly where said governance attempts to enact multiple ideas in practice 
(Espeland & Sauder, 2007; Gawer & Phillips, 2013; Raviola & Norbäk, 2013). In 
other words, we need to know more about the “felicity conditions” under which 
effective performativity, or effective governance, arises from mediating instruments 
(Bourdieu, 1991, p. 71; Espeland & Sauder, 2007, p. 34; MacKenzie, 2007, p. 69; 
Revellino & Mouritsen, 2015, p. 47).  
 
In order to explore how multiple ideas are brought into practice through a mediating 
instrument the chosen research setting was a large employee-owned cooperative 
Partnership: John Lewis Department Stores. Firstly, and in addition to cooperatives 
and retail organizations being under-researched (Bryer, 2011; Jeacle & Carter, 2012, 
respectively), cooperatives’ successes are often attributed to their ability to 
simultaneously manage dual identities, ideas or logics, (Chenhall, 2008; Smets et al., 
2015). Indeed, the Deputy Prime Minister has called for a “John Lewis economy” in 
the UK (Mason, 2012). John Lewis Department Stores must successfully promote 
both ideas of business (profit, efficiency, standardisation, self-interest etc.) and ideas 
of partnership (member happiness and satisfaction, autonomy, flexibility, community 
etc.) to both internal and external constituents in order to sustain their identity (Moll 
& Hoque, 2011). Secondly, the case site was large enough, and with sufficient 
geographic diversity, to present various technological instruments acting on others at 
a distance in an attempt to govern them by enacting these dual, engineered ideas in 
practice (Dambrin & Robson, 2011). These instruments are designed to hold actors 
to a certain account, based on these dual values, and were implemented during the 
case study (see Section 3.3 for further justification). Thus, John Lewis Department 
Stores presented a suitable setting in which to investigate how a mediating 
instrument makes real multiple ideas in practice and the moderating factors which 




The research followed an abductive approach involving a single, in-depth case study 
focusing on one branch of John Lewis Department Stores over eighteen-months and 
followed areas of interest within the case (Bryman & Bell, 2011). For instance the 
final research focus on the factors which moderate effective performativity emerged 
from iterating between theory and the empirics. Whilst framed differently, 
organisational actors were also concerned with variation in responses to attempted 
governance. The Partnership wanted to ensure its members acted in the way they 
desired; accordingly, they updated their performance measurement and appraisal 
practices in an explicit attempt to govern their employees to these ends. However, 
managers and employees were similarly concerned with the amount of variation in 
responses to this instrument. Thus the research interest arose abductively and was 
reflected in both the empirics and the theory.  
 
Thirty-six interviews were conducted across the entire managerial hierarchy in three 
phases to capture responses to the implementation of this mediating instrument 
(Lounsbury, 2008). Additionally, proprietary and non-proprietary documents were 
analysed to provide background information and validate the views of the 
interviewees. Finally, the author spent ten days in branches, observing various 
meetings, training programmes and day-to-day life on the shop floor, as well as 
photographing various organizational charts and chatting informally to staff. All data 
was added to a pool as it was collected across the three phases. This was coded, 
theorised and compared to extant theory after each of the three phases of data 
collection. As the data pool grew, the research questions became more refined based 
on various presentations of the work and reading literature associated with the 
emerging themes. Subsequent data collection focused on these emerging issues in 
more detail and was able to build more inductively on the emerging themes. Finally, 
in a “creative leap” these themes were theorised in order to answer the research 
questions (Langley, 1999, p. 691). 
 
The research adopts a position informed by interpretivism under a social 
constructionist epistemology and idealist ontology (Blaikie, 2000; Burrell & Morgan, 
1979; Elder-Vass, 2012). This perspective argues that all ideas and objects are 
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socially constructed: that is, they are not inevitable and a part of the nature of things 
(Hacking, 1999). Rather, they have been constructed as they currently are through 
various mechanisms and entities. They do not have to be as they currently are and are 
a reflection of multiple contingencies (Hacking, 1999). For example, neo-liberalism 
is not inevitable and “It could be otherwise!” (Woolgar, 2015) This does not mean, 
however, that objects are not ‘real’ and that nothing exists outside of language. The 
‘reality’ or ontology of objects is socially constructed, but their effects are decidedly 
‘real’ and material (Elder-Vass, 2012); the effects and pressures of neo-liberalism 
cannot simply be wished away or ignored. 
 
As such, this thesis explores accounting in its institutional and social context, taking 
account of these various contextual mechanisms and entities, and seeks to increase 
understanding about the constitutive links between these elements and accounting 
instruments (Hopwood & Miller, 1994; Miller & Rose, 2008; Miller & Power, 2013, 
p. 711). Given the methodological position, the thesis does not seek to represent 
reality as it exists ‘out there’ but instead aims to re-present the case in its absence 
(Jordan, Jørgensen & Mitterhofer, 2013; Quattrone, 2004, 2006; Quattrone & 
Hopper, 2005). Specifically, it describes the moderating factors that contribute to the 
various realities which actors construct through their interaction with a mediating 
instrument. 
 
1.2 Research Questions 
Through such a description, this thesis explores the processes by which a mediating 
instrument governs: in other words, how actors come to an understanding of 
appropriate action in relation to multiple prescriptions which are provided by an 
accounting instrument and multiple rationalities within their cognitive sense making. 
Accordingly, it theorises the factors which moderate effective performativity in 
attempted governance. As such, three research questions are proposed: 
 




The first research question focuses on the actions that actors enact in response to the 
mediating instrument. It questions the existing assumption in governmentality that 
governance is a homogeneous outcome and asks how this governance unfolds in 
practice. Echoing prior work, the findings document multiple translations of the 
accounting instrument’s ideas into reality. In other words actors respond in a variety 
of different ways. Subsequently, the thesis focuses on explaining this variation: 
explaining degrees of effective performativity. The second research question 
enquires as to the factors which moderate the degree of variation in effective 
performativity: 
 
Research Question 2: What factors moderate actors’ responses to this instrument? 
 
Having outlined that actors respond in a variety of ways, and thereby detailing that 
effective performativity is not an assured outcome of governance, this second 
research question focuses on why such variations arise. As such it explores the 
process of governing and the factors which moderate effective performativity. In 
answering this question the findings highlight that symbolic logics indeed shape how 
actors make sense of governance attempts, but that these logics do not determine 
action and many decisions are not taken for granted: rather, actors experience 
tension. Despite such tension, these actors can, under certain circumstances, still 
demonstrate effective performativity. In other words, despite initially struggling to 
recognise the legitimacy of alternatives (hence experiencing tension), actors can, at 
least temporarily, ‘step out’ of the framing in which they are embedded and come to 
recognise the legitimacy of alternatives. Accordingly, a third research question arises 
which seeks to propose a theorisation of how this happens: 
 
Research Question 3: How can actors ‘step out’ of one logic and come to recognise 
the legitimacy of an alternative?  
 
Collectively the three research questions provide a line of enquiry into the effective 
performativity of a mediating instrument and allow an examination of the factors 
which moderate actors’ responses to attempted governance. In answering the 
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proposed research questions, the thesis shows that: (i) actors enact variations of the 
prescriptions presented by the mediating instrument and that effective performativity 
is by no means guaranteed; (ii) three factors moderate actors’ responses and drive 
variation:  underlying ties to extant logics, self-interest and others’ influence, 
depending on whether the prescriptions of the mediating instrument are framed, 
added, merged or re-framed; and (iii) whilst actors who are institutionalised under a 
certain logic frame prescriptions from this logic, variation in the degree of effective 
performativity can occur as actors temporarily override the logic in which they are 
embedded and thereby recognise the legitimacy of alternative rationalities without 
undue tension, particularly in the case of the latter two more pragmatic and less 
existential moderating factors.  
 
In summarizing these mechanisms, this thesis details the process of governance with 
reference to the factors which moderate the effective performativity of a mediating 
instrument. In others words it shows how ideas come to be made real in practice. 
Thus this thesis contributes to both the accounting and organizational literatures. 
Firstly, it contributes to studies of mediating instruments by extending understanding 
of how ideas are constituted and made real: that is, how instruments govern and 
enact ideas in practice. Whilst prior studies have highlighted how mediating 
instruments link and sustain an assemblage of actors (Mennicken, 2008; Miller & 
O’Leary, 2007), this thesis conceptualises at an individual level how a mediating 
instrument governs actors and makes real the ideas combined in that instrument; it 
details factors that drive varying degrees of effective performativity. It explains how 
this performativity is moderated by three factors: underlying ties to logics, self-
interest and others’ influence. The findings extend understanding in what a mediating 
instrument makes real and how it reifies those ideas in practice by focusing on the 
moderating factors upon effective performativity through studying the process of 
governing. 
 
Secondly, it contributes to institutional theory by highlighting the importance of a 
material technological instrument in combining multiple logics and in enacting these 
practices on the ground. It responds to calls for a more detailed focus on the role of 
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instruments in the enactment, and management, of multiple institutional logics in 
practice (Czarniawska, 2008, p. 775; Gawer & Phillips, 2013; Powell & Colyvas, 
2008, p. 277; Raviola & Norbäk, 2013). As such it provides a more nuanced 
understanding of how logics come to be constructed in practices and the role of 
instruments within this process. Additionally, it highlights how actors can become 
aware of the legitimacy of alternative logics where they are interpreted against 
isolated and pragmatic work demands by such prescriptions creating a temporary 
override from the logic in which an actor is embedded. Finally, this thesis also hopes 
to make a contribution by outlining an example of the benefits of combining notions 
of governmentality with those in organizational studies (Miller & Power, 2013). 
 
1.3 Structure & Concluding Remarks 
This thesis adopts a traditional structure. Following this introduction, the literature 
review, methodology, case site and findings, discussion and conclusion chapters 
outline how and why the research was undertaken, what it shows, and what we can 
learn from it. The literature review chapter, split into three sections on accounting, 
institutional theory and the interface between these approaches, outlines the 
emergence and current state of both accounting and institutional theory vis a vis the 
research questions. After outlining their philosophical and theoretical compatibility, 
the chapter concludes by presenting how each can contribute to an understanding of 
how ideas come to be enacted in practice, but show how this understanding is 
insufficiently developed and requires more attention both theoretically and 
empirically.  
 
The Methodology Chapter outlines the philosophical position underpinning this 
research project and, subsequently, the research design and approach: outlining how 
the research, analysis and theorisation were conducted. In both cases the sections 
also justify why the chosen method or theoretical lens is appropriate to the research 
questions at hand. The Case Site and Findings Chapter firstly details the context of 
the research site within John Lewis Department Stores and how this provides a 
suitable setting to answer the research questions outlined in the preceding chapters. 
The chapter continues to outline what the characteristics of the ideas evident within 
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the case site are, how these engineered ideas come to be made real in practice 
through an accounting instrument, how such a process leads to multiple ideas being 
enacted in practice and, finally, how actors justify their varied actions. Such an 
empirical story line is echoed in the Discussion chapter which presents a theorised 
narrative to answer the three research questions explicitly and explains how ideas are 
made real in practice and what factors moderate variation and, therefore, effective 
performativity in this process of governing. Specifically, this chapter is broken down 
into four parts to demonstrate: (i) what the ideas evident within the case setting are 
(both the formalised ideas in the performance appraisal process and the informal 
ideas enacted in practice) and that these can be conceptualised as symbolic logics or 
governmental programmes; (ii) how these formal ideas come to enacted in practices 
through a mediating instrument, and that the performance appraisal process within 
the case site can be conceptualised as such an instrument; (iii) what the moderating 
factors are that determine how actors will respond in a multitude of different ways; 
and (iv) a holistic explanation of how mediating instruments govern, detailing how 
actors can temporarily step out of the logic in which they are embedded to recognise 
the legitimacy of alternatives under certain circumstances. Finally, the Conclusion 
Chapter summarises the results, explores the theoretical and practical contributions, 


















































Chapter 2: Accounting, Governmentality & Mediating Instruments 
2.1 Introduction 
This thesis is interested in governance, in how individuals are controlled and respond 
to such disciplinary attempts within an organisational setting. Specifically it is 
interested in the moderating factors that influence how actors respond in certain 
ways. Accordingly, as argued above, the thesis requires a first theory to 
conceptualise ‘control’ and a second theory to conceptualise how actors make sense 
of such attempted control. The following sections provide an overview of two 
theories which allow such conceptualisation and also comment on their 
compatibility.  
 
The chapter begins with an overview of governmentality and how it conceptualises 
control based on Foucauldian (1973, 1977) notions of willing compliance as actors 
compare their performance to others, and to standards, through various instruments 
of measurement. Such control is manifested through ‘technologies of government’ 
(i.e. material measurements) which constitute in practice certain ‘programmes of 
government’ (i.e. symbolic ideas). Subsequently, the following section outlines more 
specifically how such technologies govern by constituting and constructing reality by 
detailing the more recently developed notion of ‘mediating instruments’ (Miller & 
O’Leary, 2007). This section concludes with an illustration of how accounting has 
characteristics which make it particularly suited as a technology of government: 
namely its ability to measure and discipline.  
 
In reflecting upon this literature, the chapter then argues that govermentality has 
focused on governance as an outcome rather than a process and that there remains a 
need to explore this process: particularly to understand where and why actors do 
conform to the instruments of government, where and why they do not and the 
spectrum in between. In order to conceptualise such variation the chapter then 
presents more recent developments in Performativity, which focus specifically on 
how instruments construct the world which they purport to describe (MacKenzie, 
2007). Such a lens provides a spectrum of varying degrees of ‘effective 
performativity’ from reality being constructed in a manner aligned with the ideas of 
	
16	
governing instruments through it being adapted and to it not. The section concludes 
with a summary and overview of how governmentality, in its focus on control as 
outcome, can be extended by analysing the factors which moderate such effective 
performativity. The conclusion then situates the first two research questions into the 
gaps in this literature. 
 
Having outlined a theory of control and a typology to characterise how actors 
respond to such control, the chapter then moves on to outline a theory of why such 
variation in responses might arise. This section begins with an overview of 
Institutional Theory, and the institutional logics perspective particularly, as a theory 
in which actors are embedded in various culturally defined symbolic value systems 
which affect their framing and sense making of the world. The section then continues 
to outline how these symbolic value systems shape sense making before detailing 
how actors also use such value systems to their advantage to influence others. 
Finally, the social construction of these logics is reiterated in more recent research 
which highlights that active work must occur in order to reify these symbolic logics. 
Upon summary and reflection, the section then outlines how this literature faces 
similar challenges to governmentality in its lack of detailed understanding about 
precisely how and why some symbolic values become reified in practice and how 
and why others are amended or are not reified at all. Specifically we lack 
understanding about why and how certain actors are able to ‘step out’ of the logic in 
which they are embedded and thereby consider alternatives as legitimate and thus 
cause such variation, to which the third research question enquires.  
 
Before moving on, in the Methodology Chapter, to discuss how such questions are 
answered, this chapter closes with a brief overview of the philosophical compatibility 
between the two theoretical lenses and argues on them as an appropriate combination 
to complement each other in terms of the specific research questions proposed in this 
project. In conclusion, the section reiterates the explicit research questions under the 




2.2 Governmentality, Mediating Instruments & Performativity 
2.2.1 Governmentality 
2.2.1.1 Programmes and Technologies of Government 
Governmentality is concerned with the mentality of governing: the ‘conduct of 
conduct’ (Miller & Rose, 1990, 2008). The governmentality thesis sought to develop 
a new approach to exploring how the state could “shape the ways in which people 
conducted their daily lives” (Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 6). It builds on the cultural turn 
in sociology (Bourdieu, 1977; Foucault, 1973, 1977) and draws on the ‘making up’ 
of spaces and persons (Hacking, 1983; Rose & Miller, 1992) through the 
‘construction’ and ‘instruction’ of them (Miller & Rose, 2008). Such ‘making up’ 
and control is achieved through the ‘multiple contingent factors’ that arise to stabilise 
an assemblage of things (Hacking, 1991; Latour & Woolgar, 1979). In other words, 
governmentality seeks to deconstruct taken for granted practices and show reality as 
socially constructed, as contingent and therefore open to alteration (McKinlay, 
2010). It seeks to show that there is nothing ‘natural’ about reality and instead it is 
constructed by the alignment of an assemblage; in other words: “It could be 
otherwise!” (Woolgar, 2015) 
 
Whilst the initial “rather awkward neologism” (Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 15) of 
governmentality was proposed by Foucault, it was Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose 
who developed the concept into one applicable approach for conducting 
sociologically directed research (Miller & O’Leary, 1987, 2007; Miller & Rose, 
1990, 2008, 2010; Rose & Miller, 1992). Finding prevailing Marxist concepts 
unhelpful in explaining how authorities interfered in the lives of individuals within 
advanced liberal democracies, Miller and Rose were caught by Foucault’s (1973, 
1977) The Birth of the Clinic, Discipline and Punish and his 1978 lectures on 
Governmentality. In these, Foucault detailed how one could focus on “analysing an 
event according to the multiple processes that constitute it” (Foucault, 1977, p. 277). 
These works highlighted “that to understand what was thought, said and done meant 
trying to identify the tacit premises and assumptions that made these things 
thinkable, sayable and doable.” (Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 3)  For example, by 
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describing the changes in law, philosophy of disease, medical practice etc. which 
brought about ‘The Clinic’ and it’s associated mentality, Foucault (1973) detailed “a 
precise, meticulous and scholarly tracing of the small and disperse events that 
brought something new into existence, and in doing so, irreversibly reshaped human 
ontology and ethics.” (Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 4)  
 
Foucault’s work reaffirmed Miller and Rose’s interest in these ‘small’ figures and 
events by highlighting the role they play in the contingent emergence and 
normalisation of new ways of talking, thinking and doing; in other words, their role 
in contemporary governance. Foucault additionally argued that government consists 
of “various instruments and rationalities” (Barth, 2008, p. 291, emphasis added) 
which are analytically separable and which, together, constitute government. Such a 
distinction argued that “authorities seek to embody and give effect to governmental 
ambitions” through these instruments employed by such ‘small figures’ (Rose & 
Miller, 1992, p. 175). Indeed Rose and Miller (1992, p. 175) argue that: 
[…] government is intrinsically linked to the activities of expertise, whose 
role is not of weaving an all-pervasive web of ‘social control’, but of enacting 
assorted attempts at the calculated administration of diverse aspects of 
conduct through countless, often competing, local tactics of education, 
persuasion, inducement, management, incitement, motivation and 
encouragement. 
 
For example, economic historians such as Schumpeter (1954) and Polanyi (1944) 
showed how ‘the economy’, and its associated ideas or rationality, was not an 
objective reality that was discovered, but was rather brought into existence – and 
brought into existence with the help of instruments of economic calculation: 
Economic theories, laws and concepts such as profit and loss, marginal 
returns, equilibrium, and so forth, together with their associated calculative 
technologies, did not so much describe economic life as make it possible and 
manageable. 
(Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 11) 
 
Governmentality, as defined by Miller and Rose (2008), maintains the Foucauldian 
distinction between ‘programmes’ and ‘technologies’ of government. Governmental 
programmes are the abstract and symbolic ideas that appropriate “styles of thinking, 
ways of rendering reality” in a particular way and appeal “to the nation, to virtue, to 
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what is or is not possible or desirable” (Miller & Rose, 1990, p. 6). They operate at a 
ideational or value level to legitimise behaviour by providing “varieties of 
rationality, forms of reason” (Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 16). For instance, the ideas and 
values within economic theory: Homo-economicus, the laws of supply and demand, 
market equilibrium, the invisible hand, profit maximisation etc. could all be 
considered as elements of one economically driven ‘programme’. 
 
Technologies, on the other hand, “seek to translate thought into the domain of 
reality” by their constitutive influence upon the lives of a multitude of ‘small’, non-
local actors (Miller & Rose, 1990, p. 8). They are the material instruments of 
calculation that render the domain to which government is applied as visible and 
calculable. They “reveal and construct norms and processes to which evaluations can 
be attached and upon which interventions can be targeted.” (Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 
186) For instance, GDP calculations, various profitability calculations and ratios, 
rankings based on these calculations etc. could all be considered as technologies 
which instantiate the economically driven programme noted above. Without these 
technologies, governmentality argues, the government of the population is 
impossible, for “ways of thinking” and “tools for intervening” are irreducible: 
“intimately and intricately intertwined” (Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 20).  
 
Thus, governmentality focuses attention on the “humble and mundane mechanisms 
by which authorities seek to instantiate government: techniques of notations, 
computation and calculation; procedures of examination and assessment” (Rose & 
Miller, 1992, p. 183). This focus directs attention away from the ‘large’ at the ‘top’ 
and towards the dispersed ‘small’ figures and their instruments of calculation at the 
‘bottom’: the accountants, social workers, medics, factory managers etc. (Miller & 
Rose, 1990, p. 8). As highlighted by Hoskin and Macve (1986), the notion of 
accountability and control of individuals was established not ‘at the top’, nor even by 
accountants, but instead by pedagogues through the seemingly mundane technique of 
examination. Hoskin and Macve (1986) argue that between the fourteenth and 
eighteenth centuries it was pedagogues, and not businesspeople, who developed and 
used a type of “human book-keeping [rather than product book-keeping]” (Hoskin & 
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Macve, 1986, p. 125). Such a discourse of control was enabled by the technology of 
exam grading and it was only when a single individual, George W. Whistler who was 
previously trained and worked under such an examination regime in an educational 
institute, moved into business that contemporary control and accountability for 
employees could be thought about, talked about and acted upon (ibid, pp. 130-131). 
Thus their work demonstrates how notions of accountability and control were 
translated from academia into business and, more specifically, how an accounting 
technology (pupil examination marks) shaped how Whistler, and many others after 
him, see the world in its absence: how the accounting process of pupil examination 
provides a “blueprint” through which certain things are foregrounded and thereby 
others are backgrounded (ibid, p. 131).  
 
The argument, then, is that government, and control, is manifest in these seemingly 
mundane technologies. How is it then that the efforts of these ‘small’ figures and 
their instruments constitute the programmes of government in practice? How do they 
influence, govern and seek to make their ideas real? How do they “translate thought 
into the domain of reality” (Miller & Rose, 1990, p. 8)? 
2.2.1.2 The Constitutive Nature of Instruments  
Miller and Rose (1990, p. 10) argue that “‘government’ is a congenitally failing 
operation” and therefore political programmes must be continually constructed in 
practice. Ideas do not travel or exist in and of themselves but instead must be 
continually constructed; and constructed through the effects of these discursive 
instruments (Czarniawska, 2008; Hoskin & Macve, 1986). Such instruments reify the 
symbolic values of programmes in practice by ‘constructing’ and ‘instructing’ both 
spaces and persons (Hacking, 1983; Miller & Rose, 1990, 2008). 
 
Governmentality argues that these instruments of measurement are not simply 
applied to spaces but are actively involved in constructing and creating them: in 
‘making them up’ in a certain way (Hacking, 1983; Hoskin & Macve, 1986; Rose & 
Miller, 1992). Instruments of calculation are able to inscribe reality into a form 
amenable to transportation, debate, comparison and interference (Latour & Woolgar, 
1979; Miller & Rose, 1990; Rose & Miller, 1992). For instance, the GDP of Scotland 
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is calculated as X: this X can be discussed and compared to England’s GDP, in 
London and measures taken to increase, for example, taxes on the basis of this 
information. Without an instrument to measure GDP the entity of Scotland is defined 
in a different way; for example, defined in terms of land mass or population or 
unemployment or any number of alternative measures and with alternative 
calculations. Governmentality argues that when we apply such instruments we do not 
discover pre-existing spaces, but rather construct and create them (Miller & Rose, 
1990, p. 7). The object of Scotland’s GDP makes no sense without the instrument of 
calculation which inscribes into it that particular presentation of reality. We cannot 
talk about GDP if we measure land mass. In calculating GDP we define the 
boundaries, values, characteristics and relations of the object which we seek to 
describe: we thereby construct and make ‘Scotland’ as defined by GDP ‘real’ (Rose 
& Miller, 1992).  
 
It is not only spaces that can be made up and subject to intervention, but also persons 
(Hoskin & Macve, 1986). Indeed, Miller & O’Leary (1987) document the 
construction of ‘the governable person’ where individuals are now subjected to a 
barrage of calculative instruments on their performance socially, economically, 
environmentally etc. Such instruments of calculation can pervade even the most 
private spheres of personal life and can have substantial effects in the way people 
think, talk and act (Power, 1997). For instance with calculative instruments we can 
talk of persons’ efficiency, profitability, contribution etc. and can compare this to 
other persons, to their performance last year etc. and this can cause them to feel 
pressured to perform according to a certain idea (Hoskin & Macve, 1986, p. 129).  
 
Importantly, such construction through instruments renders objects in a particular 
form which makes them “amenable to intervention and regulation.” (Miller & Rose, 
1990, p. 5) In measuring and making an object we not only define it but also can then 
compare it: compare it both to other objects and the same object over time (Hoskin & 
Macve, 1986; Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 175). Thus governmentality argues that such 
inscription into instruments:  
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[…] is itself a way of acting upon the real, a way of devising techniques for 
inscribing it in such a way as to make the domain in question susceptible to 
evaluation, calculation and intervention. 
(Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 185) 
 
This ‘making up’ of spaces and citizens through instruments provides (certain forms 
of) ‘knowledge’ and areas of ‘expertise’ for those managing such situations. Part of 
the Foucauldian inspiration is that the values embedded in such instruments are 
perceived as neutral and rational and hence government does not need to be 
constituted by force, but rather it creates citizens who willingly conform to 
normalisation against such knowledge and expertise. Accordingly government is 
“not so much a matter of imposing constraints upon citizens as of ‘making up’ 
citizens capable of bearing a kind of regulated freedom.” (Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 
174)  
 
Once persons and spaces have been ‘made up’ as amenable to intervention by 
generating knowledge about them, instruction of those spaces and persons can occur. 
Knowledge and expertise afford comparison and, as Foucault (1977) argues, one 
inherent aspect of humanity is the ability to reform and improve: to measure and 
adjust our conduct through comparison to societal norms whether in daily or 
incarcerated life. For instance, measuring Scotland’s GDP affords a comparison with 
England’s GDP and encourages the ‘poorer’ performer to imitate the ‘better’ 
performer (Espeland & Sauder, 2007). It is easy in such scenarios to take for granted 
that GDP is a goal one should be working towards. Likewise with individuals: 
measuring this week’s productivity affords a comparison to last week’s productivity, 
to this week’s productivity last year, to peers’ productivity etc. Again the reaction to 
such measures is often to attempt to ‘improve’ against them, rather than considering 
what this means and why it might, or might not, be a good thing to do in the first 
place (Foucault, 1977). 
 
In sum, it is through these forms of measurement and calculation that the ideas of 
government are constituted in practice: the government objective of ‘economic 
growth’ is enacted through the seemingly free choice to use Discounted Cash Flow 
techniques as a ‘rational’ form of knowledge (Miller & Rose, 1990). For 
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governmentality, these measures allow control without breaking the ‘freedom of 
choice’ or ‘autonomy’ which individuals perceive themselves as having: thus making 
it all the more effective (Miller & Rose, 1990, 2008). Rose and Miller (1992, p. 187) 
summarise neatly: 
Installing a calculative technology in the enterprise, in the hospital, in the 
school or in the family enjoins those within these locales to work out ‘where 
they are’, calibrate themselves in relation to ‘where they should be’, and 
devise ways of getting from one state to the other. Making people write things 
down and count them – register births, report incomes, fill in censuses – is 
itself a kind of government of them, an incitement to individuals to construe 
their lives according to such norms.  
 
Such pressure to construe one’s life according to these norms reflects the dual ability 
of calculative instruments to both construct and instruct governable persons and 
spaces (Miller & O’Leary, 1987; Miller & Power, 2013; Miller & Rose, 2008). The 
above sections have shown that it is through such instruments that governance is 
successfully constituted. However, so far we have learned little about the instruments 
themselves: how, precisely, do they help to coordinate various aspects of an 
assemblage? In other words, why are these instruments are so successful? Such 
answers are provided in the development of the notion of ‘technologies of 
government’, which has more recently been extended at the practice level into the 
idea of ‘mediating instruments’ (Miller & O’Leary, 2007). 
2.2.1.3 Mediating Instruments as Technologies of Government 
Shifting the focus from the constitution of the ‘macro’ governmental programme of 
neo-liberalism (Miller & Rose, 2008), Miller and O’Leary (2007) instead focus more 
narrowly on the construction of one particular assemblage: that of the semi-
conductor industry. They employ the term ‘mediating instruments’ to capture a more 
developed theorisation of their previously termed ‘technologies of government’ to 
focus on the characteristics of these instruments and their ability to constitute 
particular realities. 
 
They document how the market for semi-conductors is constructed through various 
instruments of capital budgeting. At various industry conferences ‘technology road 
maps’ are used to coordinate and interest the various actors and their goals: in this 
	
24	
instance some are concerned with the science behind technological development 
whilst others are concerned with the economics of coordinating a supply chain and 
selling a final product which matches customer expectations. All of these actors 
require coordinating if the market for semi-conductors is to be constructed. Miller 
and O’Leary (2007) argue that it is through instruments of capital budgeting built 
into the road maps that such coordination occurs: a certain future can be envisioned 
and activities coordinated around that vision by the “common narrative” provided by 
the instruments (Miller & Power, 2013, p. 581).  
 
Such a narrative, Miller & O’Leary (2007) argue, plays a fundamental role in the 
reification of abstract ideas in practice and thereby the construction of the semi-
conductor industry as it has come to be. Specifically, they highlight how ‘Moore’s 
Law’: a set of ideas and propositions on the future growth in capability of 
semiconductors, can only be reified in practice if these calculative instruments are 
successful in coordinating the assemblage. The instruments must bring together 
economic and technological rationalities and thereby allow the various actors within 
the assemblage to coordinate investment, scientific innovation, product development, 
supply-chain management etc. They argue that such an instrument is fundamental in 
the constitution of the market for semi-conductors: by “translating the simplified 
imperatives […] into a framework that can guide and encourage the myriad of highly 
uncertain […] decisions […] technology roadmaps operationalise Moore’s Law, and 
facilitate the process of making markets.” (Miller & O’Leary, 2007, p. 703)  
 
Their description highlights the role of these instruments in the construction of the 
semi-conductor industry. They highlight that these instruments must be able to both 
mediate between various entities and govern entities to act accordingly. It is not 
enough just to mediate, a mediating instrument must also alter the entities which it 
mediates between: it must govern them (Thomson et al., 2014). Miller and O’Leary 
(2007) show how technology roadmaps act to both construct a particular vision of 
the future and then instruct the relevant actors in order to construct that future in 




Building on the work of Norton Wise (1988), the mediating instrument concept 
outlines how instruments can act to mediate between multiple actors, domains and 
ideas by providing a common reference point or analogy. They act like a ‘boundary 
object’ as the medium through which diverse actors might communicate (Star & 
Griesemer, 1989). For example, the electric telegraph links science and the economy 
by providing an object through which the interests of both sides can be represented: 
the telegraph “projects the interests of engineering and industry into the interests of 
electromagnetic theory and vice versa” (Wise, 1988, p. 77). In other words, one can 
come to understand another’s (unknown) perspective through communication via an 
object which is familiar to both parties (Thomson, et al., 2014).  
 
Applying the notion of mediating instruments empirically demonstrates the multiple 
technologies that can act to mediate and govern between and within these 
assemblages. For instance, Kurunmäki and Miller (2011, p. 220) detail how 
accounting instruments, such as ‘pooled budgets’, linked the global “modernising 
government” initiative to the discrete localised practices of health-care practitioners. 
They show how accounting translated ideas of cooperation and partnership into the 
prevailing independent, autonomous and distinct professional groups evident in 
hospitals and illustrate how politics was linked to medical care in practice. Such 
instruments managed to mediate between the previously isolated areas of expertise 
and thereby help to construct a “common narrative” (Miller & Power, 2013, p. 581) 
around which a particular future could be envisioned: a future of cooperation and 
partnership within UK health care. Accordingly they show how medical practitioners 
were governed: how the ideas of cooperation and partnership were made to be real in 
the previously independent and autonomous practices of health-care practitioners. 
 
Likewise, although in the private sector, Jeacle and Carter (2012) detail how the 
practices of budgeting and costing combine the competing imperatives of creativity 
and commercialism. Again budgets were able to mediate in a fluid manner between 
the buyers and sellers, and their potentially conflicting goals, of a high-street fashion 
retailer. They highlight that ‘cost-conscious yet creative fashion’ is enacted through a 
mediating instrument and that this instrument is fundamentally intertwined in the 
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enactment of such a reality. The budget, for example, constrains the creativity of the 
designers with cost-consciousness. However, at the same time this cost-
consciousness is not totalitarian and the interests of fashion are also evident within 
those conscious of cost: for example the full budget is available to designers, buyers 
strive to increase the budget for design and designers are trusted by the buyers to 
deliver fashionable items on budget. Without this mediating instrument, the budget, 
such a cost-conscious and fashionable market could not be constructed as it is: 
without the budget to mediate between these two domains and ideas, fashion would 
not be cost-conscious and finance would not be fashion-conscious, thus the company 
could not construct products or an identity as cost-conscious yet fashionable. Again 
the instrument constitutes reality and governs the actors within the assemblage by 
making these ideas real. 
 
Jordan et al. (2013) highlight similar findings within risk management. They show 
that ‘risk management’ is constituted in the performance of using ‘risk maps’, which 
again act as mediating instruments between various interests. Such maps mediate and 
translate the concerns of risk into functional domains within the organization: 
thereby creating an organisation which performs, and is governed by, the idea of risk 
management. We again see how reality is constructed through the use of such 
instruments; without risk maps, one cannot envision a future where this particular 
type of risk management exists: such a future is made to exist through the effects of 
the instrument. Importantly, by focusing on how mediation is maintained in practice, 
Jordan et al. (2013) highlight that users value the instruments for different purposes 
and not necessarily for the functional expertise they provide. For instance, the risk 
maps provided a reassurance that projects were ‘on track’ (ibid, p. 171).  
 
The notion of mediating instruments being perceived as useful for qualities other 
than their technical accuracy or ‘designed’ functionality is expanded upon in 
Thomson et al. (2014). They echo Jordan et al.’s (2013) findings on performances of 
‘sustainability’ arising through calculative instruments as constituting ‘sustainable 
organisations’ and show how environmental accounting is able to enroll actors from 
diverse and multiple domains because it is perceived as “familiar” (Thomson et al., 
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2014, p. 472). Counter-intuitively, they argue that such familiarity is more important 
for mediation than the technical accuracy or functionality of the instrument. Thus, 
they suggest that accounting practices, with their inherent ability to hybridise (Miller, 
Kurunmäki & O’Leary, 2008), are particularly well suited as mediating instruments 
which both mediate and govern. 
 
In each of the above instances a particular material instrument is able to both mediate 
between multiple actors and govern these actors by making ideas real. Mediation and 
governance are two necessary characteristics required for a material instrument to be 
considered as a mediating instrument (Miller & O’Leary, 2007; Thomson et al., 
2014). Whilst other things might occur within the assemblage to help facilitate such 
mediation and governing, for instance by bringing various actors together in one 
space and time through industry-wide conferences (Miller & O’Leary, 2007) or 
various interactions at meetings (Jeacle & Carter, 2012; Jordan et al., 2013; 
Kurunmäki & Miller, 2011; Thomson et al., 2014), a mediating instrument is one 
which, firstly, acts as the medium through which these diverse parties interact and, 
secondly, alters the state of affairs to be more like the ideas which are embedded in 
it. Firstly, a mediating instrument must be a material instrument which translates the 
imperatives and interests of one party into terms understandable by another party 
(Miller & O’Leary, 2007; Wise, 1988). Meetings may facilitate such mediation but 
the instrument should act as the medium through which these translations occur. 
Secondly, it must govern and influence those interested actors to act in a way which 
constitutes in practice the ideas embedded in the instrument: whether this is Moore’s 
Law (Miller & O’Leary, 2007), participative health-care (Kurunmäki & Miller, 
2011) or risk management (Jordan et al., 2013). A mediating instrument is one which 
should not only describe but actually govern and thereby constitute reality (Thomson 
et al., 2014). 
 
The above work highlights the multiple accounting practices which can operate as 
mediating instruments, including: environmental accounting hybrids (Thomson et al., 
2014); capital budgeting practices embedded in ‘technology road-maps’ (Miller & 
O’Leary, 2007); ‘pooled’ (Kurunmäki & Miller, 2011) or traditional budgets (Jeacle 
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& Carter, 2012) and ‘risk maps’ (Jordan et al., 2013). Why is it, then, that accounting 
is seemingly so able to mediate and govern? 
2.2.1.4 Accounting as a particularly well-suited mediating 
instrument 
Given that accounting is perhaps one of the most pervasive forms of rationality and 
one of the most taken for granted aspects of organising (Bromley & Powell, 2012), it 
is perhaps unsurprising to see the number of studies that show accounting as an 
instrument which is particularly well suited to the governance of individuals in both 
corporate and private life. But what makes it so pervasive as a governing 
mechanism?  
 
Accounting practices seem particularly adept at describing, measuring, computing, 
comparing and calculating (Miller & Rose, 1990, p. 5): at translating realities into a 
single figure (Miller, 2001). They make “the incomparable comparable” by “turning 
qualities (e.g. the quality of healthcare or the decency of imprisonment) into 
quantities, through devices such as patient satisfaction questionnaires, rankings […] 
balanced scorecards, and much else besides.” (Mennicken & Miller, 2012, pp. 7-8)  
Such inscription makes accounting instruments and their outputs easily transportable 
and comparable: as prime candidates to enable ‘action at a distance’ (Preston, Chua 
& Neu, 1997; Robson, 1992). Indeed they can seemingly influence actors across 
international boundaries (Cruz et al., 2011; Mennicken, 2008) or where the 
assemblage is incomplete or ‘interrupted’ (Dambrin & Robson, 2011).  
 
Commensuration seems to enhance the perception of objectivity: accounting is 
perceived as neutral and rational, “a facticity that appears objective and 
unchallengeable, beyond the fray of politics or mere opinion.” (Miller & O’Leary, 
2007, p. 559) Accounting also provides actors with visual and graphical elements 
that ‘engage the user’ and provide a perception of functionality or usefulness; it 
allows them to do things (Busco & Quattrone, 2014; Jordan et al., 2013; Millo & 
MacKenzie, 2009). Additionally, accounting seems to be able to bring together and 
mediate conflicting programmes or ideas in a productive manner, particularly, for 
	
29	
example, those of creativity and control (Chenhall, Kallunki & Silvola, 2011; Davila, 
Foster & Oyon, 2009; Jeacle & Carter, 2012; Moll, 2015; Mundy, 2010).  
 
Counter intuitively, one of the main characteristics that allows accounting to govern 
is its ability to be governed itself: to be altered and ‘adapted locally’ (Cruz et al., 
2011, p. 95) or to ‘hybridise’ with existing areas of expertise (Miller et al., 2008, p. 
952). In other words, in order to govern and change others, accounting must itself be 
open to change. For example, Mennicken (2008, p. 42) documents how the 
“ambiguity” of accounting standards was one of their strengths within a globalisation 
project: their abstract nature meant they could “embrace a variety of meanings and 
interpretations and, thereby, make the standards attractive to a wide range of people 
and institutions.” Similarly, Chua (1995) and Dambrin and Robson (2011) comment 
on the strength of ‘imperfect,’ ‘flawed approximations,’ and ‘ambivalence and 
opacity' which contribute to users having ‘faith’ in costing or performance 
measurement practices. This interpretability and imperfection of accounting numbers 
allows them to be perceived as accurate, but more importantly, for them to be 
perceived as useful (Millo & MacKenzie, 2009).  
 
These characteristics highlight how actors enroll into the “common narrative” of 
accounting with relative ease, and outlines why it is so successful as an instrument 
that links a multitude of different actors, domains and ideas and can influence them 
(Miller & O’Leary, 2007; Miller & Power, 2013, p. 581). However, in broadening 
the focus outside of studies of governmentality to accounting in practice, we see, in 
the above sections, the heterogeneous ways in which actors respond to accounting 
(Busco & Quattrone, 2014). We see that what is reified in practice is not universal 
and varies. Because of the “vagueness” or “level of abstraction” required of the 
instrument to enrol such diversity (Mennicken, 2008, p. 386), the ideas embedded in 
the instrument are interpreted differently or “hybridise” as they are enacted in 
practice (Mennicken, 2008 pp. 410-411; Miller et al., 2008, pp. 944-945). Such 
translation causes a “multiplicity of roles, concepts and practices” to emerge 
(Mennicken, 2008, p. 389). Similarly, there is a temporal dimension which means 
that such interpretations occur repeatedly: over and over again and again. Once an 
	
30	
instrument has been implemented we must remember it is constantly translated 
(Czarniawska, 2008). That is to say, of course, that people also influence instruments 
(Miller et al., 2008): even after such instruments have been ‘implemented’ and a new 
‘system’ is in place, people still influence and alter them (Wagner et al., 2011). 
Practice is heterogeneous, multiple and continuously unfolding (Czarniawska, 2008; 
Mol, 2002). Thus we can question whether, or rather when, why and how, 
governance occurs and when, why and how it does not. 
 
Governmentality, as Thomson et al. (2014 pp. 470-471) argue, has often conflated 
mediation and governance and thereby assumed or studied governance as a 
successful outcome where mediation occurs: e.g. neo-liberalism as existing (Rose & 
Miller, 1992), the modern government that is cooperative-driven (Kurunmäki & 
Miller, 2011), cost-conscious-and-fashionable design (Jeacle & Carter, 2012), 
companies who do manage risk (Jordan et al., 2013) etc. As such it has overlooked 
such variation in individual responses as governing unfolds. The mechanisms of 
governing are different to those of mediation, have often been overlooked and 
therefore require further analysis (Thomson et al., 2014, p. 471). If we are to 
understand how governing works we need to understand such variation: a mediating 
instrument might be successful in facilitating discussion, but if nothing happens as a 
result of this discussion then the instrument fails to construct the reality which it 
describes – it fails to govern. Thus there remains a concern with the ability of 
mediating instruments to create the world they purport to describe: in other words, 
with their ‘performativity’ (MacKenzie, 2007). Conveniently, the notion of 
performativity, upon which the mediating instruments idea was originally explicitly 
built (Miller & Rose, 2010), provides a typology to categorise such variation of 
individual responses and thereby capture governing as a contingent and emergent 
process, rather than an outcome. 
2.2.1.5 Performativity 
The notion of performativity is closely tied to the constitutive ability of instruments 
as outlined in Governmnetality. The initial idea proposes that certain illocutionary 
acts do not describe a pre-existing reality but rather bring that reality into being. For 
instance, Austin (1962, p. 47) outlines that in uttering the phrase “I apologise” an 
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apology is constituted.  Without such an utterance there can be no apology; the 
apology would not exist. Thus, in governmentality’s terms, the act of apologising 
constitutes and constructs the apology: like the act of managing through calculating 
GDP constitutes a neo-liberal idea in practice.  
 
What the performativity notion adds to governmentality is the “conditions of 
felicity” (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 73) which influence how effective the act is at 
constituting reality. In other words performativity has more concern with 
understanding the processes by which instruments create realities than it does with 
the outcomes of these instruments’ use (see Millo & MacKenzie, 2003). Thus this 
notion can be adopted into governmentality to extend the theorisation of the process 
of govering and to conceptualise the multiple and varied responses actors have to the 
prescriptions of accounting (Thomson et al., 2014, p. 471). By focusing at the 
practice level, performativity presents a typology of how various things can be 
performative to different degrees. For instance, it would be easy to undermine an 
apology by employing a sarcastic tone. Under such circumstances an apology would 
not be said to have been constructed. Similarly, the Queen may be able to 
performatively name a ship at a formal opening ceremony, but a ship-yard worker at 
the same ceremony would struggle to do so (Austin, 1962, p. 23). Likewise, only a 
priest (for sake of argument) can performatively pronounce a couple as ‘married’ 
(Revellino & Mouritsen, 2015, p. 33). Without the formal dress, music, material 
settings and associated entities making up the assemblage of a ‘wedding’, a priest, 
for example, would fail to marry two strangers who were commuting to work on a 
bus. Thus things can be performative to different degrees depending on the particular 
conditions within the assemblage.  
 
MacKenzie (2007, pp. 55-56) describes these possible variations as showing various 
levels of ‘effective performativity’. ‘Generic performativity’ describes situations 
where theories and instruments are merely used by actors, with little effect upon the 
reality which they describe. ‘Effective performativity’, on the other hand, describes 
situations where such instruments, firstly, make a difference (i.e. the situation would 
be different without their use) and, secondly, make the situation more like their 
	
32	
depiction by such instruments. Finally, ‘counter performativity’ describes the 
opposite: situations where these instruments make a situation less like their 
depiction. In other words these typologies describe increasingly effective forms of 
governance where the constructed reality increasingly reflects the ideas embedded in 
the instrument. For instance, building on his previous work (MacKenzie & Millo, 
2003), MacKenzie (2007) documents how option-pricing was made to demonstrate 
effective performativity as options began to behave increasingly like the underlying 
theory embedded in the pricing model. MacKenzie (2007) argues such effective 
performativity was engendered by various actors translating the ideas into the 
necessary domains by, for example, teaching the theory to students of finance or 
providing stock-brokers with ‘sheets’ of option-prices based on the model. 
 
What the performativity literature adds to governmentality is the need to study the 
conditions in which effective performativity arises and the conditions in which it 
does not (Revellino & Mouritsen, 2015, p. 47). In other words, we need to theorise 
the moderating factors which impact upon the effective performativity of a mediating 
instrument: what causes effective governance and what causes increasing adaptation 
until the mediating instrument no longer governs at all, until it has no performative 
effect upon reality? When, why and how do mediating instruments govern? When, 
why and how do they not? And how can we explain the factors which moderate the 
multiple variations in between? 
2.2.1.6 Summary of Governmnetality, Research Gaps & 
Research Questions 
The above sections provide a literature review on accounting studies, particularly 
those inspired by governmentality and the notion of mediating instruments. The 
purpose of this review is to outline the emergence of the concepts and the current 
understanding within this field in order to highlight the relevant gaps into which the 
research questions fit. 
 
Firstly, Section 2.2.1.1 outlines how contemporary government can be distinguished 
analytically into symbolic ideas and material technologies (Miller & Rose, 1990). 
Section 2.2.1.2 details how such technologies constitute ideas of government in 
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practice (Rose & Miller, 1992) through constructing and instructing spaces and 
persons (Hoskin & Macve, 1986; Miller & O’Leary, 1987). Such measurements 
provide knowledge and expertise against which persons feel motivated, induced, 
compelled, pressurised and incited to respond to: to ‘improve’ (Foucault, 1977; Rose 
& Miller, 1992, p. 175). Such a theorisation provides the core argument of 
governmentality. However, in order to build such a theorisation, these studies, 
necessarily, analysed situations where governance is the outcome: where the 
assemblage is aligned in the manner desired by those governing. For example, where 
“principles are disseminated out […] into the field of […] practice” (Hoskin & 
Macve, 1986, p. 127, emphasis added), the existence of neo-liberalism (Rose & 
Miller, 1992), modern governments which are cooperative and partnership driven 
(Kurunmäki & Miller, 2011), fashion companies which are innovative and cost-
conscious (Jeacle & Carter, 2012) or companies who do employ seemingly 
acceptable risk management practices (Jordan et al., 2013) all show assemblages 
which have been aligned: where governance is the outcome. Thus we learn little 
about governing – about the process through which effective governance is 
constructed, or not. 
 
However, as we look at work which questions why accounting is so suited to govern 
social and organisational life, it becomes apparent that much variation exists in 
practice. For instance, in order for a mediating instrument to mediate between 
multiple actors, domains and ideas and thereby govern (see Section 2.2.1.3 and 
Miller & O’Leary, 2007) it must remain indifferent: in between difference. It must 
not reduce or eliminate difference but fully mediate between such difference2. Thus 
such variation of governance requires unpacking: we cannot treat governance as an 
outcome but must explore the process (Moll & Hoque, 2011) of governing. 
 
Such a gap provides the space in which the first research question of this project 
arises. By exploring governing: how governance comes to be, this thesis contributes 
by clarifying the process of governance. It thus distinguishes such a process from 
																																																								
2 Thanks to Professor Paolo Quattrone for highlighting this issue and its conceptual 
importance within the mediating instrument concept. 
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that of mediation (Thomson et al., 2014, p. 471). In focusing on governance as a 
process, the first question to ask is outlined by the first research question: 
 
Research Question 1: How do actors respond to a mediating instrument? 
 
As suggested by the fluidity of accounting (see Section 2.2.1.4), we expect to see 
multiple responses to such attempts at governance, rather than a successful governed 
assemblage as a homogeneous outcome. Recent developments in performativity, 
particularly the notion of ‘effective performativity’ (MacKenzie, 2007, pp. 55-56), 
provide a conceptualisation of such responses. Specifically, they are conceptualised 
as varying in the degree to which the mediating instrument is able to engender 
effective performativity and thereby govern (see Section 2.2.1.6). Such a line of 
enquiry highlights the second research gap to which this thesis contributes: the 
conditions under which effective performativity occurs, the conditions under which it 
does not and the conditions in between (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 73; Revellino & 
Mouritsen, 2015, p. 47). Thus we come to ask what factors moderate the effective 
governance of mediating insturments in the second research question: 
 
Research Question 2: What factors moderate actors’ responses to these instruments? 
 
In order to theorise the factors which moderate the effective performativity of a 
mediating instrument a second lens is required, as argued in Sections 1.1 and 2.1, to 
conceptualise how actors make sense of these instruments and their prescriptions. In 
treating governance as an outcome, governmentality lacks theorization at a cognitive 
micro-level of the moderating factors which influence variation. One such theory of 
framing is provided by Institutional Theory, and the institutional logics perspective, 
which are outlined below. This additional lens extends the theorisation of the 
problem and presents a third research gap to which this thesis contributes; which is 




2.3 Institutional Theory, Logics & Enactment 
2.3.1 Institutional Theory 
Like governmentality, Institutional Theory is inherently interested in “themes of 
control and coordination” (Fiss, 2008, p. 189): in “how enduring features of social 
life […] act as mechanisms of social control” (Lawrence et al., 2009, p. i). However, 
it is more interested in these enduring features, or ‘institutions’, and the effect they 
have on sense making (Ocasio, 1999) than in the mechanisms and instruments of 
social control themselves: as governmentality is. Building on the cultural turn in 
sociology (Bourdieu, 1977; Foucault, 1977; Giddens, 1979, 1984; Granovetter, 
1985), new-institutional sociology questioned if the rationality and utility-
maximisation function that underpinned extant theories of organising could explain 
how organisations made sense of and acted in, their worlds (Greenwood et al., 2008, 
p. 3).  
 
The seminal work of Meyer and Rowan (1977) sparked such debates by theorising 
that rather than organisations responding to some objective and universal rationality, 
they actually conformed to “rationalised myths” which emerged from the 
“institutional context” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 346, emphasis added). Such myths 
nonetheless can create “binding […] powerful institutional rules […] beyond the 
discretion of any individual participant.” (ibid, p. 344) and become seemingly 
“inexorable” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 148). Such ‘rules’ lead to organisational 
responses that are directed at increasing legitimacy, by conforming to the 
institutional rationality, rather than for technical or functional purposes (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977). For instance, the pervasiveness of measuring a country’s performance 
through GDP, institutionalists would argue, is a reflection not of its technical or 
functional usefulness, but of the taken-for-granted perspective that such 
measurement is a legitimate and rational way to organise: therefore alternatives 
require, at the very least, additional justification for why they too are rational.  
 
Tolbert and Zucker (1983, p. 35) demonstrate this concept empirically by detailing 
how early adopters of hiring practices in municipal reforms were based on “merit” 
whereas later adopters were based more on the “legitimacy of the procedures 
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themselves.” In other words, they show how hiring practices became rule-like, taken 
for granted or institutionalised as they were adopted. Legitimacy and rationality 
become defined by these rule systems and thus they are difficult to break; institutions 
define how people see the world, often to the point that “alternatives can become 
literally unthinkable” (Zucker, 1983, p. 5). Thus institutional theory highlights that 
actors’ sense making is conditioned by these institutionally defined rules and that 
they do things that are taken for granted: that are done to satisfy taken for granted 
institutional pressures.  
 
Accordingly actors seriously struggle to become reflexive and make sense of a 
situation under an alternative set of rules (Thornton et al., 2012). Such power should 
not be underestimated since this rationality can pervade even when persons are 
themselves physically harmed. For example the Stockholm Syndrome describes 
situations where people held against their will begin to sympathise with their captors 
(Ochberg & Soskis, 1982). Likewise there are repeated instances of victims blaming 
themselves for the cause of another person sexually assaulting them (Bohmer & 
Parrot, 1993, p. 19) or of inflicting domestic abuse upon them (Baly, 2010). These 
situations highlight how rationality is socially defined and how actors make sense of 
their world according to these socialised perspectives: regardless of how seemingly 
irrational they seem to others outside that perspective. 
 
However, whilst rationality and legitimacy might be institutionally defined and 
thereby render alternatives as  “literally unthinkable” (Zucker, 1983, p. 5), this does 
not mean that alternatives do not exist. Indeed other institutionally defined 
rationalities do exist, and can be constructed in drastically different ways 
(Czarniawska, 2008). For instance, Fligstein’s (1985, 1987, 1990) work on the 
changing backgrounds of executives highlights how notions of manufacturing, sales 
and finance compete as alternative ways to organise large corporations. Fligstein’s 
work not only accentuates how these ‘rules’ influence cognition, but also highlights 
how differing rules can exist within one organisation. However, such multiplicity of 
rules creates a conundrum for institutionalists: how do alternatives present 
themselves if these forces are so strong as to be inexorable or to make alternatives 
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unthinkable? In other words how can actors have any reflexivity or ‘embedded 
agency’ under such conditions (DiMaggio, 1988; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Seo & 
Creed, 2008)? 
 
In order to provide a satisfactory answer to such a critique a renewed theorisation 
was required which (re)built a holistic theory to explain such embedded agency 
without using the idea of ‘exogenous shocks’ (Clemens & Cook, 1999) or of some 
‘hero entrepreneur’ (DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 2001). Such a theorisation is 
provided by the institutional logics perspective which presents neither an under-
socialised view by conceptualising actors as having mindless cognition (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1991), nor an over-socialised view by conceptualising them as “cultural 
dopes” (Creed, Scully & Austin, 2002, p. 494; Parsons, 1937).  
2.3.2 The Institutional Logics Perspective 
2.3.2.1 Origins & Core Arguments 
The institutional logics perspective (Thornton et al., 2012) takes as its departure 
Friedland and Alford’s (1991) notion of society as an ‘interinstitutional system’. 
Such a conceptualisation presents society as composed of multiple ‘institutional 
orders’ which provide varying, often conflicting, prescriptions of ‘rational’ and 
‘legitimate’ behaviour from alternative and distinct value systems, or institutional 
‘logics’, which actors associate with. Thus, in their thesis, “the notion of institutional 
contradiction is vital.” (Friedland & Alford, 1991, p. 241) Such contradiction 
provides a conceptualisation of institutions as both enabling and constraining as 
actors are both influenced by and can themselves influence institutions, thereby 
helping to theorise the heterogeneity which neo-institutional sociology struggles 
with. 
 
Such value systems arise from seven key ‘institutional orders’: the market, 
corporation, profession, state, family, religion and community (Thornton et al., 2012, 
p. 73 and see Table 1 below). Each order conditions actors’ sense making in a 
particular direction by providing distinct sources of authority, legitimacy, identity 
and bases of attention, strategy etc. For instance, the market order is faceless, self-
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interested and aims to increase efficiency or profit. In contrast, the community order 
provides a focus on emotional connection, is interested in collective membership and 
aims to increase the status and honour of members. Thus an actor embedded in the 
market order has a differing perspective to that of an actor embedded in the 
community order: they will prioritise, rationalise, legitimise, problematise, act, think 
and make sense of the world differently because of the value system in which they 
have been socialised (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012). Where such 
socialisation into an order is effective, as noted above, “alternatives can become 
literally unthinkable” (Zucker, 1983, p. 5). In other words, actors can literally not 
comprehend alternative rationalities, legitimacies, problematisations or sense making 
because they seem irrational, illegitimate, unproblematic or nonsensical. It is through 
socialisation that these orders and value systems can become seemingly inexorable 
and so powerful (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 148). Thus institutionalists argue that 
actors can be socialised even to the point of blaming themselves for crimes others 
have committed against them. 
 
Whilst Friedland and Alford (1991) provide the concept and initial five orders, 
Thornton (2004) and Thornton et al. (2012) extend the perspective by providing, 
respectively, the sixth and seventh orders and thus highlighting, as they argue, the 
sources and value systems for sense making in contemporary society: 
Institutional logics represent frames of reference that condition actors’ 
choices for sensemaking, the vocabulary they use to motivate action, and 
their sense of self and identity. 
(Thornton et al., 2012, p. 2)  
 
Additionally, Thornton et al. (2012, p. 73) conceptualise such a typology into “ideal 
types” which present the characteristics and distinctiveness of each institutional 





Table 1: The Interinstitutional System Ideal Types (adapted from Thornton et 
al., 2012, p. 73) 
The second core tenet of the institutional logics perspective deriving from Friedland 
and Alford’s (1991, p. 256) conceptualisation is that of the explicitly socially 
constructed nature of institutional orders, logics and rationality (Lawrence et al., 
2009; Scott, 1985; Quattrone, 2015). Such an epistemology highlights the “near 
decomposability” of each order which conceptualises how multiple localised ‘logics’ 
can be constructed from either within one single order or across multiple orders 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991, p. 257). For example, research has highlighted such 
localised logics as: medical professionalism and business-like health care logics 
within Canadian healthcare (Reay & Hinings, 2005); trustee and performance logics 
within American mutual funds (Lounsbury, 2007); editorial and market logics in 
higher education publishing (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999); social responsibility and 
market logics in a global brewery group (Christiansen & Lounsbury, 2013); 
manifestations of market and community logics within Llyods of London reinsurance 
trading (Smets et al., 2015); creativity and commercialism logics within a high-street 
fashion retailer (Jeacle & Carter, 2012) etc. Each of these logics provides actors with 
a different source of legitimacy, authority, identity and bases of attention, strategy, 
norms etc. which condition their sense of rationality, of sense making and of 
belonging (Friedland & Alford, 1991). These logics provide actors with a symbolic 
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value system which gives meaning to their life, to their choices and frames how they 
make sense of the world (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Thornton et al., 2012, p. 10). 
 
The third and final core tenet of the institutional logics perspective inspired by 
Friedland and Alford’s (1991) social constructionist epistemology is the 
conceptualisation of these logics as simultaneously material and symbolic. Thornton 
et al. (2012, p. 10) note that, by “material aspects of institutions, we refer to 
structures and practices; by symbolic aspects, we refer to ideation and meaning, 
recognising that the symbolic and the material are intertwined and constitutive of one 
another.” Such a distinction, as outlined below, allows a conceptualisation of how 
symbolic value systems are translated, rather than diffused, into practice: that logics 
are “refracted through context and individual experience” (Dacin, Munir & Tracey, 
2010, p. 1414). Such a conceptualisation presents a theory of how change and 
variation can occur within an institutionalised field; since “institutional contradiction 
is vital” within the logics perspective this provides actors with multiple framings of 
legitimacy and rationality as they enact symbolic logics in practice (Friedland & 
Alford, 1991, p. 241; Quattrone, 2015). 
 
By explicitly developing a conceptualisation of society as a socially constructed, 
material and symbolic and inter-institutional system of logics, Friedland and Alford 
(1991) set the stage for what would later become one of the most prevalent lenses for 
exploring organisational action (Greenwood et al., 2008, p. 2). Accordingly, the 
logics perspective presents a number of contributions that help to theorise the 
research questions of this thesis. Specifically, outlining how ideas come to be made 
real in practices and how, once realised, these ideas can influences one’s perspective 
and be used to influence the perspective of others. Accordingly, the following 
sections detail: (i) how symbolic logics condition actors’ sense making, (ii) how 
actors can use these symbolic logics agentically to condition the sense making of 
others and (iii) that despite these findings, logics must be continually constructed and 
maintained in practice.  
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2.3.2.2 Logics in Action 
2.3.2.2.1 Logics Shape Actors’ Sensemaking 
Firstly, a plethora of research documents the ability of logics in their symbolic form 
to shape cognition and sense making. Thornton et al. (2012, p. 84) highlight that 
actors who are embedded in a logic perceive the world through that lens: they 
actively look for salient aspects of any new situation in relation to their existing 
understanding, only activating those elements which they see as being salient and 
ignoring those which they do not. As detailed above, in Section 2.3.1, actors can be 
socialised into a value system which even makes them believe they are the cause of 
their own trauma: where such socialisation is successful, actors are unable to activate 
a sense that their own physical harm is not their fault. Such institutionalisation 
reflects the history of the logics perspective within Institutional Theory. 
 
Socialisation not only affects cognition but also material practice: where actors make 
sense of the world in different ways, different outcomes arise as individuals act on 
these perceptions of legitimate and rational behaviour. For example Lounsbury 
(2007) details how the symbolic values of trustee and performance logics competed 
within the mutual fund industry. Under the traditional trustee logic prevalent in 
Boston, prudence and conservatism were key values of fund managers’ actions and 
thus funds were managed in a passive and restrained manner. However, fund 
managers on Wall Street did not ascribe to this value system of conservatism and 
were instead interested in performance and growth. Despite on-going contestation, 
the New York managers were able to maintain their value system of actively seeking 
what the Boston managers would describe as ‘excessive’ growth. Thus the New 
York fund managers were able to make real their symbolic value system and 
eventually established not only actively-managed growth funds, but a whole host of 
varied funds which conflicted with the trustee logic of conservatism (Lounsbury & 
Crumley, 2007, p. 1003). Here we again see the simultaneously material and 
symbolic nature of logics; as these fund managers enacted a performance logic in 
their practices of actively managing funds in New York, their material actions 
provided a sense of symbolic legitimacy to others who were similarly interested. 
These practices constructed a value system of active management and seeking 
	
42	
growth which could itself be drawn upon by others to legitimise similar behaviour. In 
other words the idea becomes institutionalised and can then institutionalise others: 
convinced of its legitimacy, they too reify this idea in their practices. 
 
Similarly, Rao, Monin and Durand (2003) outline how identity movements affected 
the practices and outputs of chefs in French cuisine through the institutionalisation of 
a new logic. By altering chefs’ identities through the ‘nouvelle cuisine movement’, 
the prevailing symbolic values and material practices of classic cuisine were usurped 
as chefs identified with the new movement. The ‘nouvelle cuisine movement’ 
eventually established itself and altered the sense making of French chefs to abandon 
classical cuisine and its associated practices in favour of more ‘contemporary’ 
values. Again we see actors being convinced of the legitimacy of a certain value 
system and then enacting these symbolic values in their subsequent practice. 
 
Conversely, Muzio and Faulconbridge (2013) document how the idea of ‘One Firm’, 
as a consistent application of practices, failed to materialise as an accounting firm 
attempted to enter a new Italian market. They document how the practices of 
auditing within the Italian firms were so ingrained that the ‘One Firm’ model of 
standardisation was made sense of with negative connotations and strongly resisted. 
Local auditors refused to alter their practices despite these institutional pressures and 
the attempts of such ‘institutional entrepreneurs’. Eventually the initiative was 
scrapped and the accounting firm failed to secure market share within the new 
market. 
 
Whilst an alternative value system can eventually usurp the institutionalised local 
logic, as in the first two cases, or ultimately fail to make any impact, as in the third 
case, such singularity is not always the outcome. Indeed Muzio, Block and Suddaby 
(2013, p. 703) outline research recognising the coexistence and hybridisation of 
multiple logics within one profession. Likewise McPherson & Sauder (2013) 
highlight various logics which coexist within a drug court and which actors can draw 
on to different degrees, at different times and to different ends. Similarly, 
Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) outline how, in the ‘Big 5’ Canadian Accounting 
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Firms, exposure to multiple logics through clients within one location unexpectedly 
increased awareness of alternative options, rather than engendering conflicts, and 
thus reduced the constraining effects of the extant logic. As actors became better at 
dealing with complexity they became less embedded in the prevailing logic and were 
more able to consider alternatives as legitimate. Accordingly they were able to 
interact with actors who were embedded in alternative logics in a more meaningful 
way since they were more able to understand this alternative perspective.  
 
Whilst such studies highlight how logics shape cognition and how such framing 
influences practice, they also highlight the socially constructed nature of logics in 
their multiplicity and variation. Such variation hints at how actor’s are not cultural 
dopes (Seo & Creed, 2002) but instead inhabit institutions (Hallett & Ventresca, 
2006) and can actively use their symbolic value systems like a cultural toolkit to their 
own ends (Swidler, 1986). The following section comments on this notion in more 
detail. 
2.3.2.2.2 Actors Use Logics to Influence Others 
More recent work drawing on the institutional logics perspective has begun to 
unpack more precisely how it is that symbolic logics come to influence outcomes 
and how actors use symbolic logics to persuade others to act in the way they desire. 
Particularly by focusing on individuals ‘at the coalface’ or ‘on the ground’ and how 
symbolic logics are used in the process (Barley, 2008; McPherson & Sauder, 2013 
respectively). 
 
For instance, Zilber (2006) documents how actors manipulate symbols and practices 
to their own ends. She outlines (2006, p. 298) that cultural myths are translated into 
action in the Israeli high-tech industry by various individuals and highlights that 
“rational myths […] should be understood as comprising a “tool kit” (Swidler, 
1986): they are rhetorical and symbolic resources that social actors use and interpret 
dynamically rather than a given and objective reality in an institutional 
environment.” More recently, Zilber (2009) outlines how story telling between 
members in an Israeli rape-crisis centre acted to translate feminist and therapeutic 
logics into the lives of individuals. The stories translated these macro-level 
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institutional framings into sensemaking processes which affected the understandings, 
and actions, of the other members of the rape-crises centre. Such stories acted as 
rhetorical devices which were used strategically to persuade and convince others to 
act in a certain way. Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) also focus on rhetorical 
strategies and show how these underpin actors’ theorisations of appropriate 
organizational structures through a contested change initiative for the Big 5 
Accounting firms. Likewise, Willie Ocasio, a founding father of the logics 
perspective, recently (Ocasio, Loewenstein & Nigam, 2015) reiterated the 
importance of communication and language in constituting the material elements of 
logics in practice. In sum, the value systems of logics can be employed in rhetorical 
strategies in order to persuade and convince others to act in a manner which 
existentially or instrumentally benefits the initial actors (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; 
Thornton et al., 2012).  
 
McPherson & Sauder (2013) outline this process of persuasion in their ethnographic 
account of the workings of a drug court. Echoing Zilber (2006) they show how the 
symbolic aspects of multiple logics are drawn upon by actors like a cultural tool kit. 
Where successful, actors are able to persuade others to change their position by 
affecting sense making processes. For example they document how various actors 
employ the symbolic elements of rehabilitation and criminal logics to influence the 
decision of the other members by framing the discussion according to these logics. 
Interestingly they document how actor’s who ‘hijack’ the logic of those they are 
persuading are seemingly more able to influence the outcome in the direction they 
desire. Such findings hint at the ability of skilled actors to not only successfully 
manage multiple logics and understand plural framings, but also to use these 
framings to persuade others to act in a certain way (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). 
 
Such skill and capability is also reflected in Smets et al.’s (2015) account of 
reinsurance trading in Lloyds of London. They theorise a model which explains how 
actors manage this institutional complexity to their advantage. Firstly such skilled 
actors are able to segment the community and business logics so as to understand the 
different prescriptions of each. For example, Smets et al. (2015) document how a 
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broker is chastised in front of his peers for over-favouring a community logic by 
helping out a friend when the margins and future benefits were perceived as 
insufficient to justify the deal from a business logic perspective. Secondly, brokers 
bridge between the community and market logics to generate complementarities for 
both; for example by doing business favours for friends and receiving them in return. 
Finally, actors fluidly demarcate between the logics so as to decide on the relative 
prominence to give each in each situation; for example, in the example above 
demarcation had been unsuccessful. They conceptualise these three processes as like 
separate logics on two sides of a river, with a bridge between them and an elastic 
band fixed to the middle of the bridge which attempts to prevent actors from stepping 
off either end and over-privileging one logic over the other. They suggest that such a 
model explains how these skilled actors are able to successfully manage multiple 
logics and how such management leads to benefits by sustaining the complementary-
yet-conflicting nature of multiple perspectives. 
 
As well as highlighting how logics use actors to their advantage to become real, we 
see above how actors use logics to their own advantage to gain support. Indeed, 
skilled actors are able to draw on and work with multiple logics in order to: translate 
(Czarniawska, 2008); edit (Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008); re-label (Gioia, Corley & 
Hamilton, 2013; Mazza, Sahlin-Andersson & Strandgaard Pederson, 2005); reshape 
meanings of (Lawrence, 1999; Rao, 2004; Rao, Morrill & Zald 2000) and transform 
(Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010) the various symbolic elements of institutional logics 
into the practices of other actors. Such a dualism occurs from the conceptualization 
of society as an inter-instutitutional system and of the material and symbolic nature 
of reality. This theorisation reiterates the socially constructed nature of rationality 
and of reality, highlighting that logics are not a pre-existing and objective reality ‘out 
there’ but must be continually constructed by the actions of individuals.  
2.3.2.2.3 Work to Make Logics Real 
Whilst the above sections have mostly presented logics as a pre-existing ‘force’ 
which socialises actors under different rationalities or which are used by actors in 
rhetorical strategies, this has merely been to outline how they influence actors’ sense 
making as symbolic value systems which others draw upon and present. These value 
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systems are socially constructed and are ‘taught’ over time (Zucker, 1977), as 
governmentality has shown (Miller & Rose, 2008). They do not exist in and of 
themselves (Czarniawska, 2008). Measuring GDP is not a ‘natural’ thing to do: it is 
the result of a significant amount of work to problematise and promote certain value 
systems and maintain them as existing within an assemblage. Similar levels of work 
are required to make symbolic logics real in practice (Lawrence et al., 2009). 
 
Specifically, this work is undertaken by individual persons in their actions (Lawrence 
& Suddaby, 2006) and is usually “nearly invisible and often mundane” (Lawrence et 
al., 2009, p.1). Whilst the symbolic values informing an institutional logic have the 
ability to influence how actors make sense of the world, logics only exist and persist 
when they are enacted in practice: when they are material (Lawrence et al., 2009; 
Quattrone, 2015; Scott, 1985; Thornton et al., 2012). In other words, a market logic 
only exists when actors enact in material practice the symbolic ideas of the market 
logic: for example by choosing to focus on maximising profit at the expense of 
environmental or social considerations. If actors choose instead to focus on 
environmental or social aims at the expense of profit, then they do not reify the 
symbolic values of the market logic and it therefore fails to exist in this particular 
assemblage and moment. Accordingly it then fails to exert symbolic pressures upon 
others within that particular assemblage.  
 
For instance, Trenk and Washington (2009, p. 237) document how a regulatory body, 
the AACSB university accreditation and ranking agency, sought to reinforce the 
symbolic foundations of both the quality of its own accreditation system and also the 
wider accreditation field in which it was embedded through various discursive 
mechanisms of self-promotion. Such promotion for instrumental or existential gains 
is a typical strategy where benefit to one party can occur from persuading others that 
their sense making is legitimate, or the most rational (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). 
However not all the others perfectly “reflected” the aspirations of the regulatory 
body and alternative forms of accreditation were enacted in some business schools 
(Trenk & Washington, 2009, p. 255). In other words the AACSB’s coercive power 
and ability was insufficient in certain assemblages to construct the logic in practice: 
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in some instances we see reification of the value system, but in others we do not. 
Whilst they highlight such variation we learn little about what is driving it: about the 
factors which moderate whether the value system is reified or not.  
 
Building on these ideas, Dacin et al. (2010) theorise the micro-processes through 
which such construction occurs as the symbolic ideas of logics are made real in 
practice by individuals. They detail, at an individual level, how institutions come to 
be constructed in practice and thereby highlight how such variation arises. They 
show that through the rituals of Oxford University ‘high-dining’ the British Class 
System is reified in the practices of university students. For example, waiters have 
been known to chastise new students for smoking since this is not something that 
they (as members of the ‘elite’ upper class) should be doing whilst dining (Dacin et 
al., 2010, p. 1408). Such a micro-focus highlights how individuals come to make 
symbolic logics real through seemingly mundane practices. Additionally it 
illuminates the vast number of individuals involved in maintaining institutional 
arrangements and highlights the scope for variation as actors ‘interpret’ these 
prescriptions. Thus, as symbolic ideas are made real, they are not reflected, but 
rather: “refracted through context and individual experience […], they are situated 
[and] interpreted” (Dacin et al., 2010, p. 1414).  
 
Whilst the above studies highlight an increasing interest in practice and unpacking 
precisely how, when and why the ideas of logics are made real, we learn little about 
the factors which drive this interpretation and variation: who ignores the AACSB’s 
pressures and why? Who would chastise students about dining etiquette and why? 
Which students would respond to such chastisement and why? A lack of theorisation 
of this variation parallels the concerns noted above in Section 2.2.1.4. within 
governmentality. 
 
Such studies also chime with governmentality in terms of the importance of ‘small 
figures’ and the “nearly invisible and often mundane” but nonetheless essential 
“work” which actors have to conduct in order to make institutional ideas real 
(Lawrence et al., 2009, p. 1). Similarly, reflecting governmentality’s interest in 
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technologies of government, institutionalists are becoming increasingly interested in 
what they describe as ‘material artefacts’ and their role in the construction of ideas in 
reality (Czarniawska, 2008; Powell & Colyvass, 2008).  
 
For instance, Gawer and Phillips (2013) highlight the importance of instruments by 
explicitly suggesting that material artefacts are instantiations of institutional logics. 
Likewise, Christiansen and Lounsbury (2013) document how actors use a 
‘Responsible Drinking Guide Book’ as an artefact around which they can 
communicate the benefits of social responsibility and market logics. This artefact 
allows the actors to engage in a form of bricolage to combine the logics in a 
complementary manner in practice, much like a mediating instrument (Miller & 
O’Leary, 2007). Similarly, Raviola & Norbäk (2013) outline how an extant artefact, 
the physical newspaper, was embedded with certain values, like the separation of 
news and advertising. They document how this artefact acts like a ‘rule-book’ 
against which the value system of a new logic, an online platform, is compared. 
Journalists refer back to the physical newspaper in making sense of the new platform 
and sometimes resist certain practices, like amalgamating news and advertising, 
because of the pervasiveness of the old ‘rule book’, whilst others only resist in 
certain circumstances, and others do not. They characterise such variation as being 
divergent, convergent or misvergent: as being different, similar or wrong 
(respectively) to the symbolic values of the logic. Again such a typology reflects that 
noted above: of performativity’s distinction between effective performativity and 
ineffective performativity. Echoing the above studies, those focused on instruments 
and how individuals respond to them, find similar levels of variation, but still fail to 
explain the factors driving this variation. 
 
Whilst these studies highlight variation and begin to unpack how ideas are made real 
at the micro level, and the important role of instruments within this process 
(Czarniawska, 2008, p. 775; Powell & Colyvas, 2008, p. 277), they fall short of 
explaining this variation (Raviola & Norbäk, 2013). Despite highlighting that 
instruments play a fundamental role in reifying logics, and despite recognising the 
variations in response to such instruments, we know little about what factors 
	
49	
moderate this variation: what factors cause a response to be convergent rather than 
divergent or to be misvergent rather than divergent? How can some actors embedded 
in a logic be convinced that alternatives are legitimate, whilst others are not? We 
know little about the conditions under which actors react in the desired manner to 
symbolic influences, and the conditions under which they do not (Espeland & 
Sauder, 2007, p. 34). Thus whilst the logics perspective provides us with a starting 
point to understand how actors make sense of attempts to govern their behavior 
through instruments, it fails to explain the factors which moderate the variation we 
see in practice. Additionally, whilst it highlights that actors can recognise and deal 
with multiplicity (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Smets 
et al., 2015), it does not explain which actors are likely to do this and why. Why are 
some actors cultural dopes (Seo & Creed, 2002) whilst others more reflexively 
inhabit institutions (Hallet & Ventresca, 2006)? How can some actors step out of the 
framing they are embedded in whilst others become increasingly insular and resistant 
to alternatives (Lounsbury, 2007; Muzio & Faulconbridge, 2013; Rao et al., 2003). 
2.3.3 Summary of Logics, Research Gaps & Research Questions 
The above sections detail the history and development of the institutional logics 
perspective as a lens for understanding how actors make sense of the world and how 
symbolic ideas are both used to influence others and how they become reified in 
practice. 
 
Section 2.3.1 outlines the beginnings of neo-institutional theory and highlights its 
core thesis that rationality is culturally defined: that actors do things because they 
have been socialised to believe these are rational and not because of some 
universally defined utility-maximisation function (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Thus 
institutional theory argues that actors make sense of prescriptions based on the 
institutions into which they have been socialised (Zucker, 1987). However, Section 
2.3.1 highlights that simply because alternatives are literally unthinkable for some 
actors, this does not mean such alternatives do not exist. Accordingly, Section 2.3.2 
outlines a tangential approach to exploring how actors make sense of their world 




Section 2.3.2.1 provides an overview of the institutional logics perspective and how 
it is based on three core arguments: the existence of multiple and competing orders 
within an inter-institutional system, the socially constructed nature of rationality and 
the simultaneously material and symbolic nature of logics. Such a theorisation allows 
for a holistic conceptualisation of society and helps to explain the multiplicity that 
neo-institutional theory was struggling to deal with. Section 2.3.2.2 outlines a 
number of these arguments to show such variation and how it is explained by the 
logics perspective. 
 
For instance, Section 2.3.2.2.1 describes how those existing logics already reified in 
practices, provide a powerful cognitive framing that conditions how actors make 
sense of their world. For example, different logics which actors are embedded in 
influence them to behave differently, perhaps by pursuing aggressive growth 
strategies rather than passive fund management (Lounsbury, 2007). However such 
socialisation is never complete and there is always the threat that an actor will 
abandon a value system in favour of another (Lawrence et al., 2009). Indeed, Section 
2.3.2.2.2 highlights the multiplicity that arises as actors work with logics since they 
are not cultural dopes and can use the symbolic values of logics as rhetorical 
strategies to help persuade others to act in their interest (Seo & Creed, 2002; Zilber, 
2009). 
 
Section 2.3.2.2.3 reiterates that logics must be continually constructed in reality 
through often seemingly mundane practices; such as reifying the British class system 
by reminding university students that they should not be smoking during a dinner 
(Dacin et al., 2010). Such a micro-level focus reiterates the variation and divergence 
in practices as symbolic ideas are made real. Whether actors ‘skilfully segregate, 
bridge and demarcate between multiple logics’ (Smets et al., 2015), or ‘temporarily 
hijack’ the logics of others (McPherson & Sauder, 2013) their work is a translation 
rather than a diffusion (Czarniawska, 2008; Zilber, 2009) and therefore ‘messy’ 
(Helfen & Sydow, 2013) relative to the symbolic ideas of logics. In other words, 
logics are not directly reflected in practice but are rather “refracted through context 
and individual experience […], they are situated [and] interpreted” (Dacin et al., 
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2010, p. 1414) and “actively reshaped along the way” (Zilber, 2006, p. 282, emphasis 
added). For instance they can be convergent, divergent or misvergent with respect to 
the symbolic values inherent in the logic (Raviola & Norbäk, 2013). 
 
However, we know little about what drives such variation. The complex relationship 
between material instruments and institutions (Dover & Lawrence, 2010) remains 
understudied (Lawrence et al., 2013; Smith, 2010; Thornton et al., 2012) and much 
remains to be done (Czarniawska, 2008; Jones & Massa, 2013; Lawrence et al., 
2013, p. 1028; Powell & Colyvas, 2008). For instance, whilst we know that 
convergence, divergence and misvergence occur (Raviola & Norbäk, 2013), we lack 
understanding of what factors influence the degree to which they occur (Espeland & 
Sauder, 2007, p. 34).  
 
Such a critique parallels that presented in Section 2.2.1.5 in relation to the degree of 
effective performativity: we know that variations occur as actors respond to 
instruments which attempt to reify ideas in practice, but we know little about what 
factors moderate such responses. What causes actors to be embedded in a logic to the 
point where alternatives are unthinkable or whether they are open to alternatives? 
What factors moderate whether they respond convergently, misvergently or 
divergently? We know little about why some actors resist in the face of alternatives 
(Muzio & Faulconbridge, 2013), whilst others are able to recognise the legitimacy of 
alternatives (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006). If variation is driven by the logics in 
which actors are embedded, then we need to understand how actors are convinced of 
the legitimacy of alternatives and what convinces them to ‘step out’ of the logic in 
which they are embedded in order to enact such variation. Such questions are posed 
explicitly by the third research question: 
 
Research Question 3: How can actors ‘step out’ of one logic and come to recognise 
the legitimacy of an alternative?  
 
Having now outlined governmentality and the institutional logics perspective to 
begin an analysis of the moderating factors upon the effective performativity of a 
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mediating instrument, the following section comments on their theoretical, empirical, 
practical and philosophical compatibilities before the final section summarises the 
holistic framework and reiterates the positioning of the research questions within the 
relevant gaps. 
 
2.4 On the compatibilities between these theories 
Whilst the previous sections have proposed governmentality and the institutional 
logics perspective as a compatible combination to explore governing, they have 
remained silent on the philosophical compatibility between these theories. This has 
been in an effort to provide clarity on the theoretical ideas before delving deeper into 
the philosophical technicalities of each theory. Much work in each theory draws on 
notions from the other, even to the point that “logics” are explicitly part of the 
theoretical constructs in governmentality-inspired studies (see, for example, Jeacle & 
Carter, 2012, p. 745) and “governmental programmes” are explicitly noted in 
institutional theory (see, for example, Greenwood et al., 2008, p. 6). Indeed, as 
Miller and Power comment (as interviewed by Arjaliès & Raynard, 2014), the 
“commonalities seem obvious to us” between governmentality and institutional 
theory. However it is worth more formally and explicitly outlining how these 
theories are compatible in terms of research interests and philosophical positions 
before continuing. 
 
Both theories have a defining interest in control. Governmentality is interested in 
how control is manifested; in how “socially legitimated authorities […] interfere in 
the lives of individuals.” (Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 1). Whilst interested more broadly 
in how actors make sense of the world through culturally defined value systems, 
institutional theory is likewise interested in how such systems “act as mechanisms of 
social control” (Lawrence et al., 2009, p. i). Indeed, Fiss (2008, p. 189) highlights 
that “[f]rom its inception, the institutional tradition […] has been informed by 
themes of control and coordination” Whilst the focus differs, particularly as theories 
expand and travel, each has a premise of exploring and explaining the conditions, 
causes, effects and processes of how actors come to act: and how non-local actors 




Similarly, both theories share an underlying social constructionist perspective. That 
is, they are both interested in unpacking how a certain phenomena has come to exist 
and sustains its existence (Hacking, 1991). For example, governmentality assumes 
that “‘problems’ are not pre-given, waiting there to be revealed. They have to be 
constructed and made visible” (Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 14). Likewise, institutional 
logics are “socially constructed” (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, p. 804) and “in spite of 
the appearance of stability and many stabilizing mechanisms, among which is the 
emergence of institutions, the reality is under constant construction.” (Czarniawska, 
2008, p. 773) Much work goes into problematising and governing or constructing 
and maintaining (Lawrence et al., 2009; Miller & Power, 2013). Despite this, neither 
theory adopts a fully Latourian analysis to explore how neo-liberalism or a market 
logic are constructed, but has rather been more interested in how these ‘things’ 
influence once they have been constructed to a certain degree in certain assemblages. 
In other words, both theories take for granted that certain things have been 
constructed within an assemblage and to some extent therefore ‘exist’ within the 
realms of the particular study. Such a position perhaps reflects the critique of Elder-
Vass (2012) outlined in the Methodology chapter which details how many 
constructionists are happy to take for granted the reality of certain ‘things’: neo-
liberalism or a market logic for example. This thesis also adopts such a position: it is 
rather more interested in the effects of certain value systems that have been partially 
constructed within an assemblage, rather than its construction per se (see Section 3.2 
for more details). 
 
Further compatibility is highlighted in the reflection in both theories of a distinction 
between ideas and practice. As outlined in Section 2.2.1.1 governmentality 
distinguishes between the ideas of value systems: the “high level discourses that 
frame and legitimate” (Thomson et al., 2014, p. 454), and practices: the “humble and 
mundane mechanisms by which authorities seek to instantiate government: 
techniques of notations, computation and calculation; procedures of examination and 
assessment” (Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 183). Likewise the institutional logics 
perspective distinguishes between the abstract ideas of value systems: distinct logics 
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which are “frames of reference that condition actors’ choices” (Thornton et al., 2012, 
p. 2), and practices: “the purposive action of individuals […] much of it nearly 
invisible and often mundane, as in the day-to-day adjustments, adaptations, and 
compromises of actors” (Lawrence et al., 2009, p. 1). Similarly, both theories note 
the “constitutive” relation (Greenwood et al., 2008, p. 31; Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 
175; Thornton et al., 2012, p. 10) between ideas and practice: that they are 
irreducible and “intimately and intricately intertwined” (Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 20).  
 
Having briefly touched upon the philosophical roots of each theory and their 
commonalities, this thesis thus hopes to contribute to both theories by drawing on 
their complementary aspects (Miller & Power, 2013). Specifically where the thesis 
contributes, and to which research questions, is summarised in the closing section of 
this chapter. 
 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter details a conceptualisation of how contemporary governance is effected 
and how actors might make sense of such attempts. It provides an overview of 
governmnetality and the institutional logics perspective in order to theorise such 
research interests. Finally, it briefly argues on their compatibility in terms of 
philosophical underpinnings and research interests. In closing it seeks to summarise 
these literatures in order to highlight the research gaps into which the research 
questions of this project fit and to provide a holistic overview of the theoretical 
framework which will inform the empirics. 
 
As Section 2.2 outlines, governmentality conceptualises contemporary control as 
being constituted through mediating instruments (Miller & O’Leary, 2007). 
However, as detailed in Section 2.2.1.6, such studies have often taken governance as 
a homogeneous outcome; yet we know that reality is multiple and full of variation, as 
demonstrated by sections 2.2.1.4 and 2.3.2.2. Thus we need to unpack the process of 
governing through mediating instruments in more detail at the individual level in 
order to explain what drives such variation (Bourdieu, 1991; MacKenzie, 2007; 




In order to unpack such a process, Section 2.2.1.5 provides a typology by which we 
can categorise such variation as degrees of ‘effective performativity’ (MacKenzie, 
2007) in response to mediating instruments. This categorisation mirrors the 
divergence, convergence and misvergence typology employed by Raviola & Norbäk 
(2013) which also demonstrates multiplicity as ideas and values are translated into 
practices. Thus the first and second research questions come to ask how actors 
respond to a mediating instrument, and if their responses do indeed reflect varying 
degrees of effective performativity, then what factors moderate this? What causes the 
mediating instrument to be able to effectively perform the value system which it 
seeks to in some instances, and fail to in other instances? How can we explain such 
variation? More formally, the thesis asks what are the factors which moderate 
whether a mediating instrument engenders effective, generic or counter-
performativity.  
 
Research Question 1: How do actors respond to a mediating instrument? 
 
Research Question 2: What factors moderate actors’ responses to these instruments? 
 
In order to answer these questions a second lens is required to theorise how actors 
make sense of things since governmentality does not provide a conceptualisation of 
cognitive sense making which helps explain varying degrees of performativity. 
Section 2.3 documents the institutional logics perspective as one such theory of sense 
making arising from culturally constructed symbolic values. The institutional logics 
perspective also highlights that much variation arises in practice (Friedland & 
Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012) and that, accordingly, value systems are not 
always enacted across the whole assemblage and alternatives can be made real: that 
variations occur (Trank & Washington, 2009). Likewise, it details that individuals 
must act to make these value systems real (Lawrence et al., 2009) and thus such 
variation is explained by individuals’ attempts to convince others to act in a desired 
manner (Zilber, 2009), which can occur to varying degrees of success (Dacin et al., 
2010; Raviola & Norbäk, 2013). Whilst the logics perspective is not as nuanced as 
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governmentality in its theorisation of the role of mediating instruments, it does 
acknowledge the fundamental role instruments play in making real these symbolic 
ideas (Christiansen & Lounsbury, 2013; Czarniawska, 2008; Gawer & Phillips, 
2013) and which, again, occur to varying degrees of success (Raviola & Norbäk, 
2013). Despite learning that there is such variation, and that it occurs at the 
individual level, these studies again tell us little about what drives the variation: what 
factors moderate whether the ideas of a symbolic value system are made real in 
practice, whether they are adapted or whether they are ignored and something else 
enacted instead. 
 
Thus whilst the logics perspective provides a starting point from which to analyse 
how actors make sense of attempted governance through mediating instruments, it 
cannot fully answer the first two research questions. It has yet to consider what 
factors moderate the construction in practice of logics: what factors moderate the 
effective performativity of a mediating instrument. For instance the logics 
perspective argues that actors make sense of the world according to the logics into 
which they have been socialised (Thornton et al., 2012; Zucker, 1983). Such an 
approach would suggest that we can explain the effective performativity of a 
mediating instrument by the logics in which actors are embedded. Yet we know that 
actors are not fixed into one logic (McPherson & Sauder, 2013) and that actors can 
use logics (Smets et al., 2015) to their own accord: that logics are much more fluid 
(Quattrone, 2015). Hence we see great variation and multiplicity rather than actors 
either enacting a ‘pure’ logic, or not: i.e. simply the polar extremes. Indeed we see 
much variation between these poles (Dacin et al., 2010; Lounsbury, 2007; Raviola & 
Norbäk, 2013; Smets et al., 2015; Zilber, 2006). Again however, the logics 
perspective has yet to theorise how such variation occurs: how do actors ‘step out’ of 
the framing in which they are, at least somewhat embedded, and become convinced 
by the legitimacy of alternatives? How do they ‘bridge’ from one framing to 
another? In other words, understanding the relationship between the moderating 
factors is important for understanding how dual value systems are sustained and 




Research Question 3: How can actors ‘step out’ of one logic and come to recognise 
the legitimacy of an alternative?  
 
In sum these three research questions seek to unpack the process by which governing 
occurs at the individual level: specifically enquiring as to what factors moderate 
effective performativity and how we can theorise these factors in such a way so as to 
explain multiplicity. The holistic framework highlights that ideas (which can be 
considered as governmental programmes or symbolic logics: see Section 5.2 for a 
fuller explanation) are embedded into (mediating) instruments which are translated 
into practice in an attempt to govern and control (see sections 2.2.1.2, 2.2.1.3 and 
2.3.2.2). Furthermore, the framework proposes that variation arises in practice and 
thus we cannot take for granted governance as an outcome but should explore it as a 
process (see sections 2.2.1.4, 2.2.1.5 and 2.3.2.2.3). In exploring this process, the 
framework suggests that variation arises because of the multiple logics in which 
individual actors are embedded (see section 2.3.2.1). Yet more recent work (see 
section 2.3.2.2) highlights that the logics perspective fails to theorise what drives the 
variation that we observe in individual practices (again see sections 2.2.1.4, 2.2.1.5 
and 2.3.2.2.3): it suggests that rather than individuals being embedded in different 
but distinct logics, that one individual can be embedded in multiple logics (see 
Section 2.3.2.2) and thus such variation occurs. Yet, as highlighted in Section 2.3.3, 
whilst the logic perspective thereby helps to theorise the factors which moderate 
effective performativity, it has yet to theorise how actors are able to ‘step out of’ one 
logic and work with multiple logics and thus is still unable to fully explain the 
variation expected and observed empirically (see section 4.3.4). 
 
As such, this thesis seeks to unpack governance as a process rather than an outcome 
(Moll & Hoque, 2011). Accordingly the thesis contributes by developing 
understanding in both governmentality and the institutional logics perspective of how 
abstract ideas come to be made real and the factors which drive variation in this 
process (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 73; Espeland & Sauder, 2007, p. 34; MacKenzie, 2007, 
p. 69; Raviola & Norbäk, 2013; Revellino & Mouritsen, 2015, p. 47; Thomson et al., 




Having outlined the theoretical framework, compatibility between the chosen 
theories, the research gaps and associated questions, the following chapter turns to 






























Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
[…] the selection of an appropriate research methodology cannot be done in 
isolation of a consideration of the ontological and epistemological 
assumptions which underpin the research in question.  
(Ryan et al., 2002, p. 35) 
 
The previous chapters present what this research is about and why it is important. 
Accordingly, this chapter outlines how it was conducted. In so doing it outlines the 
validity of the research questions, methods and the compatibility between these so as 
to document a coherent research project that makes a valid contribution to current 
knowledge. Initially it focuses on what we can consider as ‘knowledge’ in the first 
place: in other words it explores the philosophical underpinnings that inform the 
ontological and epistemological position of this piece of research. The purpose of 
this is to make explicit the assumptions about the world that inform this thesis and 
classify it within a certain ‘paradigm’. As Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 24) 
highlight, and as documented above within institutional theory, in a thoroughly non-
trivial sense: “[t]o be located in a particular paradigm is to view the world in a 
particular way.”  
 
Firstly the chapter outlines the ontology and epistemology underpinning 
constructionism: which, as above, provides the paradigm in which this thesis is 
situated. This section begins with an overview of the ontological positions of 
nominalism and realism before summarising more recent philosophical contributions 
which suggest that either extreme is untenable (Elder-Vass, 2012). Instead it presents 
a position which moves beyond the threat of solipsism in nominalism and the 
aversion to value in realism by positing that despite existence preceding essence 
(Sartre, 1943), objects exist as materially real and such reality places some 
constraints upon what essence human actors are likely to ascribe to them: thus a 
‘table’ could be constructed as a ‘desk’, ‘art’, ‘a weapon’, ‘kindling’, ‘a children’s 
den’ or ‘a door barricade’, but not, in any widely-agreed and meaningful sense, as a 
‘light bulb’, ‘guitar’, ‘parachute’ or a ‘pet dog’. Such a position can be described as 
realist in recognising materiality and nominalist in acknowledging that such objects 
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are not fixed and are affected by our interaction with them (Elder-Vass, 2012). This 
chimes with governmentality and institutional theory since both acknowledge 
variation as actors interpret and interact with objects (neo-liberalism or the market 
logic, for example), but both nonetheless assume these objects are already (at least 
partially) constructed, ‘real’ and as having material implications for actors. Neither is 
particularly interested in how these objects were constructed per se, but are more 
interested in the secondary constructions that occur with and around such objects. 
Thus it is argued that despite both theories being constructionist (see Section 2.4 
above), they both, perhaps inadvertently (as Elder-Vass, 2012 argues is common), 
theorise these objects as materially real and ‘pre-existing’. 
 
Having outlined such an ontological position the following section then highlights 
the associated epistemology as interested in unpacking how such understandings 
come to exist and what effects they have. Accordingly this work ascribes to an anti-
positivistic (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, pp. 5-6) epistemology which is interested in 
explaining the phenomena in its situated and contextualised existence in the real 
world: to interpret it, rather than reducing the explanation to ‘causal explanatory 
factors’. 
 
Before moving on to the research methods, a brief interim section reflects on some of 
the criticisms of constructionism and what its aim is under such ontological and 
epistemological assumptions. Particularly it discusses that if we assume there is no 
‘universal truth’ then there is a threat that all ‘truths’ are equally valid. In response to 
this the section outlines how we therefore must be cognisant of morality and 
humanism in social science research in order to re-present research findings in a 
meaningful way. 
 
Having presented and discussed the methodological considerations, the chapter 
proceeds to outline the methods employed: how the project was designed, what 
methods were employed, how the data was collected, how it was analysed and how it 
was theorised. Additionally, each section provides an overview of alternative 
approaches and justifies the chosen option from these alternatives. This section 
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firstly outlines how a case study was selected as the main research design. Whilst 
ethnographic work, phenomenological interviewing or documentary analysis would 
also have proved interesting designs, a case study was selected given it incorporates 
elements of each of these whilst also providing a framework which seemed best 
suited to approach the research questions. Additionally, this section repeatedly notes 
the influence of pragmatics and the practicalities of gaining, and sustaining, access to 
a case site. Despite such an influence, the section argues that the approach is still 
appropriate because it allows flexibility for the research questions themselves to 
become fixed over a longer period of time; rather than right at the outset which may 
have caused methodological difficulties. 
 
Following an outline of the adopted research methods and explanation of how they 
were coordinated and conducted, the next section documents the technicalities of 
both analysing and collecting the data. Specifically it documents how the data was 
coded and theorised under the ‘Gioia method’ (Gioia et al., 2013) of thematic coding 
into ‘first order codes’ which are collated into ‘second order categories’ and then 
‘third order themes’. Whilst it remains difficult to record the actual process by which 
theorisation occurred, outlining the steps taken and the researcher’s concerns during 
these steps at least helps to partially outline how the uncodifiable “creative leap” 
occurs between coding and theorising (Langley, 1999, p. 691). Following this the 
section turns to outline how the data was collected over a period of three phases and 
how the data was theorised abductively: again thereby helping to outline the process 
of analysis and theorisation as well as justifying the theories selected (and those 
rejected) throughout this process. Additionally, it justifies and explains the initial 
focus on accounting as a subject area, and specifically performance appraisal, before 
highlighting the relevant decisions which informed the research interests after each 
phase of data analysis. In closing, this section explicitly justifies the use of 
governmnetality and the institutional logics perspective since they seem to fit the 
empirics whilst at the same time providing an opportunity to themselves be expanded 




In sum, this chapter highlights the methodological considerations underpinning this 
research and demonstrates how the adopted approach is consistent with these 
considerations and is appropriate for answering the posed research questions. As 
such, it provides an extension to the earlier chapters by outlining how the research 
was conducted (having outlined why it was needed in the first place in the preceding 
chapters, and where it was conducted in the following chapter).  
 
3.2 Philosophical Considerations  
3.2.1 Ontology 
First, there are assumptions of an ontological nature – assumptions which 
concern the very essence of the phenomena under investigation. Social 
scientists, for example, are faced with a basic ontological question: whether 
the ‘reality’ to be investigated is external to the individual – imposing itself 
on individual consciousness from without – or the product of individual 
consciousness: whether ‘reality’ is of an objective nature, or the product of 
individual cognition; whether ‘reality’ is a given ‘out there’ in the world, or 
the product of one’s mind. 
(Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p. 1) 
 
Ontological concerns are directed towards what can be said to exist, what is ‘real’ 
and whether existence precedes essence (Sartre, 1943) or vice versa. To provide an 
overview of these concerns it is perhaps helpful to distinguish between two 
classically opposing positions: those of realism and of nominalism or idealism. These 
two approaches delineate distinct approaches to understanding what is real and, 
therefore, where the focus of research should lie and what format it should take.  
 
Traditionally, the approach that reality is ‘out there’ is associated with realism, which 
argues that essence precedes existence: that “there exist ‘naked truths’; truths to 
which one has direct and unmediated access, and which, once accessed, put an end to 
discussion.” (O’Neill, 1995, p. 104 as cited by Elder-Vass, 2012, p. 243; see also 
Ashman & Barringer, 2005, p. 55) Realism is thus “the theory that universals exist 
independently of the human mind and that the essences of things are objectively 
given in nature.” (Stokes, 2004, p. 216, emphasis added) Realism is a “belief in the 
real, true essence of things, the invariable and fixed properties which define the 
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‘whatness’ of a given entity” (Fuss, 1990, p. xi). Thus neo-liberalism, under a realist 
view, is a natural outcome and “has an existence which is as hard and concrete as the 
natural world.” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p. 4) Accordingly, realists are interested in 
testing the causally significant features of a reality which is already divided up 
(Devitt, 2008, p. 375 as cited by Elder-Vass, 2012, p. 131). As such they ask 
questions about, for example, whether neo-liberalism improves global wealth, 
whether it improves trade, whether firms perform better after the introduction of a 
performance measurement system or how a performance measurement system can be 
improved. Such a perspective takes neo-liberalism as given, as inevitable and 
unchangeable: as part of the nature of things, people or society (Hacking, 1999, p. 
35). 
 
Nominalism, in contrast, takes an entirely different approach. Nominalism is the 
theory that reality is precisely divided up and constituted by our categories: 
“language and our use of it, far from simply describing the world, both constructs the 
world as we perceive it and has real consequences” (Burr, 2003, p. 46). It suggests 
that there is nothing ‘inevitable’ or ‘natural’ about these categories, forces, 
descriptions, beliefs etc. and instead argues that they are ‘socially constructed’ and 
can therefore be changed and could have been something different in the first place 
(Hacking, 1999; Ryan et al., 2002, p. 86; Sismondo, 2004, p. 61). “ICBO! It Could 
Be Otherwise!” as Steve Woolgar (2015) puts it.  
 
Thus nominalists seek to deconstruct the reality that has been created to show how it 
has come to be and how it might be different. In other words nominalism perceives 
‘reality’ as much more malleable and as created from ‘within’. Thus reality is not 
determined by the external objects which we interact with: neo-liberal behaviours 
like profit maximisation, the laws of supply and demand or ‘the invisible hand’ of 
the market are not natural outcomes but have instead been made, been constructed. 
Constructionists are interested in how such assemblages have been made, their 
effects and in deconstructing them. Accordingly, they are interested in different 
questions than realists, such as, for example: how did neo-liberalism come to be so 
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pervasive, how does it influence actors and gain such a stronghold, what effects do 
performance appraisal practices engender, how do people respond to them?  
 
Such ideas of separation between internal or personal reality and an external reality 
come from the German Idealism of Kant and Husserl. They argue that we always 
interact with objects through our senses: for instance we might feel like we are 
moving forward when on a train, but in ‘reality’ it might be that the train next to us is 
moving backward. Thus, Kant suggests a fundamental distinction between the 
‘external’ world (the noumenal world) and the ‘internal’ world (the phenomenal 
world) in his notion of ‘transcendental idealism’. He argues that we cannot ever 
know what the objects (in the noumenal world) we perceive and talk about (in the 
phenomenal world) actually look like because they are always interpreted through 
our senses: thus what the object actually is could be different to what our mind tells 
us we see. Thus the focus, Kant argues, should be on the ‘mind’ itself since “reality 
is a concept which is constructed [by the mind] rather than discovered” (Ryan et al., 
2002, p. 15, emphasis in original). Rather than investigating causally significant 
aspects of the underlying entity behind an appearance (the noumenal world), we 
should instead focus on the phenomenal world: the “lived-in world of experience” 
(Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p. 243). Under such a view research is interested in how 
individuals make sense of and interact with, for example, a performance appraisal 
practice, rather than whether it has certain causal effects. 
 
The progression of this view later led Husserl to conclude that the external world is 
merely “an artefact of consciousness: phenomena are shown to be willed into 
existence” and thus we can ignore it (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p. 233). In effect, one 
can “bracket off the question of reality,” that is, of the underlying reality of the 
noumenal world, and ignore it: bypassing concerns of its reality and move straight, 
and solely, to the phenomenal world (Burr, 2003, p. 90).  
 
However, if we ‘bracket off’ the reality of the noumenal world altogether, we begin 
to ‘sail dangerously close to the reef’ of solipsism (Sartre, 1943). If we cannot ever 
know the noumenal world external to our perception, then there is a possibility that it 
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might not even exist at all. Thus the argument arises that a bathroom constructs itself 
only when we open the door and perceive it, and that only the all-perceiving eye of 
God constructs reality when we are not literally perceiving something (Stokes, 2004, 
p. 95). The complete and extreme scepticism of solipsism leads to the rendering of 
research as pointless: why would one engage in the efforts of writing, discussing or 
researching if everything were just a figment of their imagination? Solipsism leads to 
a dead-end. How, then, to get around it? 
 
More recent philosophical enquiries have focused on the way in which we 
experience the noumenal world, suggesting that it is always through language, 
discourse or rhetoric in their broadest senses (Heidegger, Sartre, Foucault for 
example). Drawing on Fichte’s inspiration from Husserl (and later on Heidegger and 
then Sartre), the phenomenological movement conceptualises how individual 
consciousness is projected onto the external world, which in turn projects back onto 
individual consciousness (Stokes, 2004, p. 148). Thus a conceptualisation of the 
existence of the noumenal world is linked again with our perceptions of it but 
mediated through discourse and language: thus it is in the study of linguistics that we 
can understand phenomenal reality without worrying about the possibility of an 
‘imagined’ noumenal reality.  
 
Under the dualism of noumenal and phenomenal worlds proposed by Kant, we invite 
such a ‘radical’ form of constructionism as to discuss everything being socially 
constructed through discourse. As Elder-Vass (2012, p. 246, emphasis in original) 
notes: 
With false hope of a firm foundation gone, with the world displaced by worlds 
[…] with substance dissolved into function, and with the given acknowledged 
as taken […] Now the only worlds we can know are, in every respect, the 
products of social construction […] for example, scientists may make the 
very reality they believe they are studying, and now, for example, “the world 
is material only because we think it is” (Gergen 1999: 9).  
 
However such radical constructionism through discourse under a neo-Kantian 
perspective poses a number of problems (Elder-Vass, 2012; Smith, 2010) and causes 
conflict with a number of other schools of thought, particularly in relation to 
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materiality. For instance, there is no discursive aspect of physically banging a table 
(Edwards, Ashmore & Potter, 1995) or accidentally tripping over a rock (Collins, 
1990), yet these events are still experienced and still happen. 
 
Elder-Vass (2012, pp. 239-250) argues that this neo-Kantian dualism between the 
noumenal and phenomenal is untenable and seeks to move beyond it to explain 
actions and events that also occur outside of discourse. He highlights the problem of 
continuing a dualism between natural and social, or material and mind, by noting the 
socialness of material objects, and the materiality of social objects, suggesting 
instead that we must recognise the existence of one ontological world which contains 
both material and social dimensions simultaneously. For example he highlights the 
implicit recognition of the interplay and coexistence of material and social aspects in 
constructionist research; since, to conduct viable research, there must be some ‘real’ 
external world to interact with, including oneself, pens, paper, laptops, other people, 
emails etc. He concludes that: 
[…] the real world, though it is often referred to as the outside world, does 
not end at our skins or at the boundaries of our brains […] Our every 
thought, our every sensation, is part of one and the same real world as the 
things that prompt them. We can know about the real world (not some 
dualistically isolated noumenal world) because we are part of it (Smith 2010: 
171).  
(Elder-Vass, 2012, p. 247, emphasis in original) 
 
Thus, he adopts Searle’s (1997, p. 104) assertion that “[t]here is no phenomenal 
world and hence no noumenal world. There is just the one world we all live in.” This 
“one world” is realist in the sense that it contains material objects which exist outside 
of our own discourse, but nominalist in acknowledging that such objects and our 
understanding of them can be altered and indeed depend upon our practices. As 
Hacking (1999, p. 22) argues, Searle’s (1995) point is that objects which are 
constructed can exist and influence others but are still contingent on human practice: 
“[t]he rent you pay is all too objective (and in the world, as I put it) but requires 
human practices in order to exist […] without human subjects and their institutions 




Ascribing to such a position reflects the theorisation within governmnetality and 
institutional theory that neo-liberalism or a market logic, for example, ‘exist’ as real 
objects we have to deal with whilst at the same time recognising that they are 
contingent and decidedly unnatural: that they are constructed. It simultaneously 
recognises the social and material of the world which we inhabit, make sense of and 
interfere with. It acknowledges the materiality of the world (for instance in the 
performance measurement practices which constitute a neo-liberal agenda) and the 
existence of constructed objects (neo-liberalism itself) which we cannot necessarily 
ignore, but at the same time which we can resist, alter and do things with: thereby 
reflecting the nominalist perspective that existence precedes essence and that humans 
make a choice at every turn, even with a gun pressed to their head (Stokes, 2004, p. 
153 commenting on Sartre 1943, 1948). Indeed, Smith (2010) and Elder-Vass (2012) 
argue that this is the ontological position that most constructionists have 
inadvertently adopted all along. 
 
 Similarly, it is this position that this research project likewise adopts. If we ascribe 
to this ontological position then, what sort of knowledge can we hope to learn about? 
The following section outlines this, the associated epistemology. 
3.2.2 Epistemology 
Given that research is fundamentally about the discovery, interpretation and 
communication of new knowledge there is still little agreement about the 
source of knowledge itself.  
(Ryan et al., 2002, p. 7) 
 
Epistemology is concerned with what we can know; in other words, what is 
knowledge. Once we have outlined what we believe to be ‘reality’, that is, our 
ontological position, we can move on to epistemological concerns about how to gain 
knowledge about that reality (Ryan et al., 2002, p. 35). Thus, the two are clearly 
linked and often feature typical approaches, although that is not to say that untypical 





Burrell and Morgan (1979), following many others, distinguish between ‘positivistic’ 
approaches and what they term ‘anti-positivistic’ approaches to discovering 
knowledge about a phenomena. Positivism is traditionally associated with a realist 
ontology: the existence of an external world which has underlying characteristics 
which are unaffected by our classifications or existence. Positivism is closely 
associated with the ‘natural’ sciences, namely: chemistry, physics, logic and 
mathematics3, and the view that ‘science is the final arbiter of truth’ (Quine, 1960). 
Positivism focuses the researcher on the ‘external’ world and attempts to reduce the 
influence of the researcher, or other ‘social’ forces, to discover underlying ‘laws’ 
which, it is argued, form a superior form of knowledge to that posited by religious 
faith or philosophy (Hume, 1739). Positivism is also interested in reducing 
statements about what is, from what ought to be. In other words, it sees values as 
irrational and seeks to eliminate them in favour of ‘facts’ we can ‘prove’ (Hume, 
1739). For example, a positivistic approach to the research interests of this thesis 
might enquire as to whether or not performance appraisal practices improve 
organisational performance, how such practices can be enhanced, whether they 
enhance global wealth etc. 
 
However, anti-positivists, as Burrell and Morgan (1979) describe them, argue that 
such an external ontological position and an aversion to values causes serious 
problems (Hacking, 1999). Anti-positivists criticise positivists for failing to 
acknowledge the influence of discourse and rhetoric on actions and beliefs, and for 
assuming reality is fixed and represents natural distinctions in the world. For 
example, anti-positivists take seriously the idea that the colour of one’s skin, 
religious beliefs or genital make-up somehow created a law, a quite literal, natural, 




3 Note that whilst traditionally associated as a positivistic natural science, parts of the 
study of biology appear to explicitly have much less in common with physics and 
chemistry and more with the ‘social’ sciences’ non-linear methodology (Burns, 
2015). Likewise, Latour and Woolgar (1979) highlight the construction of 




Similarly, anti-positivists’ argue that positivists’ aversion to values and subjectivity 
does not mean there is no subjectivity within their research. For instance, anti-
positivists argue that data can never be devoid of value because it is an inherently 
socialised output; data is never a given and is instead attributed by human beings: a 
person (or persons) must record stock prices and people experiencing diseases, and 
the classification of something as X or Y is not an easy one as feminists and actor-
network theorists have repeatedly highlighted (see, for example, Butler, 1993 on 
intersexed individuals, or Timmermans, 2006 on suicide). Indeed, as anti-positivists 
highlight, the etymology of the word ‘data’ comes from the Latin datum – literally 
‘to attribute’; any and all data are mediated by the multiple subjectivities of humans 
(Quattrone, 2014).  
 
Positivistic research is thus critiqued for failing to acknowledge and take 
responsibility for the effects it causes, particularly in unquestioningly reproducing 
the status quo, and is criticised for being open to immoral uses and being sold to the 
highest bidder (Fuller, 2006, p. 84). The ontological underpinnings of positivism, it 
is argued, are incompatible with social phenomena and rendered rather useless in 
social science. Rather than seeking to eliminate other factors and reduce phenomena 
down to some underlying rules, anti-positivists argue that it is precisely these other 
factors that we should focus on during research; the point is to develop an 
understanding of how things happen in the real world: and happen because of the 
internalised meaning making of individuals within a local context. As Latour says, in 
order to better analyse, one must provide more description; a detailed description of 
the phenomena is the best kind of analysis (Latour, 2005, p. 137). 
 
Thus anti-positivists argue for a situated focus on all the factors influencing the 
phenomena. The aim is not to generate results which can be replicated and which 
detail underlying laws, but rather to provide a localised explanation of the 
phenomena which draws heavily on the entire reality as constructed by the 
participants (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, pp. 5-6; Crotty, 2004; Kemp, 2015). Because 
meanings ‘make’ the world, an anti-positivist approach analyses these meanings, 
how they have come to be and with what effect. It seeks to show how things have 
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come to be as they are and thus how they might have been different. This focus on 
meanings argues for an approach which ‘gets inside’ the phenomena and studies it 
and its relations in a relatively large amount of detail in order to generate ideographic 
understanding  (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p. 7).  
 
The subjectivities of anti-positivistic research are often criticised by those adopting 
more ‘scientific’ approaches (who often ignore the multiple subjectivities implicit in 
data, conducting research, producing research, consuming research etc.), yet, for an 
anti-positivist, this is the ‘truest’ form of knowledge we can generate about social 
phenomena; it is by (re)interpreting it and re-presenting it that we can generate 
interest between the involved parties (Quattrone, 2004, 2006). As Ryan et al. (2002, 
p. 87) note: “[s]uch research enables us to interpret (that is, understand) management 
accounting as a social practice.” The point, indeed, is to understand management 
accounting and the role it plays in constructing reality. 
 
However, if anti-positivists reject the notion of universal truths, an aversion to values 
and a search for underlying laws and replicability, how then should they present their 
research? From what position of authority do they speak? Ultimately, how can we 
judge which knowledge is ‘true’ or ‘better’ if we ascribe to the notion that all 
knowledge is constructed? 
3.2.3 On the Aims & Criticisms of Constructionism 
If all knowledge, and indeed reality, is socially constructed, what can we take to be 
true? Many adopt a pragmatic approach; for example, Elder-Vass (2012, p. 257) 
argues that ‘true’ knowledge is not a Platonian concept of justified true belief, but 
rather those beliefs which are, or have been, obtained by methods which are “socially 
authorised.” Latour and Woolgar (1979, p. 296) follow a similar argument and argue 
that accepted ‘true’ reality “becomes that set of statements considered, for the time 
being, too expensive to change.” Likewise, Hacking (1999, pp. 68-73) draws on 
Andrew Pickering’s (1995) Mangle of Practice, to highlight that another definition is 
one of robust fit between: (i) the theory of the phenomena, (ii) the data itself, (iii) the 
theory of the apparatus used to investigate the phenomena and (iv) the physical 
make-up of the apparatus itself. Hacking (1999, p. 73) argues: 
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Before a robust fit has been achieved, it is not determined what that fit will 
be. Not determined by how the world is, not determined by technology now in 
existence, not determined by the social practices of scientists, not determined 
by interests or networks, not determined by genius, not determined by 
anything. 
 
As some critiques of constructionism have highlighted (c.f. Elder-Vass, 2012; 
Parker, 1998; c.f. Smith, 2010), whilst deconstructing these truth claims has 
emancipatory potential, it also poses several problems: namely the relativism that it 
proposes. Whilst interested in deconstructing the status quo, constructionists are 
often criticised for advocating relativism by virtue of their ontological position; all 
knowledge is a construct and therefore no one, including constructionists, is in much 
of a position to suggest which form of knowledge is ‘best’. Whether ‘extreme 
religious beliefs’ are better than ‘scientifically proven facts’ is a difficult question to 
answer whilst staying strictly true to the ontology of a constructionist approach. 
 
Additionally, if reality does not exist ‘out there’ and is only an internalised 
construction based on shared meanings, which we can only re-present in another 
construction and which has no higher basis for claiming truth, what then, is the point 
of conducting such research? The point, as implied above, is for emancipation and a 
concern for sustaining humanism within science. Constructionist work seeks to 
deconstruct: to show how things are not inevitable. Whilst it is relativist in the sense 
that it shows all knowledge to be socially constructed and, thus, equally ‘true’, this is 
not to say that the outputs of constructionist work cannot be used with moral and 
humanist (or amoral and anti-humanist) concerns in mind.  
 
Quattrone (2004, 2006) highlights the point of case study research under these 
ontological and epistemological positions which prevent the representation of some 
‘out there’ reality. Instead we must fully embrace the multiple worlds, times and 
spaces which constitute reality as it exists and is experienced through practice 
(Quattrone, 2004, p. 241). If we can never represent the world through research, then 
what form of re-presentation can we, as researchers, make, and with what authority? 
Quattrone (2006) documents the ‘impossibility of testimony’ for interviewees and 
authors since every account of reality is itself a construction (Parker, 1998) and 
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cannot be said to represent reality in any authoritative sense: “Words cannot be 
compared to worlds.” (Czarniawska, 1999, p. 26 as cited by Quattrone, 2006, p. 241) 
Drawing on Latour’s writings, Quattrone (2006, p. 241) argues: 
[…] the description of a story […] is intrinsically linked to the explanation of 
that story […] The only difference that can be made is whether these stories 
are ‘interest-ing’ (i.e. be able to make people interested) or not, and this is 
probably a criterion which may replace conventional validity, intended as the 
correspondence between a story and a supposedly ‘out there’ reality. 
 
Since neither the interviewee (in their recollections) or the researcher (in their 
writing) can ever hope to represent reality, there exists an ‘absence’ – a lacuna, a 
gap, a blank space – and it is this absence which researchers can re-present in their 
own constructed accounts. As Quattrone (2006) argues, it is only because of the 
existence of this space that we ever need to represent something; if there were not a 
gap between these realities there would be no need to represent anything anywhere 
else: it is precisely this gap which makes representation possible. Thus the 
“investigation becomes a way of constructing this space, knowing that it is not 
possible to fill it completely.” (Quattrone, 2006, p. 149)  
 
Under such a conceptualisation, a researchers’ authority no longer resides in their 
ability to replicate ‘facts’, but rather in their ability to tell a story about this space: 
which exists because the reality of those studied can never be fully represented 
elsewhere. There is thus a largely humanist concern within Quattrone’s (2006) 
argument, indeed he draws on Levinas’ (2004) concept of the Other, to argue that 
our responsibility, and authority, is therefore to tell stories as authors about these 
Others in the hope of emancipating them. As such, the only “genre in which the 
veracity of the testimony can reside, the only real where the testimony can be 
housed” is narratives (Quattrone, 2006, p. 152).  
 
Drawing on the etymology of the word ‘author’, Quattrone (2006) argues that the 
only sense in which our work can be assessed, as authors of narratives, is related to 
whether or not it is “inter-est-ing,” that is, whether or not it generates interest 
between human beings (again from the Latin, inter-esse – between people): 
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Clearly, this new form of authority is not imposed by the author, but is rather 
the emerging result of the interest generated in the listener who decides 
whether or not the narration is interesting […] The kind of interest this […] 
piece is advocating calls for narratives which are amongst human beings 
(inter-esse) not to homogenize them, not to show what is normal but to 
illustrate them in a different way, that is, ‘inter-est-ing’ diversity in all 
respects.   
(Quattrone, 2006, p. 152) 
 
Thus, research is ‘interesting’ and valid where it generates interactions between 
people: that is, those people with expertise in their relevant area. This may be the 
producers of taken for granted knowledge in relation to the effects of that knowledge, 
other constructionists about the methods of deconstruction or those suited to leading 
some social movement to emancipate those suppressed and controlled by others. As 
Ryan et al. (2002, p. 157) comment this link between author and reader defines good 
research, since research is “a creative and literary act […which requires the author] 
to produce a convincing text – that is, a text that convinces the reader.” In sum, one 
way around the relativist critiques of constructionism is indeed to ‘tell stories’ in the 
hope that these narratives, demonstrating how something has been constructed, 
generate sufficient interest between parties to facilitate a deconstruction of the taken 
for granted features of life which oppress, suppress and control others.  
 
Having outlined the ontological positions underpinning a constructionist approach to 
conducting research, as well as the developments of the approach and some 
criticisms (and potential defences), the chapter now turns to detailing the particular 
methods adopted during the research project. As outlined at the beginning of the 
chapter, the adopted methods can only be assessed with reference to the underlying 
philosophical positions. Thus, in explaining them, the above sections provide a 
backdrop to the methods sections which follow, and thereby explain why it is that 




3.3 Research Design & Methods 
3.3.1 Research Design 
Since philosophical concerns “underpin the research” (Ryans et al., 2002, p. 35) they 
provide a fundamental starting point which inform the objectives of, tools used and 
questions asked within a research project. Such an underpinning position was not, 
per se, chosen for the project but rather reflects the researcher’s interpretation of the 
world and their sense of the aim and value of social science research. In other words 
it boils down to a political value judgement on the behalf of the researcher. As 
outlined in Section 3.2.3 a core element of the constructionist approach is the 
relativism it highlights in the notion of ‘true’ knowledge. Unpacking multiple 
constructions of such knowledge and unravelling the impacts of these constructions 
seems, at least to this researcher, the most worthwhile and valuable use of energy for 
social scientists.  
 
Given the underlying constructionist perspective adopted in this project, a qualitative 
approach was deemed more appropriate than a quantitative one. Whilst the 
quantitative/qualitative divide is not necessarily split between positivism and 
constructionism (Bryman & Bell, 2011; Crotty, 1998; Ryan et al., 2002), there tend 
to be typical approaches each adopts since each understands knowledge in a different 
way.  
 
As outlined above, in Section 3.2.2, constructionists conceptualise knowledge as 
constructed, fluid, multiple and as socially authorised and thus see little value in 
searching for some objective and universal truth. Accordingly they are interested not 
in testing, verifying or generalising (Lambert & Pezet, 2011, p. 11), but rather in 
explaining “individual observations in their specific context.” (Ryan et al., 2002, p. 
145) In other words they are interested in generating ideographic knowledge: 
knowledge “which seeks to generate an understanding of complexity and the unique 
features of the research subject, since, ‘man is an animal suspended in webs of 
significance he himself has spun’ (Geertz, 1973).” (Chapman, 2013) Ideographic 
knowledge aligns with the ontology and epistemology of constructionism in that it is 
not interested in generalisations but in specifics (Bryman & Bell, 2011, p. 60). In 
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contrast to nomothetic knowledge, usually the aim of ‘scientific’ methods which 
argue for distance between observer and subject, ideographic knowledge relies on a 
close relationship with the subject and the analysis of the multiple subjective realities 
which actors live in: “which one generates by ‘getting inside’ situations and 
involving oneself in the everyday flow of life” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p. 6).  
 
The objective of such an approach is to understand the impact and workings of 
phenomena which can become taken for granted: to show the reality as constructed 
and thereby point out that “it could be otherwise” (Woolgar, 2015). Relatedly, such 
an approach uses different tools than those of positivists who are, in contrast, 
interested in removing context and ‘getting away’ from what they see as the negative 
subjectivities of individuals (Ryans et al., 2002). For instance a qualitative study 
informed by constructionism seeks to capture in detail the context and individual 
lived-experience which is seen as fundamental to understanding phenomena. 
Because this research is informed by a constructionist position, it is not interested in 
predicting, generalising, hypothesising or testing models but instead interested in 
documenting how meanings have become taken for granted and how these materially 
affect the reality of individuals (Butler, 1993; Hacking, 1999; Latour & Woolgar, 
1979; Quattrone, 2006). Accordingly a statistical analysis or event-study would not 
have generated sufficiently ‘rich’ empirics to generate the form of ideographic 
knowledge which constructionist accounts aim for. Such an interest informs the 
research design adopted to investigate the phenomena of interest. 
 
Specifically, a case study was selected as the most appropriate design. Case studies 
have become one of the dominant approaches in “alternative” accounting research 
drawing on anti-positivistic epistemologies because of their ability to generate such 
knowledge (Baxter & Chua, 2003, p. 112). A case study is an intensive, in-depth 
analysis of a certain phenomena, whether this be an entire organization, or, as in this 
project, a department, function or part of that organization (Bryman & Bell, 2011, p. 
47; Lounsbury, 2008, p. 357). A case study was selected as the most appropriate 
design since it allows a detailed and in-depth interaction with individual participants 
in order to understand how, and with what effect, they create and negotiate 
	
76	
understandings of their reality and the impact of accounting upon this (Berry & 
Otley, 2004, p. 231; Modell, 2001, p. 442; Ryan et al., 2002, p. 150). In line with the 
constructionist focus, it allows exploration of “the social, the societal and the 
political in management accounting, reminding us of the larger picture and revealing 
the ideals and motivations that lie beneath the surface of contemporary practice.” 
(Vaivio, 2007, p. 441) Thus, a case study is a useful approach when concerned with 
“understanding and theorising the content, processes and context of the practice of 
accounting.” (Berry & Otley, 2004, p. 231)  
 
Whilst a full ethnographic approach would have also been suitable for the research 
questions and philosophical position it was felt that such an approach was more 
likely to cause resistance upon requesting access to empirical settings given the 
higher time commitment required. Similarly, since the research is interested in 
organisational settings, a deep phenomenological approach was also considered to be 
unobtainable given the time commitments and thus interviews were suggested as 
lasting only an hour: prohibiting a truly phenomenological enquiry, but with the aim 
of securing access. Finally, discourse analysis was considered inappropriate for the 
research questions since these are interested in how actors make sense of their world 
and thus there is a need to explore the consumption of content by individuals rather 
than an analysis of that content per se. Whilst discourse analysts (see e.g. Fairclough, 
1995) argue that such an approach can also analyse the intended consumption of 
discourse, the research questions are more interested in the practices of actors and 
how they make sense of existing discourse, rather than the construction of that 
discourse. Despite these seeming alternatives, a case study approach is, in some 
respects, a ‘jack of all trades’ as it can incorporate some ethnographic observations, 
interviews aimed at partially understanding lived-experience and some content 
analysis of documents. It cannot, however, claim to be an expert in these areas 
separately but rather seeks to find a balance between them (Bryman & Bell, 2011). It 
was felt that such a balance was most likely to reveal interesting findings, to answer 
the research questions and most likely to be acceptable to the organisations contacted 




The eventual selection of a single case study mostly reflected the practicalities of 
gaining access. Based initially on a concern for rejection and a general interest in 
comparing practices across organisations, three organisations were selected as 
potential empirical settings. The initial selection was informed by the research 
interests in the organising and accounting of ‘alternative’ organisational forms that 
might adopt a more ‘social’ approach to managing employees and how these 
employees make sense of such management. Thus the selection of cases was based 
“on the anticipation of the opportunity to learn” (Bryman & Bell, 2011, p. 60). Such 
an interest presented a number of ‘employee-owned’ organisations who could be 
described as untraditional in their form or culture. The initial three companies were 
known to the researcher through general industry knowledge and through personal 
network connections. Whilst contact was made with the respective companies 
formally, through existing contacts, other potential companies were selected as back-
ups by browsing relevant documentation: for example on various governmental or 
industry-related websites about employee-ownership. The two larger organisations 
took some time to respond and whilst the smaller organisation initially seemed 
interested, after a day of informal interviews and meeting some of the staff, they 
eventually declined to participate. Around the same time, one of the larger 
organisations also confirmed that it would not be able to participate in the study. 
Fortunately at this time John Lewis responded to say that they would be happy to 
participate.  
 
Throughout this time the research questions remained loose and thus the initial 
potential for a comparative study between organisations shifted to an in depth study 
of a single organisation as empirical settings were opened up or closed down. Such 
flexibility reflects an inherent uncertainty in qualitative research and this inductive 
approach over time allows such potential problems to be overcome by shifting the 
research questions (Horton, Macve & Stuyven, 2008). For instance, despite not being 
able to access multiple organisations within one ‘field’, the approach allowed a more 
detailed exploration of the “entire population” (Lounsbury, 2008, p. 357) within one 
more narrowly defined sub-field (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012) through a detailed 




Access to John Lewis4 was negotiated to senior management, at a Director level, 
through a personal network connection. A Personnel Director directed inquiries to a 
regional position who facilitated access to local branches. The Regional Registrar 
assisted in setting up the first phase (of three phases) of data collection and provided 
contacts within two branches. Access to the local branches was then negotiated based 
on suitable timings depending on occasions of interest, branch convenience and 
quieter trading periods through conversation with the relevant appointments. 
Eventually, mainly through availability, a single branch was selected with around 
nine hundred Partners in order to explore the research questions. 
3.3.2 Research Methods 
Having secured access, data collection commenced. As noted above a fully 
ethnographic approach was deemed to be practically unobtainable from the outset, 
thus ruling out non-participant observation, although as trust developed throughout 
the study some ethnographic opportunities presented themselves. Likewise the 
decision to conduct individual interviews rather than focus groups was also mostly 
informed by the practicalities of the empirical site. Coordinating sufficient numbers 
and representatives of different managerial positions within the branch was deemed 
to be a difficult task with less flexibility than individual interviews. Similarly the 
practicalities of managing a focus group and its participants was considered to be an 
additional complication which would be negated by individual interviews (Bryman 
& Bell, 2011; Ryans et al., 2002). Finally, the research questions reflect an interest in 
individual sense making and this was felt to be a personal topic which would require 
building a relationship with the individual interviewees and asking them detailed 
questions which might have been hindered by the time constraints of a focus group. 
Thus individual interviews were selected as the most appropriate method to collect 
the main body of data, albeit supplemented with observations and documentary 
analysis. Indeed, Bédard and Gendron (2004, p. 197) note, “[i]nterviews often 
constitute a very effective means of collecting data when the qualitative researcher 
seeks to better understand organizational and group processes (Patton 1990).”  
																																																								




Because the focus was on understanding the process by which ideas are made real 
and how meaning is created by actors, observation and documentary analysis were 
decided as secondary sources of data: whilst the primary source was selected as 
interviews so as to understand how the actors constructed those meanings that 
underpinned their actions. Additional data collection opportunities were facilitated 
by asking if it would be possible to attend, interview or observe various other 
activities or persons. As such, the approach could be described as somewhat 
‘snowball’ in terms of building up a network of relevant parties (Bryman & Bell, 
2011).  
 
Specifically semi-structured interviews were selected as the most appropriate format 
to allow flexibility in following related topics, but to also provide structure to direct 
the interview questions and to ensure sufficient data was gathered on the relevant 
topics (Bryman & Bell, 2011, p. 465; Horton et al., 2008, p. 340). It was felt that 
structured interviews would ‘squash’ phenomena of interest into the theoretical 
frame which informed the interview schedule and thus potentially hide things of 
importance and interest. Likewise a fully unstructured approach was deemed 
inappropriate since the research interests were pre-specified and thus it was felt that 
some structure was required to focus discussion around these areas. Accordingly 
semi-structured interviews were adopted in order to provide some structure whilst 
also allowing for flexibility in order to let the data “mumble” (Chapman, 2013).  
 
The focus of each interview varied depending on who was being interviewed (see 
Appendix B for examples of Senior Management, Section Manager and Selling 
Partner schedules). A mix of introductory, follow-up, probing, specifying, direct, 
indirect, structuring and confirmation questions were used, alongside silence in 
places to prompt elaboration and to elucidate a detailed re-presentation of the 




Several “main” questions5 relating directly to the research questions provided the 
core of each interview schedule around which subsequent questions were asked to 
generate more detail (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p. 135). Questions were directed in an 
open-ended manner, such as ‘can you tell me about performance measurement’ 
rather than ‘does performance appraisal work’, to elucidate detailed responses and to 
capture underlying understandings from interviewees’ reflections and explanations 
(Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p. 135). Questions were directed in a non-leading manner as 
regards to content and interviews were encouraged to expand or clarify through non-
verbal cues such as nodding, frowning etc. Further, a ‘bank’ of questions were 
retained in case of ‘dead-spots’ in the interview to keep the flow of conversation 
going where needed (Bryman & Bell, 2011, p. 477).  
 
All interviews were recorded by a digital recorder and supplemented by extensive 
note-taking6. Note taking was used: in case of emergency; to note down follow-up 
questions; to record visual and non-verbal cues; to record questions asked against the 
interview schedule and to emphasise themes which seemed important (Bédard & 
Gendron, 2004). Interviews were recorded so as to allow the interviewer to focus on, 
arguably, the most important aspect of the interview – listening (Bryman & Bell, 
2011, p. 478). This allowed a natural conversation to develop and for rapport to build 
up between the interviewee and interviewer (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). It further 
allowed the interviewer to pick up on non-verbal cues and concentrate on following 
the interviewee’s answers: ensuring sufficient follow-up questions were asked, 
searching for contradictions, probing to ensure sufficient detail in answers and 
covering the whole interview schedule (Bryman & Bell, 2011; Dambrin & Robson, 
2011; Ryan et al., 2002). 
 
Notes were taken after each individual interview, and after each day, on emerging 
themes which seemed important or contradictory. As well as noting down key 
concepts, the ‘success’ of the interview was noted which helped revisions of the 
																																																								
5 See Appendix B for examples. 
6 Upon transcription, two interviews contained inaudible sections due to background 
noise from the location but much of the core argument was recovered from the 
combination of notes and audible audio (Bédard & Gendron, 2004, p. 199). 
	
81	
interview schedule (Bédard & Gendron, 2004, p. 199)7. For example these times 
were used to reflect upon the appropriateness of semi-structured interviewing and to 
build certain questions into the formal structure of the next interview. Frequent 
breaks were scheduled, if not after every interview then after every second one, for a 
period of fifteen minutes to allow brief reflection on these points and to prepare for 
the subsequent interview (Ryan et al., 2002, p. 154). Whilst minor revisions to the 
schedule were made during these breaks, more major revisions to the schedule were 
conducted after each phase of the data collection was complete (see below), 
interviews were transcribed, coded and analysed and themes began to emerge from 
the abductive iterations between data and existing theory (see Section 4.3.2 for 
justification and explanation of the abductive approach adopted). Thus the research 
questions were reformulated based on the themes emerging from the data (Bryman & 
Bell, 2011, p. 392; Gioia et al., 2013).  
 
The research was conducted in three phases beginning October 2013 and ending 
November 2014 with an interim phase in March 2014. Each phase was interspersed 
by periods of transcription, coding, analysis and reflection. Such a temporal spacing 
allowed revisiting emergent ideas and was essential for the abductive approach 
(Bryman & Bell, 2011). Additionally, as the study focused on the newly 
implemented performance appraisal process, such a temporal dimension allowed 
interaction immediately before, during and after the process was introduced to 
capture its impact over time and observe changes in practice as actors made sense of 
and responded to the process. Whilst interviews formed the main data collection 
method within each phase, various documents and periods of observation occurred 
around visits to interview and thus helped to inform, and were informed by, the 
interviews themselves. 
 
All in all, thirty-six interviews were conducted covering the entire managerial range8 
from Head of Branch to the Selling Partners. Interviews lasted on average one hour, 
																																																								
7 A copy of the interview schedule used in the final set of interviews is provided in 
Appendix B as an overview.  
8 The managerial structure within department stores includes: Head of Branch, 
Operations Manager (of Commercial Support), Operations Managers (of Selling 
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but ranged from forty-five minutes to two hours. Thirty-one of these interviews were 
within one branch. Three duplicate interviews were conducted with matching 
managerial positions in a separate branch. Additionally, a regional position was also 
interviewed within this branch, but who dealt with the principle branch under study 
in their role. Finally, one telephone interview was conducted, due to geographical 
restrictions, with a member of the Operations Development team who was involved 
with the design of the performance appraisal process. A full record of the interviews 
is provided in Appendix A.  
 
Interviewees were selected to represent the various spaces and positions of 
interaction across the branch. The branch was deemed an appropriate unit of analysis 
since the design of the performance appraisal process is centralised and then 
disseminated to each branch, and it is within each branch where the process actually 
occurs: where ideas are materialised into practice and meaning is constructed. By 
interviewing the entire managerial hierarchy the research was able to capture how 
individuals interacted around the performance measurement process: capturing both 
sides of the process where superiors attempt to control and subordinates attempt to 
make sense of these prescriptions and act accordingly, on repeated occasions and 
around the same underlying ideas. The selection of one branch allowed for a detailed 
tracing of ideas as they ‘cascaded’ down the hierarchical levels: by focusing on one 
branch it was easier to trace how an idea was interpreted, made sense of and 
responded to as it moves from the Head of Branch to managers and then to Selling 
Partners. As such, “an entire population” (Lounsbury, 2008, p. 357) was analysed by 
focusing on one department and being able to interview the entire managerial 
hierarchy.  
 
The nature of documentary analysis changed throughout the phases in the study. At 
the outset documentary analysis was limited to public documents and was employed 
to provide “rich historical context” and background information on the history of the 
																																																																																																																																																													
Department), Section Managers and Selling Partners. A second structure, termed 
“Registry” and tasked with ensuring the Partnership is run according to Principle 1, 
was also interviewed in full, and includes: Regional Registrar, Branch Business 
Partners and Assistant Registrars. See Section 4.2.2 for more information. 
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case organization, the environment in which it operates and the challenges it seemed 
to face (Smets et al., 2015, p. 939). These topics informed and supported the initial 
interviews, along with various theoretical concepts emerging from the literature. As 
trust developed, proprietary information was then obtained and analysed including 
training and guidance documents, electronic aspects of My Performance, pay 
increase guidance, completed performance appraisals, strategy documents, 
photographs of visual controls and information etc. These provided further support or 
points of conflict for subsequent interviews as well as providing information on the 
material ‘rules’ of how the performance appraisal process should be conducted 
(Bryman & Bell, 2011; Greenwood et al., 2011; Smets et al., 2015). Relevant phrases 
and sentences from these documents were transcribed verbatim and added to a ‘pool’ 
of data which formed from the transcription of interviews at the end of each phase of 
data collection (see Section 3.4.1 for more detail). 
 
Similarly, it was only later in the data collection period that meaningful observation 
could occur as trust developed between the company and the researcher (Bryman & 
Bell, 2011; Horton et al., 2008). During initial interaction informal chatting and 
photographs of available posters, reports, television screens etc. helped to provide 
background information and to highlight areas of interest of the employees 
themselves and of the company more widely. As time went on access was approved 
to increasingly sensitive settings including a number of branch-level Leadership 
Meetings. Such observation provided an opportunity to observe the Partnership’s 
principles in action and relate observations to interview data. In total such 
observation amounted to ten days throughout the three phases of data collection. A 
notepad, electronic recording device and camera were used in these circumstances 
and notes taken during, or immediately after, the event to provide the fullest 
recollection of information possible since “[m]emories can fade quickly.” (Ryan et 
al., 2002, p. 154) Again such observations were transcribed and added to the data 
pool. 
 
In total the data pool amounted to over three hundred single-lined pages of Microsoft 
Word which was analysed abductively throughout the three phases of data collection. 
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The following section documents in more detail how the data was collected during 
each of these three phases and how it was analysed and theorised after each phase: 
eventually culminating in the proposed questions and frameworks presented here. 
 
3.4 Data Analysis & Theorisation 
3.4.1 Data Analysis 
All interviews, relevant documentary quotes and observations were typed up 
manually and verbatim into a ‘data pool’ of information. Transcription of the data 
into a single pool allowed multiple examinations of the data, reduced the inherent 
“intuitive glosses that we might place on what people say,” accounted for natural 
limitations of memory, flagged inconsistencies worthy of further investigation and 
allowed comparison of the coding by others to ensure authenticity (Bryman & Bell, 
2011, p. 481).  
 
As this document grew it was analysed iteratively in order to abductively build on 
both the data and relevant theories (Gioia et al., 2013). The data pool was coded into 
three elements: first-order codes, second-order categories and third-order themes: 
which, together, reflect increasing levels of abstraction (Gioia et al., 2013; Ryan & 
Bernard, 2003; Smets et al., 2015). As the case study progressed these codes also 
developed in an iterative manner, where some were subsumed under categories and 
others were broken down into separate codes. For example whilst the aforementioned 
“obvious” codes were recoded deductively into two distinct sets of codes based on 
logics, other codes, such as “profit justification” and “equality” could be added under 
second-order categories of each ‘logic’, reflecting a more inductive form of coding 
combined with a more deductive form of theorising. Such iteration is typical of an 
abductive approach (Bryman & Bell, 2011). 
 
The first step following each phase of data collection was to thematically code the 
data inductively. The basic idea of thematic coding is to identify and group together 
“incidents, events, or pieces of conversation related to a particular theme” (Bryman 
& Bell, 2011, p. 391). As noted above, for example, many interviewees described 
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doing things as “common sense” or “just what we do” and these explanations were 
coded as “obvious”. Such codes emerged from reading through the data pool and 
looking for instances with similarity. Following this coding a master document was 
collated which listed all these first order codes. Such codes were then compared to 
deductive theory and a rough feel of ‘fit’ was determined; for example see Section 
3.4.2 below for detail of why a Bourdieusian lens was felt to provide a poor 
explanation of the empirics since there was little common understanding: reflected in 
codes such as “interpretation” and “amended action” and only a small collection of 
“aligned action” codes. Additionally such comparison aided in reframing the codes 
themselves: for instance from “obvious” to “institutionalised” as the institutional lens 
was applied to the coding. During this process the data pool was often referred back 
to and recoded deductively either by applying the most up to date codes or looking 
for empirical instances which matched deductive codes, such as “mediator” as 
govermentality was emerging as a selected lens.  
 
Such a process further deepened the relationship with the data by continually 
‘swimming’ in it and thereby helped to facilitate the second step: collating the first 
order codes into second order categories, or, in some instances, to split what had 
initially seemed as first order codes into two distinct codes under separate categories. 
For instance the inductive first order codes “profit focus”, “accountable” and “self-
sufficiency” were collated under the category “market logic”: again reflecting an 
inductive form of coding informed by deductively comparing the codes to theory The 
aim is to prevent forcing the data into a specific theoretical lens but at the same time 
aid theorising. In contrast, the first order code “obvious” was split into each category 
of “profit logic” or “partnership logic”. Again the abductive approach meant that 
certain categories which emerged inductively from seemingly similar codes, such as 
“approachable”, “autonomy” and “coherence” that were initially collated under a 
category of “partnership values”, eventually became part of the “partnership logic” 
category through deductive consideration of the data,  
 
The final step again reflects abductivity and iterating between inductive and 
deductive reasoning in order to move from second order categories into third order 
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themes. For instance the final theme of “moderating factors” influencing the 
variations in response emerged from an iterative process of comparison between 
deductively considering the data and inductively considering the emergent codes; in 
this instance the theme eventually emerged from noticing the variation in responses 
and subsequently going back to look, both inductively and deductively for reasons 
for this variation. Here deductive theorising provided the category of “underlying ties 
to each logic” whilst inductive theorising highlighted those of “self-interest” and 
“others’ influence”. Similarly, it became apparent that there were different levels of 
tension experienced as actors interacted with multiple ideas. Further analysis of these 
patterns then highlighted the different ways that ideas were combined: re/framed, 
added or merged, and the likelihood of success under each method (see Section 3.4.2 
below for more detail). Such a process was facilitated by ‘swimming’ in the data, 
various presentations of the work in textual, oral and graphical formats but ultimately 
represents an uncodifiable “creative leap” from categories to codes and the 
theorisation of an answer to the research questions (Langley, 1999, p. 691). Such a 
leap is undoubtedly informed by the theoretical lenses which are salient to the 
researcher since it is untenable to have a truly blank mind when conducting research 
(Bryman & Bell, 2011; Horton et al., 2008; Ryans et al., 2002). However, by 
documenting the reasons for selecting and not selecting each theory in the following 
section (Section 3.4.2 below) a sort of audit trail can be constructed which 
documents to some extent how theorisation occurred in an iterative mix between 
inductively swimming in the data alongisde deductively considering this data. 
 
After each phase of data collection was complete (see section 3.4.2 below for details) 
this process was repeated until the research questions and theoretical frames settled. 
As data collection progressed the focus shifted from first order codes to second order 
categories and eventually to third order themes reflective of an increasing concern 
for abstraction and theorising. After data collection was complete, the final data pool 
was manually re-coded both bottom-up and top-down twice more again and the 
aforementioned process repeated until theoretical saturation occurred: the point at 
which new codes, categories and themes stopped emerging (Bryman & Bell, 2011; 
Gioia et al., 2013; Langley, 1999). It was at this point that a fourth phase of data 
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collection was deemed unnecessary and that the extant number of interviews was 
deemed to have provided sufficient data from which to theorise answers to the 
research questions. The final codes used are documented in the Data Tables 
presented in Appendix C which contain exemplary raw data, first order codes, 
second order categories and, finally, associated themes. Data tables were looked over 
by two independent and experienced researchers to check for consistency, coherence 
and authenticity, with no suggestions for alteration (Ryan et al., 2002, p. 156). 
 
Whilst this section outlines in detail the process of analysis, the following section 
documents how theorisation occurred between each phase of data collection and 
describes how the abductive approach adopted facilitates this process and is a 
justifiable approach to theorising. 
3.4.2 Data Theorisation 
An abductive approach uses elements of both inductive and deductive theorising 
(Bryman & Bell, 2011). It relies on “an initial inductive hunch or insight originating 
from the empirical data” which is then worked to “a higher level of abstraction” 
based on an iterative process of further coding and comparison to currently existing 
theory (Smets et al., 2015, p. 939). Whilst a fully inductive approach seeks to build 
theory out of the data, starting from a theoretically neutral ‘blank slate’ in an extreme 
sense like Grounded Theory Method (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), a deductive approach 
seeks to test existing theory (Bryman & Bell, 2011, p. 13).  
 
An abductive approach relies on aspects of both of these approaches: letting the data 
“mumble” (Chapman, 2013) and then comparing the emerging themes and concepts 
to those of existing literature, eventually settling on a theory and seeking to extend 
that theory through the abstracted empirics (Gioia et al., 2013; Smets et al., 2015). 
Beginning with the empirical puzzle and through “constant comparison” (Bryman & 
Bell, 2011, p. 577) between the data and existing theories, an abductive approach 
prevents pigeon-holing the data into any one theory. Thus it seeks to avoid 
“premature closure” of the theorising by ‘forcing’ the data into the categories of 
existing theory whilst at the same time seeking to extend existing theory rather than 
create grounded theory (Bryman & Bell, 2011, p. 326). By approaching data with 
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multiple, but loose, theoretical frames, a researcher is able to identify a suitable 
theory (albeit, probably, not a ‘complete’ one) for the uniqueness of the data (Berry 
& Otley, 2004). Thus an abductive approach is highly iterative between data and 
theory and seeks to build theory by both inductively and deductively coding the data, 
categorising emerging themes and concepts, comparing to existing literature and 
developing existing theory (Bryman & Bell, 2011, p. 393; Gioia et al., 2013; Smets 
et al., 2015, p. 939).  
 
Such an approach parallels the ontological underpinnings noted above since 
deductive analysis is concerned with identifying pre-constructed and ‘real’ 
constructions whilst inductive analysis is concerned with exploring how these 
constructions are enacted fluidly: thus following Elder-Vass’ (2012) argument on the 
reality of constructed assemblages (see Section 3.2.3). Similarly an abductive 
approach seeks to make more explicit the theories which undoubtedly inform 
research interests despite best efforts to adopt a tabula rasa approach, whilst at the 
same time avoid the pigeon-holing noted above (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Accordingly 
it was deemed the most appropriate form of analysis.  
 
The initial research interest in organising within a potentially more ‘social’ 
organisation focused on accounting since this is perhaps the most pervasive and 
taken for granted form of organising (Bromley & Powell, 2012). Accounting is 
inherently interested in the “allocation of responsibility” (Miller & Power, 2013, p. 
583) and coordinating by holding things to account and measuring accounts of 
behaviour. Accounting consists of a multitude of “calculative practices […] that 
allow accountants and others to describe and act on entities, processes, and persons.” 
(Chapman et al., 2009, p. 1) It “makes the incomparable comparable [ …by] 
turn[ing] qualities […] into quantities, through devices such as patient satisfaction 
questionnaires, rankings, […] balanced scorecards, and much else besides.” 
(Mennicken & Miller, 2012, pp. 7-8) These practices create the ‘governable person’ 
(Miller & O’Leary, 1987) which can be acted upon from a distance (Cooper & 
Robson, 2006; Robson, 1992). In so doing, accounting has a fundamentally 
constitutive role in shaping the activities, and realities, of people, society and 
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institutions: thus, “[w]hile accounting is profoundly technical, its role […] is also and 
simultaneously profoundly institutional” (Miller & Power, 2013, p. 558). In other 
words, accounting is powerful in its ability to organise. Additionally it was felt that 
in such an organisational setting something traditionally associated with hierarchical 
control and inflexibility might be used in an interesting manner or with interesting 
effects in such a seemingly alternative and ‘flat’ setting (Chenhall, 2008; Davila et 
al., 2009).  
 
The specific focus on the practices and processes of performance evaluation emerged 
through the abductive approach. To begin with the performance appraisal process 
was considered as a potential core element, but only one potential element, of the 
broader accounting regime: “[p]erhaps the most intuitive contemporary function of 
accounting.” (Miller & Power, 2013, p. 583) By definition the performance appraisal 
process is interested in organising individuals to perform in a certain manner (Malmi 
& Brown, 2008). Such a loose interest reflects some deduction since it informs and 
shapes the researcher’s interests. However, the study wasn’t limited to accounting 
tools or even performance measurement in a predetermined way and instead 
followed accounting rather than focusing solely on accountants (Hopper, 1999; 
Miller & Power, 2013; Mouritsen & Hansen, 2006). Whilst the formal and “visible 
apparatus” of accounting is important, this project gives no less attention to the 
“more ‘informal’ accounting agenda” (Jeacle & Carter, 2012, p. 740) which 
underpins various decisions and actions. In other words it is interested in the 
practices and processes of accounting in the everyday lives of those it affects: the 
“whole field in which accounting is practiced within organizations” (Jeacle & Carter, 
2012, p. 746), rather than the technicalities of the practice itself (Ahrens & Chapman, 
2004, 2007; Dambrin & Robson, 2011; Ezzamel, Lilley & Willmott, 2004; Hopper, 
1999; Humphrey & Scapens, 1996). Such an interest, and an abductive approach, is 
reflected in the final decision to narrow down on performance appraisal since this 
became of increasing importance and significance as the study progressed. For 
instance it was mentioned in all the initial interviews as a core part of the 
organisation and as something both managers and subordinates relied upon to 
coordinate and make sense of things. In other words the focus on performance 
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measurement was of theoretical interest whilst at the same time being of interest to 
the actors who were being studied; as the study progressed this process seemed to be 
of increasing importance to both spheres and thus became the final focus and interest 
of the research questions. 
 
Beginning the study inductively and following seemingly interesting aspects (Gioia 
et al., 2013), phase one data collection sought to understand the issues and concerns 
within the organisation and unpack a little of how organising happened within John 
Lewis. Whilst phase one data collection was aimed broadly at descriptive 
questioning to understand areas of interest and to help narrow down the research 
questions, interview schedules were loosely informed by notions from Foucault, 
Bourdieu, Giddens and Latour. Notions of discipline, fields, structure-agency and 
action-at-a-distance through representation all seemed potentially relevant to how 
actors made ideas real in the organising of subordinates in a more ‘social’ setting. 
Following each phase of data analysis and some ‘swimming’ in the codes, the 
empirics were written up under the lens of the chosen theory, or theories, and 
presented at various conferences or workshops in order to highlight strengths, 
weaknesses, mismatches between the empirics and the theoretical narrative and 
strains of interest. Upon reflection of this critique the following phase of data 
collection could focus more explicitly on these issues. 
 
Upon analysing the data pool after phase one, none of the theories seemed able to 
explain the full variation of the empirics, particularly in relation to how actors’ made 
sense of what they were doing. For instance, the concept of ‘field’ seemed blurry at 
the given level of analysis and whilst more recent theorisations of Bourdieu’s ideas 
(for example Fligstein & MacAdam, 2012) were applied, they too seemed difficult to 
apply to the empirics since there was very little shared understanding or collective 
agreement, even within what could be described as very micro-level fields. Likewise, 
and again influenced by the level of analysis, it was difficult to trace between the 
‘macro’ and the ‘micro’ given establishing even sub-fields of collective agreement 
seemed difficult. Additionally, as noted above, practicalities of access hindered a full 
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ANT approach as sufficiently detailed ethnographic and documentary evidence was 
not forthcoming during the early stages of the study.  
 
Despite this, many notions from each theorist are adopted in the others and are 
reflected in the theorisation here, for instance: notions of the felicity conditions of 
performativity come from Bourdieu (1977); the notion of understanding how 
symbolic ideas become materialised in practice reflects Giddens’ (1984) interest in 
the interaction between the macro and the micro; and the notion of a mediating 
instrument strongly parallels, and indeed explicitly builds upon (see Miller & Rose, 
2008), the notion of inscription and action-at-a-distance from Latour’s work.  
 
Thus whilst Foucault seemed to provide the most appropriate broad lens with a focus 
on the importance of ‘small figures’ and the willing acceptance of discipline9, the 
nuance of the empirics was still left unexplained, particularly surrounding how actors 
made sense of what to do. Thus phase two data collection targeted more explicitly 
how actors made sense of the prescriptions and requests of the performance appraisal 
process in an attempt to explain variation. Accordingly, these questions were 
informed by institutional theory since many of the explanations of sense making had 
been coded “obvious” – from the inductive analysis whereby actors would literally 
describe (sometimes completely opposite) practices as the obvious or common-sense 
way to do things. A second notion from institutional theory that seemed to chime 
with the empirics, over and above values becoming taken-for-granted, was the 
Scandinavian School’s approach to the way institutions were translated, rather than 
diffused, into practice (see Boxenbaum & Strangaard Pedersen, 2009 for an 
overview) which seemed to help explain, at least to a degree, the level of variation in 
responses. 
 
Following phase two data collection, the data pool was updated and re-analysed 
again. Whilst Foucault provided the initial broad interest, analysis of the growing 
																																																								
9 Remarkably, for instance, one interviewee in phase one commented that the 
business restructuring was “absolutely […] the right thing to do” despite that 
interviewee having been made redundant just six-months before their twenty-five 
year employment anniversary and associated six-month paid leave. 
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data pool highlighted the important ability of the performance appraisal instrument in 
describing the “ideal” partner (Manager). Such aspirations and material importance 
seemed to reflect the programmatics and technologies important in govermentality 
and thus helped to narrow the research questions further. For instance, whilst the 
instrument seemed appropriately able to mediate between multiple spaces, what 
seemed less explained was how such variation could occur if the instrument was able 
to link, for instance, the ideas of senior management to the front-line staff. From this 
line of thinking, the first two research questions emerged. Similarly, institutional 
theory itself seemed unsuited to explaining the empirics of the case with a reliance 
on hero-entrepreneurs or exogenoeus shocks to explain seemingly large and 
distinctive changes, whereas the empirics seemed more like a constant state of small 
but fluid adaptations and alterations. Having an abductive approach again helped to 
theorise the findings in a more meaningful way. For example whilst the initial 
“obvious” codes were collated into a seeming mass of different perspectives, 
applying institutional logics, with a focus on pluralism and complexity, helped to 
recognise that there were in fact two distinct types of “obvious” sense-making: one 
surrounding a commercial interest in sustaining the profitability of the organisation, 
and a second around the happiness of partners. Similalry, the logics perspective also 
helped to think about the variations evident in actors responses given its social 
constructionist underpinning and the inter-institutional system (Friedland & Alford, 
1991). Iterating between inductive and deductive coding in such a manner, for 
example by looking to see if any inductive codes matched these constructs, helped to 
highlight, for example, that these symbolic values were distinct and, furthermore, 
that they were instantiated explicitly in the Partnership’s constitution and aim.  
 
In combining governmentality and the institutional logics perspective the finalised 
research questions emerged and upon recoding and reflecting upon the existing data 
pool, it was felt that the empirics weren’t focused enough on these issues so as to 
fully answer the specified research questions. Accordingly phase three data 
collection was arranged so as to provide more data to answer these explicit questions 




Phase three data collection focused specifically on the governance of the mediating 
instrument and how actors’ made sense of these responses: thus reiterating the first 
two research questions. In other words phase three sought to understand explicitly 
what factors moderated the variation of actors’ responses to a mediating instrument. 
The final research question emerged as a theorisation of an answer to these questions 
was constructed and as the story was compared to extant theory as it was realised 
that current theory within institutional logics explains that variation occurs as actors 
interact with multiple logics (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006), in some instances 
where actors are particularly skilled (McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Smets et al., 
2015), but not all the time (Muzio & Faulconbridge, 2013), and we know little about 
what drives such variations (Raviola & Norbäk, 2013).  
 
At this point the entire data pool was recoded both inductively and deductively to 
accumulate all relevant information to inform the theorising. For example, it was 
only during this final stage that the lens of performativity was selected to categorise 
the variations in responses to the instrument since neither the logics perspective or 
mediating instruments concept seemed suited to such categorisation at the individual 
level. Similarly it was only at this stage that patterns in the way ideas were made 
sense of were noted: for example that the variation in actors responses could be 
categorised under justifications of obviousness, internal reflection or external 
persuasion (which eventually became: underlying ties to existing logics, self interest 
and others’ persuasion). Finally, various write ups, presentations, discussions and 
reflections of such theorising helped to illuminate that ideas were combined in 
distinct ways under each of these three categories: that ideas were framed or re-
framed where underlying ties were strong, that they were added where self interest 
was strong and that they were merged where others’ persuasion was successful. As 
such the likelihood of effective performativity could be categorised under each of 
these ways of combining and rationalising ideas and the first two research questions 
answered. The final research question was answered again through various write ups, 
presentations and reflection of the material as it became clear that sense making was 
not always obvious, but instead some actors experienced tension as they tried to 
reconcile competing ideas, but that they were able to, in some instances at least, 
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reconcile this tension and generate effective performativity by recognising the 
legitimacy of alternatives. 
 
In terms of final theories, performativity seemed appropriate to categorise the 
variation in responses given its compatibility with the chosen two theories: 
particulalry because of its focus on materiality and existing application within both 
theories (see, for example, Miller & Rose, 2008 within governmentality and 
Friedland, 2013 within institutional logics). Similarly, governmentality and the 
institutional logics perspective seemed appropriate theoretical lenses for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, as noted above (see sections 2.1 and 2.4), conceptualising an answer 
to the research questions required a theorisation of control alongside a theorisation of 
sense making. Such a combination helps to understand the process of governing and 
the factors which moderate variation as ideas are made real in practice. 
Governmentality was eventually selected as a first theoretical lens because of its 
Foucauldian notions of willing compliance, its focus on instruments and its analytical 
interest in the small and seemingly mundane practices which nonetheless ‘engineer 
the human soul’ (Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 5).  
 
Likewise an appropriate theoretical lens was required to conceptualise how actors 
might respond to such attempted governance. Whilst governmentality theorises how 
government is manifest in contemporary societies, it focuses on the production of 
government rather than it’s consumption. In other words, governmentality provides 
little theorisation of how or why actors might respond differently to the same 
governance attempts. Accordingly, it was felt that a theory was required to 
conceptualise how actors might make sense of these attempts to govern them. As 
noted above, the institutional logics perspective and associated literature in the 
broader field of Institutional Theory were eventually selected to help understand how 
actors might make sense of attempts to govern their behaviour (Ocasio, 1999). The 
logics perspective complemented the case findings in that multiple rationalities were 
evident from the value systems arising from a business focus and a second system 
relating to partnership values. These concepts emerged inductively in coding and the 
logics perspective then helped to theorise these codes into second-order categories. 
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Institutional logics were thus deemed an appropriate complement to the 
governmentality lens since at least aspects of both are philosophically compatible, 
they have similar interests, complement each other’s weaknesses and were both 
helpful for, and could be helped by, the empirical material at hand (see Section 2.4 
above for a fuller justification of compatibility).  
 
Once the final theoretical lenses had settled into the holistic framework presented in 
Section 2.5, this framework was applied in order to make sense of the empirics and 
to highlight the contributions the empirics made to this framework. The empirics 
were categorised under the degree to which symbolic ideas were amended as they 
were enacted in practice through a mediating instrument (see sections 4.3.4 and 
5.3.5). This provided a continuum from high reflected to highly refracted which was 
informed by notions from both theoretical perspectives; firstly from the fluidity and 
variation expected as actors respond to accounting instruments (see Section 2.2.1.4) 
and secondly from the multiplicity expected as actors construct symbolic logics in 
practice (see sections 2.3.2.1 and 2.3.2.2.3).  
 
Such categories could then be further analysed by exploring how actors rationalised 
and justified their actions under each part of the continuum. Whilst some actions 
were taken for granted (as expected by institutional theory), these were, surprisingly, 
observed clearly at either end of the continuum but not in the middle; in other words 
where action was deemed obvious, the mediating instrument was effectively 
performative in enacting one logic but not the other, or was counter-performative 
where one logic was reframed under the alternative.10 Further, such sense making 
didn’t fully explain when the instrument was performative and when it was not since 
where action was taken for granted, counter-intuitively, this seemed likely to 
engender ineffective performativity where actors were generally unwilling to 
combine logics. In contrast, the middle of the continuum demonstrated instances 
where actors were able to combine these dual ideas, albeit experiencing varying 
degrees of tension as they did so. It was noted that such tension was low at each of 
																																																								
10 There were a third set of less common instances where both logics were taken for 
granted and enacted in practice, see Section 5.4.1 and 5.5 for more detail. 
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the continuum and higher in the middle. This highlighted that actors were dealing 
with these tensions only in the middle of the continuum where ideas were combined.  
 
Thus the analysis returned to exploring how these actors made sense of what to do to 
reconcile such tension in order to construct a reality which meant they could enact 
multiple ideas in practice: where the instrument was effectively performative. It was 
noted that such reconciliation occurred under two particular methods: an internal 
reflection considering one’s own position and situations where external persuasion 
was used to convince actors of appropriateness. Further, in exploring the variations 
in tension felt by actors throughout the continuum it was noted that duality was 
enacted under different methods in each of these three ways of rationalising 
behavior: that symbolic logics were either easily framed or reframed where 
underlying ties to existing logics were strong and little tension was felt; that symbolic 
logics could be added together with some tension where these underlying ties were 
weak but where self interest was strong; and that symbolic logics could also be 
merged together successfully after experiencing a larger degree of tension where 
others’ persuasion was strong, but that this required a particular set of skills which 
could, and indeed did, often fail. Accordingly these constructs emerged from such an 
iterative process of abductive theorising recognising traits and patterns in the 
empirics, seeking explorations of these patterns in the theory, going back to the 
empirics to see if this explained the full story and theorising those parts which were 
not covered by the theoretical framework and eventually providing the contributions 
back to the theories by exploring how the un-theorised aspects of the empirical 
narrative occurred. As such it helps to document to uncodifiable “creative leap” from 
analysis to theory building (Langley, 1999, p. 691). 
 
3.5 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter outlines the research methodology. In so doing it provides an 
illustration of how the research questions are answered. It begins with an overview of 
the philosophical underpinnings of research: outlining the related concerns of 
ontology and epistemology. Having outlined the approach adopted in this project as 
idealist and anti-positivistic (and ideographic), respectively, it then moves on to 
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outline how the constructionist approach combines and extends these positions to 
provide a position which draws on realism for the material aspects of reality, but 
which nonetheless recognises the constitutive nature of meanings and language upon 
how those objects are used, and the effects this has on them in practice. It argues that 
such a position chimes with governmentality and the institutional logics perspective, 
and, perhaps inadvertently, many other constructionist approaches (Elder-Vass, 
2012). Further, it outlines the aim of constructionist research as having underlying 
emancipatory and humanist concerns by deconstructing things that are taken for 
granted. It also outlines an argument for the role of case study research within such a 
position where reality can never be truthfully represented, instead arguing, based on 
Quattrone (2006), that we seek to narrate lacunas, the presence of some absence, and 
that the aim should be to generate interest between people so as to highlight how 
their taken for granted realities are not inevitable and could be different (Woolgar, 
2015).  
 
Building on these notions of knowledge and research, the chapter moves on to 
outline the specific methods adopted to generate such knowledge in this project. It 
begins with an overview of why a qualitative approach was adopted: informed by the 
constructionist perspective of the researcher and ultimately a personal value 
judgement. It continues to outline that a case study was selected as the research 
design and justifies such an approach in contrast to potential alternatives for reasons 
of balance, practicality and research interests. Following this, it outlines how semi-
structured interviews, documentary analysis and observation were used, and why 
they were appropriate methods, to generate detailed accounts of how action occurred 
around the performance appraisal process, and how actors made sense of this process 
and of their actions. Building upon these sections, the chapter closes with an 
overview of how the data was analysed based on the Gioia method (Gioia et al., 
2013) seeking to increase abstraction from first order codes through second order 
categories and to third order themes. Finally, the chapter concludes with an overview 
of how the theorisation occurred during the project and justifies the final selected 
theories, as well as documenting, and again justifying, the abductive approach 
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adopted to theorise the data. Thus this chapter has detailed some of the ‘behind the 
scenes’ work that is evident in conducting, analysing and writing research.  
 
Having summarised the literature informing this project and the philosophical and 
practical implications involved in conducting research to fill these gaps in the 
literature, this thesis now turns to narrating an empirical story through which the 
research questions can be answered and which also contributes to understanding of 



























Chapter 4: Case Site & Findings 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the case site and findings: seeking to weave them into an 
empirical storyline. It builds on earlier chapters which introduce the project and 
highlight how there is a gap in the literature of both mediating instruments and 
institutional logics in relation to the process through which ideas are made real: the 
process of governing. This chapter begins by presenting the case setting to detail how 
the performance appraisal process works in practice. It introduces John Lewis 
Department Stores as the employee-owned Partnership where the case study was 
conducted. It provides a brief overview of the company background for context 
before outlining the process of performance appraisal within the organization.  
 
It then turns to the findings sections to detail the empirical story. The layout follows 
the research questions, which, for sake of clarity, are: (1) how do actors respond to a 
mediating instrument, (2) what factors moderate these responses and (3) how do 
actors recognise the legitimacy of alternatives? Whilst the research questions are 
answered explicitly in the following chapter, this chapter details the empirical story 
from which they are answered. Specifically, this section is broken down into four 
parts to demonstrate: (i) what the ideas evident within the case setting are (both the 
formalised ideas in the performance appraisal process and the informal ideas enacted 
in practice), (ii) how these formal ideas come to enacted in practices, (iii) in a 
multitude of different ways, and (iv) what causes such multiplicity. 
 
4.2 Case Site 
4.2.1 Introduction 
This section outlines where the research was conducted. It provides an overview of 
the John Lewis Partnership and its recent history in order to situate the findings 
within their social, political, institutional and temporal context. Firstly it presents 
how John Lewis is attempting to respond to various contextual pressures and, 
accordingly, how they have developed a new performance appraisal process. The 
following section documents the design, implementation and use of the new 
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performance appraisal process so as to outline how the process works in order to 
provide a fuller understanding of the findings: which are presented following this 
section. 
4.2.2 Company Background 
The UK based, employee-owned retailer John Lewis Department Stores (hereafter 
John Lewis or the Partnership) provides the setting in which the research took place. 
The John Lewis Partnership, as the parent company, is the largest employee-owned 
company in the UK and paid out over £200m in bonuses to its ‘Partners’11 in 2015, 
representing 11% of their salary. John Lewis offer some 350,000 high-end consumer 
goods both in-store and on-line. In 2015, some 38,000 Partners operating from 40 
stores grew sales by 7.5% to over £4bn. John Lewis have a distinguished reputation 
for customer service and are considered the UK’s leading retailer12. Much of their 
success is promoted as arising from their ownership model; a model which the, then, 
Deputy Prime Minister called to be replicated to create a “John Lewis economy” in 
the UK (Nick Clegg as cited by Mason, 2012).  
 
The Partnership was formed in 1929 when one of the founding family members 
transferred ownership of the company to its employees13 in an “endeavour to create a 
different sort of company, owned by Partners dedicated to serving customers with 
flair and fairness.” (Partnership, 2009, p. 7). John Spedan Lewis had “the happiness 
of his employees firmly at the centre of his mind.”14 His “bold” and “visionary […] 
ideal” is “embodied” in the Constitution of the Partnership which keeps the ideal “as 
alive today as it was 80 years ago.”13 This ideal is formally outlined in the 
																																																								
11 A ‘Partner’ is anyone enrolled in the Partnership. After a probationary period of 
six months all staff; even part-time, are enrolled into the Partnership. Typically 
“Partners” was used as a term to denote non-managerial Partners by interviewees, 
but it technically refers to both managerial and non-managerial Partners. 
12 They frequently win industry awards; for example they were presented the Oracle 
Retail Week Awards 2013, Best Multichannel Retailer and Which, Best Retailer, 
2013. 
13 Technically the Partnership is owned in trust for its employees. See Paranque and 




Partnership’s Constitution (2009, p. 3) through Principle 1 which “defines how we 
run our business” and states:  
The Partnership’s ultimate purpose is the happiness of all its members, 
through their worthwhile and satisfying employment in a successful 
business.15 
 
The governance structure of John Lewis consists of separate business functions 
supporting each other, and the Chairman, to run the business. The company is 
overseen by the Partnership Board and Registry: who’s task it is to make sure the 
business is being run according to Principle 1. Various Committees and 
Representatives feed Partner Voice back through these channels to ensure this 
occurs. In addition, there is an annual Partner Survey that gathers opinion as well as 
the local and company-wide internal magazines (The Chronicle and Gazette 
respectively): where any Partner can submit a question or concern and may receive a 
response from the Management Board. Each magazine, again, provides the 
opportunity to provide feedback to the Management on whether the business is being 
run according to Principle 1. The Management Board oversees the general running of 
the business and works with Operational Development to design business-
improvement initiatives. Operational Development and many of the other business 
functions are also centralised in London, including: finance, personnel, corporate, 
procurement etc. These then communicate with the individual branches to create a 
consistent shopping experience in each branch across the company. 
 
A Managing Director (MD), or Head of Branch, is responsible for the performance 
of each branch. Branches are split into three Directorates (Home, Fashion and 
Electronics & Home Technologies (EHT)). An Operations Manager of Selling is 
appointed to run each Directorate. The three Operations Managers of Selling, a 
Personnel Manager and an Operations Manager of Commercial Support form the 
Steering Group who support the MD in running the branch according to Principle 1 
and the criteria set by central teams. Each directorate is then split into Selling 
Sections (Women’s Wear, Shoes, Audio & TV etc.) that are run by Section Managers 
																																																								
15 Whilst these quotes are clearly open to more critical analysis, the point is merely to 




who are line managed by the relevant Operations Manager of Selling. The Section 
Managers are responsible for their Selling Section and the Selling Partners within it. 
A Regional Registrar manages multiple branches within various geographical 
Regions (on behalf of the Registry function) and is supported by Assistant Registrars 
in each branch. These work closely with the Steering Group to ensure the business is 
run according to Principle 116. 
 
John Lewis has consistently performed favourably since its inception, however there 
have been substantial changes in the retail industry which intensified during the early 
2000’s (Fernie & Sparks, 2004). Notably, increased competition from online shops is 
seriously threatening the traditional, high street, department-store business model 
which John Lewis employs (Hawkes, 2013; RBS Retail Report, 2013; Thomson, 
2012). The annual bonus awarded to Partners reflects these increasing pressures: it 
has fallen from as high as 24% of salary in the mid 1980s to below 10% in the early 
2000s (Kollewe & Butler, 2015). Accordingly17 John Lewis’ Management Board and 
Operations Development designed and implemented the Retail Revolution Strategy – 
a ten-year plan to reassert themselves as “Britain’s leading retailer.” (Manager) 
Despite this, the Partnership rewarded Partners in 2015 with the lowest bonus (as a 
percentage of their salary) they have had in twelve years: eleven per cent (Kollewe & 
Butler, 2015). They still face considerable challenges; challenges, however, which 
they feel are combatted by the Retail Revolution Strategy. 
 
The Retail Revolution Strategy is a holistic approach to “drive” John Lewis 
“forward” by “ask[ing] more of every single Partner.” (Manager) It is an umbrella 
																																																								
16 This structure changed slightly throughout the case study: Personnel Managers 
were centralised but replaced in-branch by a Business Partner (who could in fact be 
the same person). Additionally, the Assistant Registrar role was centralised. A 
Regional Operations Improvement Team (a single person for each region but 
working as a team across the country) was also appointed to support operational 
improvements. 
17 Market conditions were repeatedly cited as the reason for the Retail Revolution 
Strategy in both documents and interviews but there may, of course, be more critical 
reasoning of why and how this strategy arose. Whilst exploring the formation of the 
strategy would be an extremely interesting topic, here we are interested more in how 
such a strategy influences the activities of the Selling Partners, rather than the 
formation of the strategy per se, and do not delve into this subject in any more detail. 
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term under which many change projects have been implemented. These include on-
going centralisation of business functions, removal of a management layer within 
department stores (an initiative titled Future Management Structures (FMS)) and 
updating the performance appraisal process and associated accounting and control 
practices. The Retail Revolution Strategy has been running for five years and the 
aforementioned initiatives (except the performance appraisal process: which was 
introduced during the study) were on-going to reinforce the strategy and had been 
going on since before the case study began. 
4.2.3 The Performance Appraisal Process 
The updated performance appraisal process, titled My Performance, sets out a “guide 
to the Partnership Behaviours and your Annual Review of Performance.” (My 
Performance, 2009, p. 1) It performs a dual role in outlining expected behaviours and 
targets, and then recompensing Partners against those targets through an Annual 
Review of Performance (ARP). The overall process includes: a hard-copy My 
Performance booklet, or guide, explaining the process, targets and expected 
behaviours; an electronic element of the Partner Intranet (termed Partner Link) 
where Partners and managers input information, which triggers standardised letters 
and information and which performs various calculations; a face-to-face ARP 
meeting to discuss and decide on Performance Ratings and to develop a Personal 
Development Plan (PDP) which formalises targets and objectives for the coming 
year and which are input into the electronic aspect of My Performance; a separate, 
but supporting, hard-copy pamphlet outlining appropriate pay bands based on 
Performance Ratings; a managerial Calibration exercise to consider and promote 
consistency; and, finally, communication of the Performance Ratings and Salary 
Increase to the individual Partner through Partner Link.  
 
The Annual Review of Performance is identical in format across John Lewis. ARPs 
take place within a six-month period from September to February at the discretion of 
the line-manager. The manager triggers the APR process using Partner Link which 
then generates a standardised letter informing the Partner of the details of the APR 
meeting and what to prepare. Partners must rate themselves on sets of criteria and 




Assessment is split between two criteria reflecting the dual aim of the Partnership to 
simultaneously promote Partner happiness and successful business practices. These 
include various Targets, termed the What, and Behaviours, termed the How. The 
criteria contain quantitative and qualitative, as well as financial and non-financial, 
measures. Under each heading Partners are measured on four aspects, presented 
below in Figures 1 and 2. 
 
                 
Figures 1 & 2: My Performance Criteria for What (left) and How (right) 
    
Under the What criteria, measurements of these respective criteria are based on 
Partners’: Skills Profile (‘skills to do role’), Job Description (‘delivers expected 
requirements’), a subjective basis of their (‘contribution to the department’) and a 
mix of KPIs and personal targets (termed Objectives). Every Partner should have 
formalised Business Objectives that contribute to the Retail Revolution Strategy by 
focusing on its “4+1” goals (Manager). These goals focus on Partner, Profit, 
Customer, Sales and Shrinkage (stock wastage). Each is attributed a measure: 
Branch Level Partner Survey result, Net Operating Profit, Customer Satisfaction 
Survey result, Gross Catchment Sales and a Shrinkage Target, respectively. Each of 
these goals should form a KPI in every Partner’s Objectives, alongside other, more 
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personal, objectives. Measures of ‘skills to do their role’ and ‘delivers expected 
requirements’ are also formalised in the Partner’s Role Profile and Job Description, 
respectively. ‘Contribution to the department’ is measured informally and 
subjectively by the line-manager, and any remaining (personal) Objectives are more 
flexible and can be set by the Partner upon agreement with their line manager. 
 
Under the second measurement, the How, Partners are ranked based on their 
behaviour. The performance appraisal process sets out the expected behaviour for 
Selling Partners and Section Managers (Operations Managers and above are assessed 
on a similar but extended set of criteria) in three Commitments, each of which has 
two associated Behaviours, which derive from, and support, Principle 1. The 
Commitments include: ‘Build relationships powered by our principles’;  ‘Take 
responsibility for our business success’ and ‘Create real influence over our working 
lives’. The Behaviours, respectively, include: ‘Takes Pride in Ownership’ and 
‘Makes things happen’; ‘Delivers Excellent Service’ and ‘Works together’ and, 
finally, ‘Develops self and others’ and ‘Is open to and adapts to change.’ These are 
presented below in Figures 3 and 4.  
 
 





Figure 4: The Six Associated Behaviours for Each Commitment 
In addition, there is a more extensive explanation of each of the Behaviours that 
outlines both positive and negative Indicators. For example, under the “Takes pride 
in ownership” Behaviour of the “Takes responsibility for our business success” 
Commitment, the positive indicators include “can explain how our history and our 
Partnership principles of co-ownership underpin our business […] voices their 
opinion openly and constructively […] accepts responsibility for mistakes and learns 
from them” etc. (My Performance, 2009, p. 12) The negatives include, for example, 
“Is driven by the need for short term or personal gain, thinks only about their part of 
the business not the business as a whole […] is unwilling to put themselves out” etc. 
(My Performance, 2009, p. 12). 
 
Each Partner ranks themself on a sliding scale from Underperforming, through 
Developing, Good, Very Good and to Outstanding separately for each of the sub-
criteria under the What and the How. The criteria for these distinctions are to do with 
consistency and quality. Underperforming is where most of the criteria are not being 
displayed, Developing is where some are and others are improving, Good is meeting 
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all the criteria consistently (as highlighted in figures 1 and 2 above), Very Good is 
occasionally demonstrating some attributes of their immediate manager and 
Outstanding is consistently displaying all attributes of their immediate manager.  
 
This self-rating is then sent to the manager: for review and to assist in their 
preparation. Face-to-face ARP (Annual Review of Performance) meetings then occur 
in private meeting rooms where the Partner and manager discuss the ratings the 
Partner has given themself. Once a conclusion has been reached the manager is 
directed to input the agreed What and How ratings and reasoning separately into the 
electronic system, Partner Link, during the meeting. For example, a Partner might be 
graded Very Good for the What (where they hit all their targets and deliver some 
extra objectives, deliver requirements above their role profile and job description, 
and make a strong contribution to the department by, for example, coordinating a 
sales night or stock take whilst a manager is away on holiday), but Developing for 
the How (where they failed to satisfy their manager that they had worked together 
with others or contributed to the partnership spirit and local community for 
example).  
 
Following this, the Manager and Partner set Objectives for the coming year: 
comprising of both formal Business Objectives related to the 4+1 targets and 
Personal Objectives related to training, other Behaviours, or anything else not 
included in the formal Business Objectives. These are entered into the system during 
the meeting and automatically sent to the electronic Personal Development Plan 
which is stored electronically and is accessible to both the Selling Partners and 
managers throughout the year. Partners are expected to maintain and update this 
themselves and use it throughout the year to remind themselves of their Objectives. 
There are also quarterly PDP Meetings to discuss how these Objectives are 
progressing. Partners are provided with various diaries, calendars and electronic 
spaces to note down activities which demonstrate completion of Objectives – i.e. 




This concludes the ARP meeting. Following this, the system takes the individual 
Performance Ratings for the What and the How separately and computes an overall 
Performance Rating for the Partner using a matrix. This overall Performance Rating 
is again measured from Developing through to Outstanding. Whilst this combination 
is done automatically by the system on Partner Link, the matrix is presented in the 
paper guidance booklet explaining how the synthesis occurs based on promoting 
consistency, and is replicated below in Figure 5. The matrix highlights how Partners 
are rewarded for displaying consistent behaviour; note that if one of the measures is 
graded as Developing, then the maximum overall rating can only be Good, even 
where the other grading is Outstanding. In other words it seeks to promote 
consistency between both these measures. 
 
 
Figure 5: The Matrix Detailing How an Overall Performance Rating is 
Provided from the two Separate Ratings for the What and the How 
 
This overall Performance Rating is then compared to the Partner’s Performance 
Rating from the previous year. Based on this comparison a pamphlet provides 
Managers with a number of “pay bands” based on the movement of a Partner’s rating 
(Developing-Good, Good-Good, Good-Outstanding, Outstanding-Good etc.). Each 
possible movement has an associated band of pay increase with a lower and upper 
bound. These are then applied to the Partner’s salary. For example, if a Partner 
moves from Developing to Very Good from one year to the next, their pay increase 
might be in the range of 4.8% to 6.9%. In contrast, a Partner who drops from Very 
Good to Developing might expect a 0% to 1% increase. A Partner who sustains a 
Good rating might expect between 2.4% and 3.5% for example. The ranges available 
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in each band allow managers to perform a sort of benchmarking and ranking 
amongst staff even where their ratings remain the same year-on-year. For example, 
two Partners both technically graded as Good (and having been graded Good the 
previous year) could be rewarded different pay increases based on their relative 
performance: it allows some flexibility for managers.  
 
In March, after all appraisals are complete, there is a “calibration” or “pay review” 
exercise (Managers) where Steering Group members meet to review both the 
Performance Ratings and pay increases of Sections, Directorates and, occasionally, 
individual Partners to check there are no anomalies or stark differences. Only then is 
the Performance Rating and salary increase finalised, and only after this is a Partner 
informed of their finalised rating and salary increase for the upcoming year. The 
finalised version of My Performance on Partner Link is then made available for 
review and documents the Partners’ proposed grading, their evidence, a managerial 
rating, their thoughts on the evidence and then an agreed rating and agreed response 
to the evidence. Figure 6 below shows one example of a Partners’ finalised My 
Performance output. Managers then input this proposed increase into the system 





Figure 6: A finalised print-out of My Performance showing proposed and 




In summary, Partners are measured both on what they do and how they do it. Some 
measures are formalised and others are more subjectively measured by the manager. 
The most formalised measures of performance include the Objectives which are 
written in a Personal Development Plan in order to allow Partners to keep track of 
them. Objectives are split between Business Objectives (relating to the 4+1 goals of 
the Retail Revolution Strategy) and Personal Objectives. To achieve a Good rating, 
Partners must “deliver all objectives set”: that is, they must accomplish every single 
one of their Business Objectives and of their Personal Objectives. The 4+1 Business 
Objectives are measured at a branch level, and therefore if the branch does not 
achieve all of its targets, no single Partner within the branch can, technically, be 
awarded a Good rating. Partners are rated on both the What and the How and this 
provides an overall rating which is then compared to their rating from the previous 
year and which determines the upper and lower bounds of their possible salary 
increase for the upcoming year. Managers attempt to calibrate both the ratings and 
the pay increases through meetings in order to promote consistency. PDP Meetings 
each quarter encourage Partners to keep their PDP up to date and remind Partners of 
their Objectives for the year. This process provides managers and Partners with 
detailed information on both what they are expected to deliver, and how they are 
expected to act when going about delivering these objectives: as demonstrated in the 
matrix presented in Figure 5 which highlights a desire for equal weighting.  
 
Having outlined the background to the case site and provided an overview of the 
performance appraisal process, the next sections outline the findings from the study 
of interaction with, and around, the above-outlined performance appraisal process in 
relation to the research questions.  
 
4.3 Making Ideas Real in Practice 
4.3.1 Introduction 
The empirical story documented below begins by detailing the existence of two 
distinct sets of ideas arising from the measurement of The What and The How which 
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are combined to varying degrees and by various methods. One idea relates to partner 
happiness and the second relates to business success. Additionally, this section 
highlights how these ideas are manifested in both formalised material technologies 
and informal social practices. Following this, Section 4.3.3 details how these ideas 
come to be made real in practice through the influence of the performance appraisal 
process: detailing how the characteristics of the performance appraisal process 
encourage engagement whilst also constructing certain forms of knowledge and 
instructing actors to behave in a certain way. Building on this, Section 4.3.4 
documents how these ideas are not always reflected directly into practice, as in 
Section 4.3.3, but instead can be enacted with much variation. This section presents a 
continuum of action detailing variations in how the initial ideas are enacted in 
practices and made real. The final section documents three ways actors justify and 
rationalise their behaviour across this continuum: things being obvious, things 
enhancing one’s own position and things requiring external persuasion or coercion. 
Having presented the empirical narrative, the following Chapter parallels this to re-
present such a narrative explicitly under the theoretical framework to demonstrate 
what we learn from such a study, and therefore how this project contributes to 
knowledge. 
4.3.2 Ideas of Partner Happiness and Business Success 
This section documents manifestations of each of the distinct ideas that are explicitly 
the aim of the Partnership under ‘Principle 1’ which states that the “Partnership’s 
ultimate purpose is the happiness of all its members, through their worthwhile and 
satisfying employment in a successful business.” (Partnership, 2009, p. 3) Whilst the 
relationship between Partner happiness and business success is not specified, i.e. it is 
not clear if it is felt that one should lead to the other, it is clear that the Partnership 
aims to make both of these ideas real in the actions of its Partners as highlighted in 
the matrix documented in Figure 5 and the dual aims of Principle 1. This section is 
split into two parts which document both the formalised material instantiations of 
each idea as well as the informal practices associated with each idea for, firstly, the 
partner happiness idea and, secondly, the business success idea. In other words the 
two sections describe how each idea is understood and what it means to the Partners 
within the case site. In closing, the differences between these two ideas are 
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commented upon in order to highlight their distinctiveness: such differences are 
summarised in Table 2 below. 
4.3.2.1 Partner Happiness 
Instances of Partner happiness as an idea to aspire to are littered throughout the 
formalised documentation provided to Partners during their induction, throughout 
further training periods and in their day-to-day activities. Perhaps the most 
formalised instance of the idea of Partner happiness is its position within Principle 1: 
the Partnership is constitutionally defined as, firstly, aiming to promote Partner 
happiness. Whilst such a statement remains somewhat opaque, this statement 
expands to outline that such happiness should be encouraged “through […] 
worthwhile and satisfying employment” (Partnership, 2009, p. 3). Likewise, the Role 
Description of Section Managers sets out that their “Job Purpose” is to “create an 
environment in which Partners […] achieve personal fulfilment.” (Job Description, 
Section Manager) But what does this mean? 
 
Whilst the terms remain loose there are various descriptions of how Partners should 
behave in order to encourage happiness both for themselves and for others. In sum 
these boil down to a collective or co-operative spirit and ‘Partnership way of 
working’ where Partners are: trusted, autonomous, given responsibility, asked for 
their views, treated with respect and as equals and are considered to be a good 
salesperson when the customer is happy. Such characteristics are repeatedly cited 
alongside the idea of Partner happiness. For example, the Welcome Booklet Partners 
receive upon joining notes: “the Constitution was written over 80 years ago, so how 
does Principle 1 work in today’s modern Partnership?” In answering it provides an 
explicit idea of what partner happiness means: “we are all co-owners, we share 
responsibility for the success of our business and influence what happens by voicing 
our views and opinions.” (Welcome Booklet, p. 12)  
 
Such themes of involvement in the business continue throughout other documents, 
from broad strategic documents down to individual questions in surveys of Partner 
content. For instance, documents such as the Branch-wide KPIs lay out that Partner 
happiness is one of four “Strategic Goals” which should be encouraged through 
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“brave, empowering leadership” and which should be measured through surveys, 
absence records, performance appraisal and employee turnover information. 
Likewise at an individual level Partners are each asked to conduct a Partner survey, 
which includes questions such as “My ideas to improve our business are welcomed,” 
“I am treated with fairness and respect” and “I feel comfortable questioning the way 
things are done”. The results to these surveys are directly linked to managerial 
performance review and taken seriously as they can impact upon managerial 
promotions or pay rewards. Similarly, the Role Description (another measure upon 
which Partners are measured) for managers includes the directions: “create a spirit of 
lively, engaged co-ownership […and] Play an active and influential role in the 
branch’s local community” which again hint at the importance of feelings of 
inclusion, respect and value which are supposed to deliver this idea of happiness. 
 
Whilst such descriptions proliferate various documents, they are most coherent, 
explicit and formalised in the How measures of My Performance which sets out in 
some detail the behaviours Partners are expected to display when interacting with 
colleagues. As noted above (see Section 4.2.3 and Figures 2, 3 and 4), the How 
outlines three expected Commitments and six associated Behaviours against which 
Partners are measured and which include: ‘Build relationships powered by our 
principles’;  ‘Take responsibility for our business success’ and ‘Create real influence 
over our working lives’. The Behaviours, respectively, include: ‘Takes pride in 
ownership’ and ‘Makes things happen’; ‘Delivers excellent service’ and ‘Works 
together’ and, finally, ‘Develops self and others’ and ‘Is open to and adapts to 
change.’ Again there is a strong rhetoric of being involved, taking responsibility and 
co-operation: as demonstrated in the positive Indicators which outline that Partners 
should be able to “explain how our history and our Partnership principles of co-
ownership underpin our business,” that they are someone who “voices their opinion 
openly and constructively” and not someone who “Is driven by the need for short 
term or personal gain, thinks only about their part of the business not the business as 




Indeed such ideas are formally embedded into the structure of the organisation and a 
secondary and separate “democracy” (Assistant Registrar) or governance structure, 
termed “Registry,” is in place solely to ensure the business is managed according to 
Principle 1 and the happiness of Partners: 
[…] everybody’s held to account through […] the democracy process […] 
you’ve got [a Registrar] who [the Head of Branch] doesn’t line manage […] 
and if she thinks [the Head of Branch] is making the wrong decisions for the 
business and for the Partners then she challenges [them]. 
(Section Manager)  
 
Similarly, representatives are elected to sit on various ‘forums’ and committees at 
branch, regional and partnership-levels and feed Partner Voice back to the 
Management Board. Quarterly Town Halls and Leadership Conferences allow 
Partners to hear the current business strategy from management, as well as again 
providing an opportunity to “question, test and challenge.” (Assistant Registrar) 
Similarly, monthly in-house magazines, The Gazette and Chronicle, afford Partners 
the ability to write, and read responses to, letters to the Management Board, as well 
as to learn about issues and strategies concerning the business. All of these instances 
demonstrate formalised commitments to delivering the idea of Partner happiness by 
involving Partners in the decision making of the business. 
 
These structural features represent manifestations of the Partner happiness idea 
within John Lewis. The material enactment of this symbolic idea is taken seriously 
and can indeed have significant ramifications for the way the company operates. For 
example, a manager noted that a decision had been made which “changed the day of 
when the pensions were going to be paid,” but that this “all got changed” because of 
“a massive outpouring […] the letters just came through, and came through, and 
came through.” Whilst managers stressed that not every concern was accommodated, 
the Partnership did it’s best to listen to “Partner Voice” and amend decisions to the 
best interests of Partners wherever possible. 
 
Another example includes planning Christmas rotas. The Assistant Registrar 
explained how they coordinated this procedure and detailed how the planning stage 
involved a number of iterative steps between senior management and shop-floor 
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Partners before the rota was finalised. An initial schedule was proposed by senior 
management and then amended by Partners, with reasoning for the suggestions, since 
“you can’t just say that’s not a good idea, that’s not what we want to do, you’ve got 
to come up with a solution, so as co-owners in our business it’s about also coming 
with a solution.” (Assistant Registrar) A re-amended proposal was then presented 
which Partners again responded to. After a number of rounds of iteration, senior 
management finalised a rota which was slightly longer than desired by Partners. 
Despite Partners not ‘getting their way’ completely, this iteration reflects a genuine 
effort and involves considerable work over and above simply proposing the rota as 
final and not being willing to alter it. The idea of Partner happiness expressed 
through involvement and autonomy was not taken lightly and in addition to being 
formalised in company documents actually altered management decision in order to 
instantiate this idea. 
 
Manifestations of the Partner happiness idea are also evident in daily practices on the 
shop floor. For example, the Partner happiness idea is interpreted by Partners as 
promoting “fairness” (Selling Partner) and equality in performance appraisal in terms 
of loyalty and commitment to the company: others repeatedly expressed the opinion 
that long-serving Partners should be rewarded and paid more than new starts. One 
Partner noted it was “crazy” that some new starts were being paid more then 
established Partners regardless of their current performance. Another suggested:  
I know you have to develop but people work differently […] especially like 
with the folk that have been here, like the girls in our department, who’ve 
done everything - I know they find this [the increased demands from My 
Performance] ridiculous because they’ve been here 20 years, they’re 50 
years old, what more do you want from them? 
 
The implication from this Partner is that even if some Partners are not delivering 
their targets they should be relatively well paid to reflect their commitment and 
loyalty to the Partnership. Equally, Partners are also concerned about equality for pay 
in relation to increasing demands upon their time. For example, one Partner noted 
that “they’re looking into the Section Managers and their pay, but the Partners, the 
experienced Partners, are maybe getting things handed onto them: what’s happening 
with their pay? Because they’re not getting paid that level the managers are you 
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know.” These again reflect a perception of equality and fairness in pay, 
demonstrating a desire to recompense Partners on their work-load rather than their 
title or hierarchical position in order to promote Partner happiness.  
 
Another instance of the idea of Partner happiness is highlighted in the expectations 
of Partners, in relation to: communication style and content; expectations of 
managerial roles; and Partners’ own identities. This collection of taken for granted 
expectations were summarised by Partners as “the John Lewis way.” One manager 
commented that “as soon as you start it’s made very clear that it’s a Partnership: 
what the principles are, what the behaviours are […] how we should treat each 
other.” For example, values of friendship, community and cooperation were 
highlighted when, “within the first week [of joining], I had a one-to-one with the 
Head of Branch […] we went for a coffee and we had a chat, and I got to know him a 
bit and he got to know me.”18 These expected behaviours are outlined in the three 
Commitments, which are “always on your mind” because they are printed on the 
wall at the staff entrance and are “the first thing you see when you come into work 
every day.” (Manager) Similarly, Partners repeatedly referred to John Lewis as 
“actually respect[ing] their employees” and having “principles: so their commitment 
to Partners and the happiness of Partners.” One Partner summarized: 
[At previous employers], you often felt like you were a number […] and you 
weren’t always getting your voice heard. Whereas here it seems to be a little 
bit of a different set up and it’s quite nice. [So, for example,] I’ve been 
allowed to take time out of work and go and do some reading for a primary 
school […] which has never been something I’ve been able to do through any 
other company. They’re like: ‘time off? For what?! Are you kidding?!’ 
 
A number of managers noted the difficulty they had “adapting” to this “John Lewis 
way” when coming from another business because it was so different to what they 
had previously experienced. For example, a manager commented that, “I was 
confused by the fact that you couldn’t say this to a Partner in this way, and you 
couldn’t do that […] and oh you’ve got a meeting every 5 minutes […] but that’s a 
cost of doing business the way we do […] and we get a lot advantages through that. I 
mean there’s Partners that do things that you wouldn’t believe.” Another commented 
																																																								
18 Recall that there are close to one thousand Partners within the branch under study. 
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that in his previous job, “regardless of how many folk I made cry […] and unless I 
did anything illegal, the results were what mattered. Whereas here there’s plenty of 
opportunities for Partners to input into how I go about my job and how I get the 
results: so I can’t force it anymore unfortunately. But that suits me, that’s why I’m 
here.” Again here we see reflections of how seriously the idea of Partner happiness is 
taken by the Partnership: it is not a tokenistic effort at involving Partners and 
involves a significant amount of extra effort and work for staff to run the business 
according to these principles: managers “can’t force it”. 
 
The “John Lewis way” socialises expectations both of what managers should 
communicate with their Partners, and how they should communicate. Firstly, 
Partners expect to receive “a huge amount of information on how the business is 
performing” (Head of Branch). Various structural aspects facilitate this information 
flow, including: numerous Bulletins, Notice Boards and Posters, quarterly Town Hall 
Meetings and Leadership Conferences, the company magazines The Gazette and 
Chronicle etc. Managers’ duties include not only basic managerial tasks, but also 
supporting, encouraging and training Partners, including them in decision making, 
explaining the rationale for business-decisions, coordinating and encouraging their 
feedback into Partner Voice channels, facilitating and coordinating their personal 
development within the Partnership, organizing their mandatory training and 
holidays, through to “having their back” when dealing with aggrieved customers or 
“being a shoulder to cry on” at the end of a hard day (Selling Partners). Many of  
 
Managers reflected upon these activities as “spoon-feeding,” “hand-holding” or 
providing a “paternalistic” function and being responsible for their Partners. Again 
these reflect practice enactments of the partner happiness idea: inclusivity, equality, 
support, value etc. These symbolic elements are manifested through the role a 
manager is expected to fill. A manager summarised: 
It’s all about respect, and being open to the fact that Partners will challenge 
you […] I’ve said, on a number of occasions to all my team, ‘if I ever ask you 
to do something, and you think it’s the wrong thing, feel free to challenge me 
on it, and I’ll give you my reasons and hopefully explain to you that is why I 
need it done in this particular way and why I need it done now, but ask the 




Such activities were repeatedly evident in the practices of management; for example, 
another manager reflected that “I personally keep the team posted on what’s 
happening as far as recruitment goes, so if I’ve managed to get a new Partner or if 
I’m interviewing, assessing, I’ll keep them in the loop as to what stage we’re at 
within that recruitment process.” Another Partner commented similarly, highlighting 
their expectations of support, on the perceived role of the manager and where the 
responsibility lies in career enhancement: 
If you’re still Developing after three years, I would be asking why the hell 
you’re still Developing after 3 years and no one’s done anything about it? 
That’s up to the managers to be saying ‘why have I got a Partner here that 
has been here for 3 years that is Underperforming or in Developing? [...] 
We’ve done something wrong; they’ve not been looked after.’ 
 
Secondly, there are particular expectations of how managers communicate with 
Partners, particularly in a respectful, inclusive, encouraging and positive manner. For 
example, one Partner commented that: “new managers have spoken to colleagues 
using their old workplace [language…] which shouldn’t be [happening], because 
there’s a just way, the John Lewis way of doing things.” This “John Lewis way of 
doing things” involves a particularly supportive relationship between manager and 
subordinate, where the manager is expected to devote considerable effort to looking 
after, in the broadest sense and both in content and style, their Partners. A manager 
reflected on this when they commented: 
[…] another example would be floor walking with my store manager in [my 
previous employer] and they’d go: ‘don’t like that, don’t like that, don’t like 
that, go and fix it.’ Whereas here, it’s more [like]; ‘I’m not sure about that, 
this is what I see as my picture of success.’ They care more. There’s more 
emphasis put on building people around you as opposed to just having people 
around to deal with the year. 
 
Likewise, this “way” of communicating was highlighted by a manager who was 
“confused [when I started] by the fact that you couldn’t say this to a Partner in this 
way, and you couldn’t do that, and you need to go down that route and that route and 
that route.” Summarising these expectations, an Operations Manager described the 
managerial position like being a “leader […] and about bringing people with you, 
your followers.”  This position as a “leader” legitimised managers as occupying a 
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supportive, rather than directive, role and provides Selling Partners with expectations 
of both what information they should receive and how they should receive it. 
 
The idea of Partner happiness manifests itself in such performances around the 
identity of Partners as autonomous and trusted members of a wider team of 
professional salespeople. Partners repeatedly referred to their goal of delivering 
“excellent customer service” by “making sure that your customers have got the best 
experience that they can have.” (Selling Partners) Selling Partners were satisfied 
when the customer was “happy,” and noted “to make them happy you’ve got to go 
the extra mile sometimes and keep them coming back.” One manager provided an 
example of a Selling Partner “going the extra mile” by installing a television for an 
elderly customer, outside of working hours and of their own initiative. Another 
Partner reflected fondly that a customer had recently been upset because they thought 
a Partner had “left without saying goodbye” when, in fact, they had merely been 
transferred to another department. 
 
In summary, the idea of Partner happiness manifests itself in a variety of ways which 
can be summed up as the “John Lewis way” of doing things and which is both 
instantiated in formalised documents and day-to-day practices. Activities 
contributing to this happiness include: partners being given autonomy and being 
“trusted to do [their job]” (Selling Partner); managers acting in a supportive capacity 
and taking responsibility for Partners; managers communicating in a respectful and 
inclusive manner; Partners being provided with information about the business and 
being able to influence decisions on the back of this; and Partners providing 
professional sales service and making the customer “happy.” These are summarised 
below in Table 2 which provides a contrast against the second idea of business 
success, which has nearly opposing activities in each respect and which is considered 
in the following section. 
4.3.2.2 Business Success 
In contrast, the idea of business success legitimises profit, rather than partner 
happiness, as the ultimate goal of a “successful business” and rationalises activities 
to this end. The terms of reference shift from partner happiness to the “business 
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case” (Selling Partner) and the aim is to become more “business orientated” and 
“commercial” (Operations Manager) because, as one manager suggested: the 
Partnership “may be there for the happiness of Partners, but we’ve still got to make a 
profit. We’ve still got to be a commercial business. We are there to make a profit, to 
sustain ourselves.” Here we see a distinct shift in what the ultimate goal should be: 
profit. The business success idea manifests itself through a focus on increasing sales, 
profit and efficiency. These are rationalised with reference to the “business 
arguments” (Manager) which legitimise self-interest and hard selling to increase 
profit. Again there are instances of the idea of business success in material 
documents as well as informal day-to-day practice and these are, again, summarised 
and compared to the partner happiness idea in Table 2 below. 
 
Whilst business success ideas often conflict with those of Partner happiness in values 
or aims, they are often placed side by side with little effort to reconcile any potential 
conflict between them. For instance, in the Role Profile for managers mentioned 
above, managers are directed to “inspire and engage managers and Partners to 
maximise their contribution in delivering profit” and similarly to “Maximise [the] 
productivity of Partners” alongside statements to “create a spirit of lively, engaged 
co-ownership […and] Play an active and influential role in the branch’s local 
community”. How these activities link, whether there might be conflict between 
these and how to reconcile such conflict is left unspecified. 
 
Despite such placement it seems there are conflicts in practice between the two ideas. 
In contrast to the idea of Partner happiness as cooperation, autonomy and inclusivity 
of perspectives, business success is instead focused on individualism, standardisation 
and a sole focus on profit maximisation. Specifically it is the focus on profit 
maximisation, rather than achieving and sustaining an ‘acceptable’ level of profit, 
which seems to engender conflict with the Partner happiness idea. Such a focus is 
evident, for example in the Welcome Pack which places emphasis on the financial 
bonus rather than inclusivity and suggests the “most tangible advantage of being a 




Such a proliferation of financially orientated information is indeed felt as causing 
tension and as coming at the expense of a focus on partner happiness. Partners 
perceive the Retail Revolution Strategy as placing more focus on business success 
than had been done in the past: “it used to be Partner, Customer, Profit. In the years 
that I have been here that has completely changed, for various reasons it is now 
Profit, Customer, Partner.” (Selling Partner) 
 
Such a feeling of profit being the ultimate focus is also reflected in material 
documents. For instance, the Operating Plan, termed “4+1”, outlines formally the 
objectives of the company and “every Partner has to feed into that Operating Plan” 
(Manager) by delivering these objectives. My Performance formally incorporates this 
idea by setting Business Objectives: “every Partner should have the same Business 
Objectives, our Business Objectives are 4+1.” “4+1” focuses on “Customer, Partner, 
Sales, Profit, and Shrinkage is the plus one.” (Manager) Here we see three out of five 
areas explicitly focused on improving business success, a fourth, “Customer”, which 
is ambiguous, and only one area explicitly focused on Partner happiness. Similarly, 
other areas of The What measures in My Performance outline an explicit focus on 
maximising profit: such as the requirement to deliver “all objectives set” which 
include the prescriptions that Partners should “grow catchment and shop sales ‘above 
the market’” or that Partners should explicitly focus on “workroom profit” or 
additional ‘add on’ products such as “JLFS [John Lewis Financial Services] Growth 
(including P/Card [Partnership Credit Card]”. Likewise, the job description for 
selling managers prescribed that Partners should be pushed to “actively sell the full 
product assortment and service range” and “utilise all channels to secure sales.” 
 
Likewise the vast majority of the daily ‘morning meetings’ are taken up with 
discussion of the previous day’s trading results in terms of revenue, further informed 
by material print outs of financial information. Additionally, the back-office 
corridors and ‘staff-only’ spaces within the store display a vast amount of visual 
information in electronic and paper format of financial information broken down to 
Selling Sections, Departments, Stores, Regions and Company categories with 
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information on like-for-like sales, profit, shrinkage and various other measures of 
financial performance. 
 
Under the idea of business success, Partners are instructed to explicitly focus on 
increasing revenue rather than delivering what the customer needs. One manager 
talked about the need to focus on “add-ons […] promoting [the] Partnership [credit] 
Card and all the other financial services.” In addition, others spoke of the push to sell 
complementary products, “so not just selling a mattress, but selling the mattress 
protection, maybe a new duvet, so it’s all the add-ons that you can add in to that sale 
which will ultimately help profit at the end of the day.” Another Partner joked: “it’s 
like twenty questions at the till! Have you got that, do you want this?” Likewise in 
Partners’ Job Descriptions they are formally advised that they need to “achieve sales 
targets by actively selling the full product assortment and service range” which again 
conflicts with the idea of delivering customer satisfaction; instead the idea is to 
actively sell as much as possible.  
 
Some Partners, drawing on the notion of a professional salesperson under the idea of 
Partner happiness, felt like promoting a Partnership Credit Card was “just selling 
something to somebody that they don’t particularly need […and] pushing stuff upon 
people” (Selling Partner). However, the idea of business success rationalises this 
behaviour under a different type of professionalism; as outlined when a manager 
commented others were “very sales motivated […and] hungry for money, [for them] 
it’s all about sales […because] at the end of the day that pays our, everything.” 
(Manager) Here there is a distinction between two types of ‘professional’ sellers: 
one, associated with Partner happiness, is about being an expert and providing the 
customer with everything they need and keeping them “happy” (Selling Partner), 
whilst the second, associated with business success, legitimises more ‘pushy’ selling 
where a professional salesperson is one who can get the most revenue out of each 
sale.  
 
In addition to increasing revenue, the business success idea rationalises activities 
relating to increasing efficiency and becoming more “business orientated” 
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(Manager). For example, many back-of-house functions have been centralised and 
much in-house decision making has been standardised with the aim of improving 
business success through increasing efficiency. Again this reflects a shift away from 
the cooperation, autonomy and feelings of respect which Partners spoke of under the 
idea of Partner happiness to delegation, standardisation and top-down control. For 
example, Partners spoke of “the folder” or “the book” which outlines Branch 
Operating Procedures, or “BOPs,” which should be strictly followed. One Partner 
commented, “if I say ‘oh, that [cushion] should go there,’ [my manager is] like ‘oh 
no, we can’t have that there […] that’s not what it says in the book.’” These contrast 
with earlier comments about being “trusted to do your job” and highlight a different 
way of organising when trying to realise the idea of successful business. Such 
comments demonstrate evidence of a profit rationality overtaking a concern for the 
happiness of members: their “worthwhile employment” through engaging in business 
decision making, even on such small-scale decisions as the colour and layout of 
cushions on a display settee (as in the example above), is pushed aside by a concern 
for standardising shops in an effort to reduce costs, increase the consistency of the 
shopping experience, and ultimately generate increased profit. 
 
This business orientation is also reflected in the perceived role managers’ play within 
the business. One manager noted that “over the last few years […] we’ve moved to a 
much more centralised model, [and] there are a) less opportunities to have different 
ways of working, [and b)] there’s more and more external people […] coming up 
from the centre, to measure and audit.” Some managers, again drawing on the ideas 
of Partner happiness, noted the negative impacts this was having by “stifling 
creativity,” for example on Chefs menu-making abilities which rewarded them with 
feelings of worth, interest, autonomy and respect from the company to do their job 
professionally. In contrast, these activities were justified under “efficiency” and 
“consistency” concerns attached to improving business success because “the way the 
business will move forward to be a successful business, [is for] more and more [to] 
come from central.” (Managers) Again we see conflicts emerging between the 
coexistence of these ideas: each has a distinct focus and rationality. Here chefs’ 
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interests in happiness (by running their own kitchen) or trust in Partners’ abilities are 
usurped by a concern for standardisation of shopping experience. 
 
This focus on “efficiency” (Manager) also alters the role of managers within the 
Partnership to be less supportive and more directive: reflective of the rationality of 
centralisation and standardisation under the idea of business success and in stark 
contrast to their role as supportive “leaders” under the Partnership happiness 
imperative. Many of the responsibilities of a manager as a supportive leader become 
irrational when aiming to materialise the idea of business success. For instance, 
Partners repeatedly spoke of their increased workload and “responsibilities” and how 
they were being pushed to become “self-sufficient” by taking on activities previously 
completed by their manager.  For example, now a managers’ role should not include, 
according to the idea of business success, organizing holidays, coordinating training 
or being responsible for Partners’ development and learning (in contrast to the 
paternal and supportive role managers should play when focused on the idea of 
Partner happiness). Instead, the idea of business success rationalises that it is more 
efficient for these tasks to fall to the Partner themself. For example, a manager 
commented: 
When I first started we really, really, really hand-held Partners to a 
ridiculous extent and probably my second most-used word, other than 
consistency, is ‘self-sufficiency’ because I keep saying to my team all the time 
that they need to become more self-sufficient. The things they’re coming and 
asking me, nine times out of ten [they can find themselves].  
 
Echoing this shift in the role of managers, another commented how it was “not my 
job to go through this [the performance appraisal guidance] with a fine toothcomb 
and to speak to every single person to make sure they understand it” (Manager). 
Reflecting an increasing focus on enhancing business success and decreasing focus 
on their role as supportive of Partners, they continued: “going forward if there’s 
more involvement and more knowledge needed, that needs to be Partner driven […] 
it’s about Partners going ‘do you know what, if I don’t worry about this, then how 
am I going to get there?’” This again reflects a directive and self-sufficient 
expectation of Partners which contrasts with a supportive and paternal relationship 




A rhetoric of transition and ‘moving forward’ rather than using ‘change’ language 
was littered throughout the interviews and again demonstrates the perception of 
business success becoming more prominent than Partner happiness. This transition is 
legitimated by a “business case” (Head of Branch) argument rationalised by concerns 
centred around profit and legitimised under the idea of business success. For 
example, one manager commented that they had come across letters in The Gazette 
from Partners highlighting that “this business was founded to look after Partners, but 
you’ve made this change and now I’m deeply unhappy,” but that “you can see the 
business argument for that [change].” Another manager summarised: 
I think John Lewis had a reputation of having a load of very nice people that 
weren’t really that geared up on delivering results […] I think in the past 
John Lewis has been far too soft on some of its employees in the sense that 
they come in, they do a lovely job, they walk around behaving very nice to 
everyone, but they don’t sell anything or they don’t deliver enough, whereas 
the What makes it very clear that there’s an expectation that as a company, 
we want to get our money from them, they’ve got to earn their way. 
 
In relation to ‘earning their way’, Partners are expected to take on additional 
responsibilities, for example, by focusing on add-on sales, organizing their own 
holidays etc. (as detailed above), but also by providing feedback to their peers on the 
Branch Operating Procedures or “best practice” and also being flexible in where they 
work. Here we again see a standardisation of what it means to be a Partner and 
values of their product knowledge, passion and ability to give the customer excellent 
customer service shift to become less important under the idea of business success.  
 
Such increasing focus on business success is legitimised by an appeal to the 
‘ultimate’ concerns of profit, company survival and efficiency. For example, one 
manager commented that they had had multiple conversations where they said that, 
“you need this [change] to survive, and if we don’t change then there isn’t going to 
be a business, and this isn’t going to change folks, so you really have to make up 
your mind if this is still the company that you want to work for!” Another suggested 
that: 
[…] if we don’t ask more of every single Partner by framing it like that then 
we’re never going to get anywhere […] we’re not efficient in any way shape 
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or form at half the stuff we do, we have far too many meetings, there’s some 
people here that are still stuck in the past where they were Flossy that looked 
after shoe polish and they now have to look after the whole of stationery or 
the whole of shoe-wear or something like that, so it’s about pushing every 
Partner and asking them to do things in the exact way we need them to do it. 
 
Alongside this shift of supportive leadership roles, the aim of managers is also 
different according to the idea of business success. Instead of a focus on support, 
Managers spoke of the importance of promotion and the performance appraisal being 
“really key” in showing them “exactly what I need to do to take a step up.” 
(Managers) The idea of business success rationalises an individual focus on 
promotion, as one manager highlights when commenting: “I want the best for my 
Partners because if my Partners do well, I do well.” Again this contrast sharply with 
the notion of collectivism, equality and cooperation under the idea of Partner 
happiness; where Partners were instead concerned with rewarding loyalty regardless 
of current performance.  
 
In summary, the idea of business success manifests itself through a focus on profit 
(both through explicitly increasing revenue and increasing efficiency) to become 
more “business orientated.” (Operations Manager) Rationality is assessed from a 
“logical, business-headed stance” rather than an “emotional stance” (Head of 
Branch) which justifies moves towards centralisation and standardisation. The role of 
managers is more directive and partners are expected to take responsibility for their 
own development under the idea of business success. Finally, the business success 
idea also implies a more individualistic focus (in contrast to a collective focus) which 
rationalises individual reward and “pushing” (Selling Partner) products onto 
customers in a more ‘hard-selling’ fashion. These characteristics are summarised and 









Characteristics Partner Happiness Business Success 
Core metaphor Partner happiness Successful business/profit 
Focus/aim Happiness of Partners & Increasing revenue, sales 
  excellent customer service & profit 
Language Paternalistic/supportive Business case/directive 
Role of Manager 




Delegate responsibility & 
increase efficiency 
Audience for legitimacy Partners/community Bottom line 
Role of Perf. Appraisal Equality/accountability Self-interest/promotion 
Identity Collective, professional Individual, sales focused 
Appropriate structure Autonomous, independent Centralised & 
  & trusted units standardised whole 
 
Table 2: Characteristics of the Partner Happiness and Business Success 
Ideas 
We can clearly see some of the conflict emerging as the idea of business success is 
felt to be prioritised over the idea of Partner happiness as the Retail Revolution 
Strategy is landed. Such tensions are felt to increased as the Retail Revolution 
Strategy is introduced and specifically as My Performance is implemented since it 
contains a more explicit focus on the idea of business success than the previous 
process. For example, the Operations Manager of Commercial Support criticised the 
old performance appraisal process for not being:  
[…] fit for purpose […] because it was very, very behaviourally based. So we 
measured […] how nice was a partner, does he smile, were they fluffy and all 
the rest of it. But actually if they couldn’t sell, it didn’t really matter. Because 
we didn’t measure them on whether they could sell or not, we just measured 




Thus, whilst managers would try to “find [a] way of ensuring that you were bringing 
that [profit focus] into their appraisal somehow […] the system wasn’t set up in a 
way that that was easy to do, so you had to be quite clever” (Operations Manager of 
Commercial Support). As such, the newly implemented My Performance seeks to 
bring about a shift to more formally engage with the idea of business success. The 
following section turns to document how such a shift occurs, before the final section 
documents responses to the implementation of this attempt.  
4.3.3 Making Ideas Real Through Performance Appraisal 
The aim of this shift is to sustain John Lewis as “Britain’s leading retailer” 
(Manager) through the Retail Revolution Strategy: described as a “big cultural shift.” 
(Personnel Manager) The first initiative of this strategy is termed Future 
Management Structures (FMS) and involved removing an entire layer of 
management from department stores. Partners described this as significantly 
affecting their activities and altering the way things are done: one Partner described 
it as “a new world.” Following FMS, the updated performance appraisal process, My 
Performance, was introduced to outline how Partners were expected to behave and 
what they were expected to deliver in this “new world” (Selling Partner) which 
outlined different expectations and defined ‘good’ performance in a new way: as 
highlighted when one manager commented that Partners who had previously been 
graded at the top of the scale might “automatically think that [they] sit up here. But 
that’s really not the case because it’s a totally different thing and you need to do 
doing a lot to be up here!” Similarly, another commented that there was a difference 
between doing things to a high standard and actually meeting the criteria of a Very 
Good rating: 
I might say someone’s merchandising is really good, and they think: ‘oh, she 
said it’s very good, oh, a Very Good Partner!’ Hmm, no, you’re not! If you’re 
not delivering all of this consistently throughout the year, being really 
positive and thinking outside of the box then actually you’re not Very Good. 
They need to have that understanding of what My Performance language is 
and what the general meaning of ‘good’ is.  
  
My Performance was designed specifically to demonstrate the expectation to deliver 
not only The How but also The What. In other words, managers sought to “mould 
new people into the Partner we want them to be.” Managers commented that My 
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Performance provides them with a “mountain of tools,” “created a new vocabulary” 
or was a “Bible” for presenting Partners with expectations and thus helping to mould 
Partners accordingly. Partners themselves repeatedly referred to My Performance as 
outlining expectations and providing “clarity” and “mak[ing] it clear what [they] 
want,” or that it “sums it all up for you, exactly what is expected.” Another manager 
reflected how the tool constrains what behaviours should be displayed by 
legitimising only those which it details: “there’s no point in adding in any bits 
yourself and doing other bits because that just gets messy, this is what you’re 
working towards.” In sum, My Performance forms the formalised and material 
instantiation of the requirement to focus on both Partner happiness and business 
success, reprioritising business success to be at least as, if not more, prominent than 
Partner happiness.  
 
My Performance visually combines the ideas of Partner happiness and business 
success (see Figure 6 below) and, subsequently, instructs Selling Partners on 
appropriate and expected behaviour according to the ideals of senior management: 
specifically the notion of enacting both ideas in practice. Partners repeatedly spoke 
of the importance of this “balance” (Head of Branch) that My Performance sought 
between recognising “what people do, and how they do it.” (Operations Manager) 
Partners felt that “they’ve made it very clear that there’s two things that the 
Partnership wants: [a)] is that you do it right, and b) that you actually do it in the first 
place.” Managers spoke of My Performance showing sales-orientated Partners the 
need for them to also “engage with what this business is about: […] engage with co-
ownership,” and vice versa: for highlighting the importance of selling to Partners 
who were “very nice people that weren’t really that geared up on delivering results.” 
(Managers) Similarly, the two ideas are given equal weighting in the process and a 
lack of equality can strongly affect a Partner’s overall rating (see Figure 5). Another 
manager highlighted how My Performance combined these two ideas: 
[…] the previous [appraisal process] was very much about behaviours: how 
did you interact with your colleagues and all that sort of stuff, but that 
shouldn’t really matter: if they are selling to the customer, that’s what should 
matter. So the What element was very good, as I say, well overdue, and then 
the How, is almost the opposite: where you find these people that are very 
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heavily sales focused, it makes them realise there’s a balance towards being 




Figure 7: The What and the How Pictured Together in My Performance 
(adapted from My Performance, 2009, p. 5) 
The measures under each of the criteria noted in Figure 7 detail how these ideas 
should be enacted in practice by providing Indicators and Objectives respectively. 
Such indicators are perceived as of objective, consistent and adaptable which 
provides Partners with enough security to ‘buy in’ to the process. For example, 
Partners spoke about how My Performance is “better” than the old process because it 
is “much clearer,” “very focused” and “tells you there in black and white what’s 
acceptable and what’s not” (Selling Partners). Others described how the new process 
isn’t open to interpretation. For example where Partners had a different interpretation 
of the requirements to the managers (which could lead to “difficult conversations” 
(Manager) in the performance review process), this was down to Partners “not 
reading it properly” or “not understanding” (Managers) it by not putting in enough 
effort themselves, rather than the wording or process being open to interpretation.  
 
Here we see a perception that My Performance is objective and consistent; any 
inconsistency is put down to Partner’s misinterpretation which can, and should be, 
corrected. In more extreme circumstances, some managers reflected that they asked 
	
132	
Partners to be “really honest” when providing their evidence: implying that, rather 
than misunderstanding it, they were being actively dishonest. This also highlights the 
perception that performance is measurable in an accurate, consistent and fair way 
through the performance appraisal process. An Operations Manager reflected this, 
commenting that My Performance measured what Partners were “truly worth.” 
Others, similarly, reflected these ideas when commenting that the required evidence 
for their appraisals made Partners “prove” themselves and what they had done.  
 
Additionally, the perception that the process had been developed in-house and that 
prior feedback had been, and future feedback could be, taken into consideration also 
made it easier for Partners to successfully enrol into the process of performance 
measurement without questioning it. For example, the Regional Registrar noted that 
the process had been “partner influenced when it was created, because what partners 
said with the previous appraisal was ‘we don’t understand this, we can’t work with 
this, what is this?’” Another Manager reflected: “we can still actually feedback 
[upwards] now we’re all using it […] but it’s been well tested to make sure 
everything’s okay.” Others highlighted that they had “confidence” in the “central 
teams” who designed it because it had been trialled in other branches. A manager 
noted that “they took a long time bringing this out and they actually pulled [an earlier 
version of] it […] because they found it wasn’t going to work, they needed to go 
back and look at it again.”  
 
Partners reflected how My Performance meant everyone was “fully accountable 
now” (Operations Manager) because “I have this book, every other manager in the 
business is working to this book, when I walk into my ARP I’m being graded on 
exactly the same things, so it doesn’t matter what level I’m at, we’re all graded the 
same.” (Manager) The perceived objectivity of the process means that Partners see it 
as “fair,” “helpful,” and that it is therefore “pretty good because those who are giving 
their all will be rewarded.”  
 
Familiarity also aids this process of enrolment. For example, managers try to “use 
My Performance language” whenever possible. Partners, similarly, noted that “it’s 
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always on the walls” and it builds on, or “updates,” existing practices of performance 
appraisal within the company. One Partner summarised: 
Yeah [My Performance is] really useful, it’s very simple and it’s very 
achievable and if you really look at it and understand it then you can create 
very good and challenging objectives to better your development, it’s a 
really, really fantastic tool. 
 
In other words, the notion of performance measurement itself was taken for granted. 
Indeed, the Head of Branch described how it was “ingrained with[in] us […] it’s 
almost like a responsibility of managers and a right that Partners have […] to sit 
down with their manager once a year and have a frank discussion about their 
performance.”  
 
Whilst My Performance combines these ideas visually and explicitly without any 
notion of potential conflict between them and seems to be taken for granted, 
everything is “not all rosy in the garden.” (Business Partner) In other words, the 
prescriptions which Partners interact with (through and around My Performance) are 
not interpreted universally; rather there is a multitude of different action that arises in 
response to the prescriptions of My Performance as Partners interpret these in 
different ways. Whilst Sections 4.3.2.1 and 4.3.2.2 above document the 
distinctiveness of each idea and some of the tensions that arise when these 
independent ideas interact with one another in practice, the following section 
documents a marked increase in such tension and variation when the two ideas 
interact in other settings: ranging from practices which are highly reflective of the 
underlying idea through those which are increasing less reflective and to practices 
which become increasingly refracted and eventually end up being vastly different 
from the initial idea. This continuum is presented in sections merely to highlight 
differences in how Partners enact ideas in practice, rather than to imply distinct 
segments of measurable categories or activities. 
4.3.4 Variation of Realised Ideas 
4.3.4.1 Highly Reflective Practices  
As noted above, in Sections 4.3.2.1 and 4.3.2.2, some practices accurately reflect the 
ideas of either the Partner happiness idea or of the business success idea with little 
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variation. There were many other instances of these ideas being tightly reflected in 
practices. For instance, examples of pension pay dates and Christmas rotas being 
altered based on Partner feedback reflect a material demonstration of commitment to 
the idea of involving Partners in decision making; in other words, a material 
enactment of the values of the partner happiness idea. Likewise, providing Partners 
with information about where the team is within the recruitment cycle also 
demonstrates the idea of providing Partners with information about organising the 
Partnership. Similarly, Partners spoke, for example, of the feeling of “community” 
and “all work[ing] as a team and the team is John Lewis and we’re all working 
towards the same goal.” Again this highlights feelings of cooperation and 
collectivism in practice.  
 
Others highlighted the expectations of how Partners should behave towards each 
other, for example, by younger Partners carrying heavier items up the stairs for older 
Partners “to help them out.” Again this reflects the values of support and respect 
within the idea of Partner happiness. Partners repeatedly suggested that their goal 
was to deliver “excellent customer service” and “keep the customer happy,” for 
example by “coming in [to work] early […] because new insurance leaflets had to go 
out.” In a similar vein of concern for customer happiness and collective support, 
another Partner noted that “if we’re short [staffed] on [my days off], I’ll be the first 
to offer to come in, because I wouldn’t like to think I would be left in a position 
where we had no other Partners in a department for support, so yeah, I’m always 
willing to come in.”  
 
Partners referred to these activities as obvious: as “common decency,” “politeness,” 
“common sense,” or “what I would do anyway […] because that’s what I do.” In 
other words, these activities were unconsciously decided and Partners didn’t 
experience much tension in enacting them: they felt this was the ‘right’ thing to do. 
 
Paralleling this, other instances demonstrate the idea of business success being 
prioritised and neatly reflected into practice without much tension. As noted in 
Section 4.3.2.2, examples of Partners citing a shift in priority to “Profit, Customer, 
	
135	
Partner” or managers describing some Partners as “hungry for money” demonstrate 
evidence of Partners with a focus on the idea of business success. Similarly, the 
examples of increased internal audit, increasing use of standardised Branch 
Operating Procedures and the need for Partners to “earn their way” all reflect 
practices which clearly demonstrate the ideas of business success in terms of 
standardisation and maximising returns. 
 
Similarly, many Partners illustrated a rationality of being “a business, the same as 
everybody else: we’re here to make money.” Others spoke about standardisation 
being a good thing and “that’s how it has to be: […] to move forward efficiently […] 
we’re all doing the same thing.” Again these were taken as “obvious” or as having 
been “drummed in” (Selling Partners) and were unquestioned paths of action, despite 
often being in sharp contrast to other alternatives (such as maintaining the autonomy 
of stores and reducing standardisation in order to customise the store to the local 
population).  
 
Whilst the above examples document the Partner happiness and business success 
ideas being enacted in practice without much conscious reflection, there were other 
instances where both ideas were enacted simultaneously: again seeming as a natural 
thing to do, despite many potential alternatives. Such focus on the dual ideas of My 
Performance seem to arise either from an acceptance that the Partnership is 
supremely wise or authoritative and therefore Partners should follow it’s 
prescriptions, or from a feeling of ‘fit’ between the ideals of the Partner and of the 
Partnership. For example, in relation to the former, the Partner noted above who 
suggests that “there’s no point in adding in any bits yourself and doing other bits 
because that just gets messy, this is what you’re working towards” highlights an 
acceptance of the goals of the Partnership as legitimate and does not question them. 
Likewise, in relation to the latter, ideas of collectivism are often simultaneously tied 
to and mixed in with ideas of profit in the case of the Partners’ annual bonus which 
was seen as delivering both Partner happiness (albeit through profit but still retaining 
a cooperative and collective notion) and business success. One Partner, for instance, 
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noted that the aim was to “make a profit so we can give the bonus back to the 
Partners.” Another Partner commented:  
[…] this has been me in every job […] ’every penny is a prisoner!’ So it’s 
like, ‘don’t use clean paper for scrap paper: we use scrap paper. Don’t use 
two carrier bags when one would have done.’ I’ve always been [in] that mind 
set and now it’s like, ‘you’re using that extra, that’s coming out our bonus!’ 
Everything that’s wasted you think: ‘Bonus! It’s going down!’ 
(Selling Partner) 
 
These examples outline how action can be highly reflective of the prescriptions of 
the ideas of Partner happiness, business success or indeed both, in practice. When 
actions are highly reflective of the ideas, there tends to be little conscious thought 
about how to rationalise them. In other words, they are naturalised by Partners and 
seem the obvious thing to do. However, such obviousness is not always immediate 
and instead there can be reflexivity, consideration and therefore tension, as explored 
in the following section. 
4.3.4.2 Reflective Practices  
In contrast to the above section, some practices are still reflective of each idea, but to 
a lesser degree than those highlighted above. In other words, the prescriptions of My 
Performance seem less “obvious” but can still be “one of those things that, to build it 
in with everything else, takes time.” (Manager) Whilst these don’t necessarily 
impose significant problems for, or cause resistance from, Partners, they are more 
aware of these activities being prescribed, and more aware of alternatives, than the 
ones, above, that they took as given and obvious. For example, the Partner noted 
above, who felt that promoting a store credit card was “pushing stuff upon people,” 
reflected that they didn’t dislike it enough to warrant ‘rocking the boat’: “that’s been 
installed for years […] you’ve still got to do it […] I don’t question it […] I’d say to 
someone that I was working with that I don’t like doing it, but you know you have to 
do it.”  
 
Here the Partner feels the prescriptions of My Performance are at least somewhat 
incompatible with their understanding of how they should act. However, this 
incompatibility is, in this case, slight enough to be overruled by other factors. 
Despite this, such framing still leads to practices which are less than highly reflective 
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of the prescriptions of My Performance. For example, this Partner doesn’t fully 
embrace the goal of selling Partnership Cards but recognises it is something you just 
have to do. Subsequently, they sell some cards, but not many. They also paint a 
negative picture of the goal to other Partners by ‘moaning about it’ or generally 
being negative, which may affect the motivation of others as well. Nonetheless the 
ideas of both Partner happiness and business success are realised, since the Partner 
feels justified in voicing their negative opinion, whilst at the same time at least sells 
some Partnership Cards which they otherwise wouldn’t sell and which contribute to 
increasing the profit of the Parntership. 
 
In this instance ‘pushing’ sales onto Customers, as prescribed by the business 
success idea, is not seen as the obvious thing to do: as reflected by the Partner’s 
expansion that they didn’t like doing it and the associated justification of why they 
didn’t like it and what they did to make their opinion heard. Pushy selling conflicts 
with the notion of keeping the customer happy under the Partner happiness idea and 
thus we see some tension as the Partner has to think about how to act. Despite this, 
they act in a way which reflects both ideas of Partner happiness and business 
success. Further instances highlighted practices which seemed even less obvious, 
which required further reflection and which caused more significant tension, as 
detailed below. 
4.3.4.3 Reflective But Resisted Practices 
Moving further away from practices which are highly reflective of each idea, other 
instances of practice highlight examples where Partners felt the prescriptions were 
incompatible enough to warrant resisting them in some way, shape or form. These go 
beyond an approach of enacting the prescriptions of My Performance ceremonially 
whilst ‘moaning about it’ to others and mark a more significant point of reflexivity. 
For example, managers spoke of the difficulties they had getting some Partners to 
work towards certain Partner happiness goals, such as “Develops self and others” or 
“Takes pride in ownership”, within departments with a “very sales-driven 
background […] because, in their mind, that wasn’t their job.” These goals included 
setting objectives such as becoming “reading buddies” (Manager) for local schools 
or fundraising for local charities. One manager commented: “it was really, really 
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difficult to get them to even acknowledge that they had to do that, they were like, ‘I 
don’t see the point.’ You’re like, ‘but it says on the paper here you are supposed to 
get involved in it.’” Some partners were “so against it, it’s unbelievable.” (Manager) 
In these instances the Partner happiness ideas of community involvement and the 
lack of focus on profit appear irrational to Partners and they initially refuse to engage 
with the ideas or ignore them, despite half of their performance evaluation depending 
upon such engagement. 
 
However, even where these prescriptions were perceived as irrational and as causing 
tension, practices could still be at least somewhat reflective of the combined 
underlying ideas. Managers felt that they could often get around this resistance by 
“having honest conversations” or even, more harshly, that they were “quite 
comfortable saying, ‘look, I don’t know if this business is for you’” if Partners 
couldn’t reframe these activities as appropriate. Managers noted that, “landing stuff 
like that was difficult and it took time, it took a lot of time,” but felt this gave them 
“in hindsight […] brilliant examples” which they could use to demonstrate to those 
resisting that it was a worthwhile thing to pursue. In such instances we see a longer 
and more contentious period of resistance which may spread to others and cause 
tension and unreflective practices in the interim, but ultimately managers felt they 
were able to convince the Partners to behave according to these ideas and thus enact 
them both in practice; whilst they initially resisted, Partners might eventually become 
“brilliant examples” who now focus on both selling products and contributing to the 
community and who “love it [doing readings in local primary schools] and […] 
wouldn’t give it up.” 
 
These instances highlight increasing amounts of reflexivity and tension: here 
managers are required to be more active in convincing Partners to enact both ideas. 
In contrast to the above example of selling Partnership cards in a ‘pushy’ manner 
where the Partner no longer required active convincing, here we see instances where 
managers are required to actively convince Partners of how to behave when they 
seek to add a focus. In this instance we see successful convincing: both ideas of 
Partner happiness and business success are eventually enacted. However, we can 
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imagine, and indeed will see below, instances where more significant tensions arise 
and where such convincing is unsuccessful. 
4.3.4.4 Slightly Refracted Practices 
As this tension increases further, practices become decreasingly reflective of the 
underlying idea until they can no longer be said to be reflective at all, and instead 
become refracted practices: in other words where actors do less, do more or do 
something else entirely relative to the underlying singular idea. The following 
presents examples of increasingly tense situations which reflect increasingly 
refracted practice. 
 
Firstly, practices refracted from the business success idea include those where 
Partners alter the prescribed focus on profit provided by My Performance. For 
example, some managers continued to enact their role as supportive rather than 
directive when managing their Partners using My Performance and thus altered the 
notion of Partners taking responsibility for their own learning as proposed by the 
business success idea. Managers described how they didn’t feel My Performance “by 
itself was that easy to work with,” so they created additional documents and 
“guidelines” to “supplement the book” and to “try and keep it a bit more simple and 
[…present it] in a way that the Partner understands.” (Managers) These additional 
documents were designed to assist Partners’ understanding of the system and help 
them through it. They required additional work for managers which could have been 
spent on other things: things which were recognised and rewarded by the 
performance appraisal process for example. Instead, these managers chose to spend 
some of their time developing documents and supporting Partners through the 
appraisal process: reflecting Partner happiness ideas despite the prescriptions of the 
business success idea which now prescribe that Partners do these activities 
themselves since it is more ‘efficient’.  
 
Another manager described how “you’ve got seven pages dedicated to all this [the 
My Performance measures and indicators], and […] from a Partner’s point of view 
[…] that’s quite daunting.” To combat this, they “decided […] to soften the blow a 
bit” by initially giving “them the sheets […] that I’d copied before the branch 
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approved it” and, later, by creating “a simple, one page document […] to make it 
[…] crystal clear and […break it down] into bite-sized chunks.” Managers also 
spoke of waiting until the rating “window” was closing to give Partners “enough 
time […] to really get their teeth into [their objectives].” These examples reflect the 
Partner happiness idea since these managers strategically conduct their appraisal at 
the very end of the appraisal process in order to provide staff with the most time 
possible to demonstrate the prescriptions of My Performance. Others highlighted 
how they “always try and give [Partners] a bit of a real life example, because that 
book is great, but it is essentially a book full of statements, so what that means to 
each individual is very different.” Here we see further enactment of the role of a 
manager as supportive and responsible for Partners, i.e. the idea of Partner happiness, 
being prioritised over the manager as directive and the Partner having responsibility 
for their own development, i.e. the idea of business success. 
 
We again see increasing tension reflected in the additional work which managers 
complete; they see the prescriptions of the business idea as different to their own 
understanding since they feel their role should include Partner happiness notions of 
supporting Partners. In these instances we see acceptance of the need to provide 
Partners with profit goals, but an amendment of the idea of increasing efficiency by 
delegating tasks to them. Thus some of the business success ideas are enacted but 
others are reinterpreted or ignored and a Partner happiness idea is enacted. Again, 
despite increasing tension, we see evidence of both ideas being enacted 
simultaneously and the ideas being combined: for instance where Partners are given 
profit goals but where managers continue to act in a supportive manner rather than a 
directive one by passing on increased responsibility to the Partners. Ignoring aspects 
of an idea reflects a weaker reflection, and a stronger refraction, of that idea into 
practice. Such weakening continues as tensions increase, as documented in the 
following section. 
4.3.4.5 Refracted Practices 
Continuing moving along the spectrum of increasing tension we see increasingly 
bold or deliberate ignorance of ideas to the point that they start to be ignored so 
much that they are not combined, but rather are reinterpreted so significantly that 
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they are enacted quite differently to their symbolic values or formalised 
prescriptions. Partners rationalised this variation by employing Partner happiness 
notions of autonomy, the value of their opinion and respect: by speaking of how they 
had “an element of freedom, or licence I suppose, to actually make it work best 
within your store” by, for example, amending “BOPs” (Branch Operating 
Procedures) “because it’s not a ‘one size fits all’ for all the branches.” This is despite 
the formalised prescriptions that the BOPs should be followed strictly in order to 
create a consistent shopping experience. In contrast, managers noted that: “there 
have to be tweaks because obviously every branch is different,” and: “yes you want 
consistency, but, also, everyone will have their own natural style and way of doing 
things.” (Regional Registrar) These “local decisions” were not localised and were 
also made at a managerial level, and “you can see that [much] diversity in one shop 
alone.” (Managers) In other words, they were widespread. 
 
This “diversity” reflects the range of interpretations Partners ascribe to the 
prescriptions of My Performance. Whilst the above sections document increasing 
variations as ideas attempt to combine, the following example documents a more 
extreme instance where one idea is reinterpreted according to the other, and thus 
rather different than the original idea.  
 
As noted above, the market logic prescribes that for a Partner to be graded Good, 
they must “deliver all objectives set.” (emphasis added, see Figure 1 above) Practice 
reflective of this business success idea is evident when managers suggest: “it’s not 
about ‘oh, I got that [objective] and not that one, but oh well, we won’t worry about 
these two.’ It has to be, ‘you have to deliver these.’” Another commented that some 
Partners “did part of it, but […] didn’t do the whole thing, and therefore [they] 
haven’t achieved it […] and therefore we have to say that [they’re] Developing.” 
Similarly, the business success idea requires Partners to display these behaviours 
“consistently […] every single day.” (Manager) Finally, the guidance prescribes that 
“every Partner has to feed into that [4+1] Operating Plan” and so “every Partner 
should have the same Business Objectives, our Business Objectives are 4+1, so […] 
everyone’s Business Objectives should be the same.” Here, like Section 4.2.4.1 
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above, the business success idea is clearly reflected into practice. In sum, the idea of 
business success prescribes that Partners should deliver “all” objectives rather than 
some, that every Partner should have the same “4+1” objectives and that they should 
display this concern for profit “consistently” throughout the year. 
 
Despite these prescriptions, managers do not always comply. Whilst we see some 
reflecting this idea into practice, as above and in Section 4.3.4.1, other managers 
significantly alter this business success idea to the point that their reinterpretation 
means something different is enacted in practice. For example, some managers feel 
the prescription of achieving “all” objectives is too strict: “you don’t want to give 
them too much, because ultimately it will drown them, four plus one is a lot of stuff 
[…] it’s a bit [too] hard.” Others described how they “don’t want to set my Partners, 
or have them set, these unachievable goals that, ultimately, they come in and they’re 
stressed out about […] and there’s just this huge misunderstanding.” Here managers 
interpret the business success idea under an idea of Partner happiness by suggesting 
it might “drown them” or is too “hard”. In such instances the explicit prescription to 
deliver all objectives is reinterpreted under the idea of Partner happiness.  
 
Managers employ a variety of strategic techniques to get around such prescriptions. 
For example, some managers apportion the 4+1 objectives to different Partners, to 
“split it up” between them rather than giving them all to each Partner. Others 
described how they were somewhat “lenient” and weren’t worried about the 
behaviours being displayed “every single day,” because “it might just be that they are 
a really hard working Partner and just on that day they missed that opportunity.” 
Relatedly, another manager suggested a Partner had “a few months left to improve,” 
implying that their performance didn’t need to be consistent throughout the year. 
Others spoke about it being a “conversation,” or “guideline” and not being a “tick 
box exercise,” rather, its “a subjective thing […] you don’t just go, ‘well you didn’t 
hit that one little thing, and therefore you’re Developing.’” Similarly, other managers 
noted that they set Partners’ Objectives using looser language, such as “contribute to 
us hitting our target,” so that effort is assessed instead of the outcome. Likewise, 
another commented that they would “just [see] what standard they’ve managed to get 
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those objectives completed to” rather than whether they had achieved every single 
objective. These examples highlight how Partners would interpret the business 
success prescriptions of My Performance under Partner happiness values of respect, 
effort, equality etc. Thus their actions become increasingly altered from the 
prescribed practices of business success. 
 
In these instances as one idea is interpreted under the rationality of the other, the 
possibility of both ideas being enacted begins to break down. Because of these 
interpretations, the values of the business success idea are undermined and Partners 
reinterpret these prescriptions to suit their understanding. Thus the idea of business 
success becomes less likely to be enacted. Accordingly, the goal of enacting both 
ideas simultaneously also becomes less likely. The next section documents the 
extreme of this continuum: to the point that ideas are completely reinterpreted and 
therefore ignored or highly refracted in practice. 
4.3.4.6 Highly Refracted Practices 
At the end of the continuum, practices become increasingly distant from the 
prescriptions set out explicitly in My Performance. Partners rationalise these actions 
by undermining the prescriptions and reinterpreting them entirely: in contrast to 
combining them (albeit to various degrees) to incorporate elements of the alternative 
idea in the previous, above, examples. For example, one Operations Manager asked 
“is it right” to measure managers against the criteria “two levels up,” since Future 
Management Structures had removed the tier of management immediately above 
managers? Another suggested that some of the criteria in My Performance related to 
information which was “a bit out of date if I’m honest,” whilst others noted that they 
relied on “gut feeling,” rather than My Performance, to decide if action was aligned 
with “the John Lewis way.” Others questioned: “what would it do for morale” if they 
stuck strictly to the requirements for Partners to “deliver all objectives set” and 
reflected: “what if I have done this, this, this and this to really have a focus on 
service, but […] the rest of the branch is not hitting the target? […] That’s not fair 
then to reflect that on me.” These questions of validity allow managers to reinterpret 
the prescriptions of My Performance. However, the tension they experience is 
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evident as they deal with existential questions as what is fundamentally “right” and 
therefore what is fundamentally ‘wrong’ with the prescriptions of My Performance. 
 
As Partners increasingly reinterpret the prescriptions of My Performance, their 
practices become significantly amended from, and have little resemblance to, the 
original prescriptions. For example, despite the privacy afforded to performance 
ratings, one Partner commented how a colleague had been criticised for not being 
“forthcoming enough big-ing himself up” or “selling himself” during his ARP. They 
felt this was “unfair” and so nominated him for a “One Step Beyond” reward as well 
as “go[ing] to [my line manager…] and [saying] ‘he might not put himself forward 
as knowledgeable and everything else, but he is fantastic!’” Here we see Partners 
undermining the idea of having to ‘sell’ your own achievements, an aspect of the 
devolved responsibility notion within the business success idea aiming to increase 
efficiency. Rather than engage with the system this Partner tries to bypass it. Thus 
the idea itself of Partners being responsible for highlighting their own strengths and 
achievements throughout the year is undermined and fails to be enacted in practice: 
the first Partner ignores it and the second, complaining, Partner tries to bypass the 
prescriptions and have them overruled. 
 
In order to get around this strict prescription of delivering all objectives set, another 
manager noted how they could alter objectives on a Partner’s Personal Development 
Plan (PDP): how they would “set a few [Objectives] and once you’ve achieved it, 
we’ll redraft it.” Others talked about having a very basic set of Objectives and 
“adding to them” throughout the year after completing them. Similarly, and in order 
to ensure Partners “deliver all objectives set,” another manager reflected how they 
scheduled a PDP  “catch-up” before the appraisal to remove objectives which 
wouldn’t be achieved: “if you’re really focusing on these two [objectives then…] 
let’s take that [other one] off for now, let’s keep it in mind: because you want to do 
that, but let’s put it out the way for just now and let’s focus on these.” Here Partners 
go beyond ignoring the prescriptions and begin to actively alter them; significant 
reinterpretation is required to legitmise deleting objectives, adding them after 
completion or formally confirming them only immediately before the final appraisal 
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to ensure they are achieved. Despite the explicit prescriptions of business success 
laid out in My Performance, these Managers feel they are too strict and too heavily 
prioritise the values of business success. Thus, they reinterpret these prescriptions 
under a Partner happiness value whereby their goal is to support Partners and ensure 
they do the very best they can; even if this means managers interpreting the 
prescriptions in a strategic sense. 
 
Reflections of such significant reinterpretation and blatant variations from the 
prescribed practices are also evident in how managers select the final salary increase 
for Partners from the pay bands. Again the documentation sets out strict criteria 
based on the Partner’s grading this year compared to last19. Instead, one Business 
Partner commented that they took “a lot of things […] into consideration,” like “how 
much pay everyone else is on, and if that person shoots straight up in one year then 
what kind of Partners are they going to be sitting with, and is it fair?” Again Partner 
happiness values of fairness are introduced to a process which gives very little 
consideration to fairness: since it is rationalised under the idea of business success. 
Likewise, another manager noted that instead of following the prescriptions, they 
would often bring Partners’ pay closer together, reflecting notions of equality and 
community rather than individuality and inequality:  
[…] so if two people are in Good […and] one’s at the top and one’s at the 
bottom, [then] you might give that person at the bottom a bigger one [pay 
increase] than the person at the top because you don’t want that [top] person 
getting even further away […and] that draws them closer. 
 
Whilst such significant framing presents what seems as serious tensions as Partners 
question whether a certain practice is existentially “right”, these instances eventually 
display little tension: as Partners reinterpret the prescriptions of My Performance 
they come to understand what they feel the prescriptions ‘must really mean’ despite 
‘saying the wrong thing’ and therefore many of these seemingly strategic alterations 
are in fact seen simply as the obvious or “right” thing to do. Thus, similar to Section 
4.3.4.1, after some tension before the reinterpretation has occurred, there is little 
tension or consideration of how one should behave.  
																																																								




Despite this, and again echoing Section 4.3.4.1, we see instances where the practices 
which are enacted do not actually reflect the dual ideas prescribed by My 
Performance; where Partners reinterpret the prescriptions, their practices end up 
being so refractive that they actually reflect the original idea which they use to 
interpret others. In other words, in the above, we see how Partners ignore the idea of 
business success, despite being confronted with explicit prescriptions, and instead 
reinterpret these prescriptions to solely conduct practices which reflected the ideas of 
Partner happiness.  
4.3.4.7 Summary 
In sum we see a range of different practices which vary from accurately reflecting 
individual ideas through slightly altering them and to significantly refracting them in 
practice. It should be reiterated that the sections outlined above are not distinctly 
different segments but instead are merely used to clarify the differences as practices 
move from being reflective of a single idea to being significantly refracted with 
respect to that idea. Nonetheless, such a continuum demonstrates how a single idea 
prescribed within My Performance can be enacted in a variety of different ways. For 
instance, practices can be highly reflective of either the Partner happiness or business 
success idea, as evidenced in Section 4.3.4.1 where Partners spoke of the evidence of 
a “community spirit” or being a “team,” reflecting a Partner happiness idea, or where 
others spoke of increasing internal audits or as some Partners being “hungry for 
money” reflecting the idea of business success in practice. In these instances one idea 
is easily enacted but the alternative isn’t really considered. As such, action seems 
obvious. Likewise, albeit in less cases, other practices which again seem obvious but 
do reflect both ideas in action, such as when Partners are concerned with improving 
efficiency in order to save money which is distributed collectively back to the 
Partners.  
 
Continuing along the continuum of tension and interpretations, Section 4.3.4.2 
demonstrates practices which are only slightly less accurately reflective of the 
underlying idea as a second idea is implemented into the Partner’s focus; for instance 
in the lack of enthusiasm, but general acceptance, of enacting the business success 
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idea of promoting the Partnership Credit Card to every customer. Reflecting 
increasing variation, Section 4.3.4.3 documents practices which are reflective but 
more seriously resisted when ideas are combined such as Partners initially refusing to 
accept Partner happiness objectives of contributing to the local community by 
reading to primary schools, but eventually being persuaded of the value of such an 
idea. Similarly, the notion of getting Partners who were previously focused too much 
on Partner happiness to recognise the need for “balance” towards the business 
success idea is also reflected in managerial comments such as “it’s [the Partnership] 
not a members club, this is employment!”  
 
As tension increases yet further we observe increasing alterations to the initial idea 
as it is interpreted with notions from the alternative. For example, Section 4.3.4.4 
begins to document ideas which are, albeit slightly, refractive rather than reflective 
of the underlying idea in practice as these dual ideas are combined. For example, 
where managers supplement My Performance with additional documents to aid 
understanding highlight acknowledgement of the need to focus on business success 
and profit by encouraging Partners to conform to My Performance, whilst at the 
same time also reflect the manager’s commitment to their role as a supportive figure 
to their Partners and their understanding of their role as assisting and supporting 
rather than delegating and directing. Tensions increase further still as dual ideas 
begin to be reinterpreted more significantly as documented in Section 4.3.4.5. Here 
we see instances of the initial prescription being interpreted according to the 
alternative idea. For instance where managers measure effort rather than absolute 
achievement, or not, of objectives, or where they apportion objectives across 
multiple Partners rather than giving all the Objectives to every Partner. These 
refracted practices demonstrate some reinterpretation and can lead to dual ideas 
being enacted in practice where they are managed successfully: i.e. if the managers 
noted above are able to achieve their objectives as a department overall, despite 
apportioning the objectives across that department.  
 
However, Section 4.3.4.6 documents instances where such successful management is 
unobtainable and where actors significantly reinterpret the prescriptions of My 
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Performance under an alternative idea; such as when managers physically remove 
objectives from their Partners’ appraisals or when they add them only after the 
Partner has completed them. Such instances reflect situations which are unlikely to 
constitute the dual ideas in practice since Partners significantly reinterpret even 
explicit prescriptions under the idea which they feel is morally “right”. After a period 
of tension directed at My Performance, rather than internally, Partners seem to 
conclude that the explicit prescriptions must mean something else: often something 
else entirely, and thus in these instances the idea is often altered so significantly that 
it instead reflects the alternative idea in practice. 
 
Throughout this process there is evidence of increasing tension: at least until 
reinterpretation has occurred, as in the final section, whereby tensions dissipate as an 
obvious course of action once again presents itself. Similarly, increasing reflexivity 
is evident as practices move along the continuum from accurately reflected to highly 
refracted and altered.  Likewise, at both ends of the continuum we see practices 
which are unlikely to reflect the dual ideas of My Performance since Partners already 
think it is obvious what they should do and thus find prescriptions of My 
Performance which reinforce their existing position, or reinterpret prescriptions so 
that they too reinforce their current understanding. It is more often in the middle of 
the continuum where the dual prescriptions of My Performance are put into practice, 
as detailed more explicitly in Section 5.4. 
 
If the realisation of dual ideas varies so much in practice, the question remains of 
what drives such variation? How do Partners justify and rationalise their different 
behaviours under each of these circumstances? The following section documents 
empirics relating to these questions. 
4.3.5 Explaining Variation 
Partners employ three distinct justifications to rationalise their practices. First, as 
implied above some practices seem obvious and possible alternatives are not 
considered. Second, these alternatives become more salient and thus practices are 
considered, here based upon what would enhance one’s own position. Third, where 
self-awareness and internally-directed reflexivity fail to provide what seems as a 
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rational course of action, external persuasion or coercion occurs in an attempt to 
rationalise behaviour. At each end of the above continuum we observe things 
seeming obvious, whilst in the middle we see reflexivity about enhancing one’s own 
position and the influence of persuasion and coercion.  
4.3.5.1 Things Being Obvious 
Firstly, where one idea is neatly reflected into practice it often seems obvious for the 
Partner. They experience little tension, demonstrate little reflexivity and there is a 
lack of awareness of alternative ways to act. For example, Partners justify activities 
relating to the idea of Partner happiness such as covering shifts for each other and 
having responsibility and autonomy for tasks as “common decency,” “politeness,” 
“common sense,” or “what I would do anyway […] because that’s what I do.” 
Similarly, ideas of being informed and being able to influence Partnership decisions 
and of managers acting in a supportive manner were described as “what we do” and 
that “there’s a just way, the John Lewis way, of doing things.” All these activities 
seem obvious to these Partners and as clearly the ‘right’ way to behave. 
 
Whilst these activities seem obvious to some Partners, they seem entirely unobvious, 
or even irrational, to others. For example, Partners also justify activities relating to 
the conflicting idea of business success as equally “obvious”. These Partners also 
feel there is a clear way to behave, despite this being in contrast with those Partners 
mentioned above. For instance, Partners spoke of being “a business, the same as 
everybody else” and about standardisation and centralisation being the “right way” to 
‘move the business forward’. Another highlighted that “I don’t think I’ve changed in 
my selling technique, I just think I’m now in the right [company].” Again these 
rationalisations demonstrate a feeling of this being the “right way” to do things, 
despite these ideas being in contrast to the alternative ideas of autonomy, 
individuality, customer satisfaction etc. which are espoused in the Partner happiness 
idea. In other words, despite the option of alternatives, these activities are taken for 
granted and rationalised as the only possible activities: here the obvious thing to do is 
promote business success by standardising, centralising, push-selling etc.: activities 




Echoing this obviousness, albeit less frequently, other Partners reflected that it was 
clear to them to simultaneously focus on the ideas of both Partner happiness and 
business success. For example, the quote above highlighting that “every penny is a 
prisoner” because wasting money means a reduced bonus for everyone, demonstrates 
the combination of Partnership happiness and business success ideas simultaneously. 
The expansive reflection: “this has been me in every job,” highlights a perception of 
this being the obvious and only way to act; it seems odd to this Partner for others to 
do anything but simultaneously consider both ideas, despite the evidence above of 
both ideas seeming irrational to others. 
 
Secondly, and in contrast, at the opposite end of the continuum where ideas are 
highly reinterpreted, activities are again justified as “obvious”, despite a marked 
increase in tension and reflexivity. Such obviousness is again evidenced in the 
prescriptions of both ideas. For instance, business success ideas of setting standard 
Objectives for everyone are reinterpreted under the idea of Partner happiness so that 
it becomes justifiable to delete objectives that aren’t going to be achieved. Similarly, 
Partner happiness values of respectful treatment of others and creating a community 
atmosphere are reinterpreted under business success ideas so that it becomes 
justifiable to comment that John Lewis has “a load of very nice people that weren’t 
really that geared up on delivering results” or that, ultimately, the Partnership “may 
be there for the happiness of partners but […] we are there to make a profit, to 
sustain ourselves.”  
 
Here the ideas of Partner happiness or business success are reinterpreted under the 
alternative idea and thus enacted in a manner which stretches the refraction of the 
initial idea so much that it actually ends up reflecting the alternative idea in practice. 
Whilst such reframing demonstrates more significant tension and reflexivity than at 
the other end of the continuum, where ideas are neatly reflected into practice, even in 
these instances it becomes obvious how Partners should behave. Again in these 
instances, Partners justify their behaviour by suggesting things were “a bit out of 
date” despite being implemented within the past three years, or as questioning 
whether something was morally “right” or “fair”. We again see how Partners feel 
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there is an obvious way to act, despite the degree of variation, and therefore lack of 
obviousness, in practice. 
 
However, other practices show more conscious decision making where Partners are 
aware of alternatives and have to resolve the tension themselves by justifying them 
in a more active sense. How actors deal with such tension and rationalise its 
reconciliation is detailed in the following two sections. 
4.3.5.2 Enhancing One’s Own Position 
The first sort of active justification when considering alternative courses of action is 
an internalised consideration of how this decision directly affects the individual 
Partner. Such considerations range from going with the flow and making one’s life a 
little easier by not resisting prescriptions upon one’s behaviour, to more strategic and 
active consideration of how to enhance one’s career opportunities and to ‘making a 
stand’ about such prescriptions. These rationalisations also incorporate a concern for 
who has authority within the Partnership: is it those who are long-standing members 
or those who are in a ‘higher’ position up the hierarchy? 
 
For instance, in some situations Partners feel that it is relatively clear who has 
authority and are willing to compromise on their views in order to keep their 
manager happy and make their own life easier. These situations reflect only a slight 
degree of tension where the Partner’s concern is only minor and can thus be 
relatively easily overcome by the authority of a manager’s request, or where it 
doesn’t seem worth arguing over for the individual Partner. Accordingly, the 
enactment of dual ideas is relatively likely. For example, the Partner mentioned 
above who felt that asking every customer if they would like a Partnership Card 
reflected that they didn’t dislike it enough to warrant ‘rocking the boat’ since “that’s 
been installed for years […] you’ve still got to do it […] I don’t question it.” Whilst 
this conflicts with their interpretation of ‘professional salesperson’ (as delivering 
excellent customer service rather than maximising profit), they still “have to do it”. 
Likewise, another Partner commented that they felt they had to reply “Yes, Sir!” to 
managers’ requests to move around the store because they were the authoritative 
people appointed by the Partnership and who were ‘in command.’ Here we see 
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situations of tension where ideas of business success (maximising profit and 
standardisation respectively) are successfully combined in Partners who feel that 
their role should be defined by the idea of Partner happiness. However, such tension 
is relatively small and thus the idea of business success can be relatively easily 
combined alongside the Partner’s existing focus where they reflect upon a tension 
and consider it to be insufficiently strong to warrant resisting or arguing. 
 
In contrast, other circumstances demonstrate situations that are sufficiently 
problematic to warrant taking a stand: by leaving the business in extreme instances. 
For example, a manager commented that Partners had “to make the personal choice: 
do I shut up and put up with it, or do I leave and go somewhere else?” The Head of 
Branch explained that they felt this ultimately came down to whether Partners 
“would rather do that work in another business [or] do another role within John 
Lewis.” Here we see situations where Partners have to decide if their interest in 
retaining their employment outweighs any prescriptions that are perceived as 
problematic. If these prescriptions are perceived as too problematic to be overcome 
then they can leave the business in hope of finding another position whereby their 
perception aligns more closely with company expectations. Otherwise they have to 
alter their behaviour and “put up with it”. 
 
In extreme instances these prescriptions can be so untenable for Partners that they 
cannot see how they could rationalise their position and reconcile this tension, and 
instead remove themselves from that situation. For example, reflecting upon various 
change initiatives, an Operations Manager spoke of how Partners had left the 
business following the introduction of My Performance or had “got left behind” 
because they felt “this isn’t for me, this isn’t the world I want to operate in.” 
 
In contrast, in the middle ground, between relatively little tension where ideas are 
combined relatively easily and relatively large tension where Partners leave the 
Partnership when ideas cannot be combined, other Partners act with more strategic 
consideration of their own position. For example, some Partners disregard 
perceptions of what they feel their role should entail, and simply follow the 
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prescriptions of My Performance as closely as possible. In these instances the 
potential of promotion and sustaining a career overcome concerns of what a Partner 
feels should be appropriate: Partners are happy to accept that appropriateness is 
authoritatively defined by the Partnership, rather than concerning themselves with 
what they see as important in their role. In accepting this authority, Partners then try 
to follow the prescriptions of My Performance as closely as possible. Where they are 
successful in doing this, they are rewarded accordingly. For example, one manager 
described how My Performance, with its dual prescriptions, was “really key” in 
showing them “exactly what I need to do to take a step up.” Likewise, a Partner 
commented that “if you want your pay to go up you’ve got to go back to basics and 
see where you need to be performing”: ‘see’, of course, according to the particular, 
dual, values of My Performance since it “allows you to know what you need to do to 
go forward.” Promotion is impossible without satisfying both the What and the How 
because Partners “know that if they don’t perform then it will impact on their ARP.” 
(Selling Partner) Thus Partners focused on sustaining their position tend to enact 
multiple ideas without reframing them, sticking to the verbatim idea written 
explicitly in My Performance: 
I’m very well aware of what I need to develop to move forward, I know my 
development areas, I know what [my manager] feels my development areas 
are […and I frequently ask] ‘is there any gaps in My Performance that I’m 
not delivering?’ [...] I know what I need to do because I’ve got a PDP 
[Personal Development Plan] and I know what I need to work on, and I know 
the results and the Key Performance Indicators I need to reach so I know 
exactly what I need to do in my job […] I know the next steps and I know 
what I need to do to get there. 
 
In sum, where Partners do not feel there is an obvious way to act in response to the 
prescriptions of My Performance then they experience tension. They then attempt to 
reconcile this tension internally by considering whether such tension warrants 
resistance, or whether they feel that they should eliminate tension by disregarding the 
activities they feel their role ought to include and simply following the prescriptions 
of My Performance in order to enhance their own position. In all situations except 
where Partners leave, we see secondary ideas being relatively easily combined. 
However, such internalised reflexivity does not always reconcile the initial tension 
when faced with an alternative prescription and when this occurs the tension builds 
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further, often to the point that it cannot be reconciled internally and instead requires 
external influence. 
4.3.5.3 External Persuasion and Coercion 
In these scenarios Partners are more aware of potential alternatives than in the above 
examples and thus tensions again increase as Partners are increasingly unsure of how 
to behave. These Partners often have to be convinced by others (to varying degrees 
of success) that the prescriptions of My Performance are appropriate because they 
cannot internally reconcile these tensions. Ample opportunities to convince others 
are presented through the ethos of involvement and community under the Partner 
happiness idea which rationalises that Partners are provided with “a huge amount of 
information” (Manager) about business decisions. In addition to the in-house 
magazines, quarterly Town Hall meetings and various Forums provide Partners with 
further opportunity to communicate, justify and explain decisions. Furthermore, the 
expectation, from Partners, that Managers should communicate the business strategy 
to them on a daily basis provides additional space where Managers are able to try 
and reduce these tensions by persuading and directing behaviour. This persuasion 
occurs at multiple levels: senior manager-manager, manager-Partner, Partner-Partner 
and Partner-manager. 
 
Such opportunity to present information is not taken lightly. Indeed, an Operations 
Manager spoke of how they would select managers for these communications 
strategically. For example, they suggested that the “level of commitment to the 
message” is important because “if [differences in interpretation] start to leak through 
into the message the Partners get, then we have a problem.” Further, they were 
selective in what information they delivered themselves “to as many Partners as 
physically possible,” in contrast to that information which lower-level managers 
were asked to “cascade […] through the line.” Specifically they would select 
Partners and Managers who are “confident in what they’re delivering” and can 
“convey a message” successfully to get “buy in.” (Operations Manager) 
 
Similarly, the Head of Branch commented that they “set the ground early on” with 
Partners by giving them “a huge amount of information” which makes Partners 
	
155	
“better prepared” for accepting direction under times of tension: “so when it comes 
to an announcement time I’m sort of going in warm.” They noted that they “warmed 
up” Partners by “explain[ing] some of the pressures in the market: […] that all 
retailers needed to adapt and that […] John Lewis would need to be looking at these 
particular areas.” The Head of Branch attempted to “smooth that passage” of 
persuasion by “sit[ting] down with Partners and explain[ing] to them and show[ing] 
them the statistics.” Whilst “they might not like it […] they understand it […And 
that] takes a huge amount of the emotion out of it and they accept it.” They 
attempted to ‘remove the emotion’ by presenting arguments from a “logical, 
business–headed stance” and delegitimised those resisting by framing their responses 
as relying on “an emotional stance” by:  
[…] paint[ing] a picture:[…] ‘We’re standing on a burning platform and 
unless we take that brave step to jump off it, the base is going to burn away 
from us and we’ll be left [to drown]!’  
 
In a more “subtle” manner, another manager noted how convincing Partners that they 
needed to be able to work the till (as part of the “new world” (Selling Partner) of 
reiterated standardisation under the idea of business success, regardless of whether 
they were customer-facing or not) was “incredibly challenging […they] just didn’t 
see it as part of their job, didn’t understand why they had to do it.” Whilst managers 
felt this was improving over time and that “we’re definitely getting there […] and 
they’ve become much more accepting of it”, they noted that these situations were 
“really, really difficult” and “it’s one of those things that to build it in with 
everything else takes time […] a lot of time.” 
 
In order to persuade others of the appropriateness of these requests, managers 
attempt to make their requests “crystal clear” and “put it into bite sized chunks.” 
They also tried to get “them to acknowledge that they had to do it, and to try and 
give them an opportunity that would […give them] a buzz back from it.” To do this 
they kept pushing them to do things and used their “own personal experience” to 
illustrate the “really nice glow inside” that you get from, for example, raising money 




Similarly, one recently transferred manager noted that they were “telling people what 
areas they need to work on and develop […but] at the moment I’m doing it very 
subtly to try and gain their confidence, rather than me just coming in and just blitzing 
it.” Another manager commented that, upon joining a new team, they would “take 
the Partner for a coffee, and use it as an opportunity to get to know them a bit, but 
also be really quite clear on my expectations and the way that I’d like to work with 
them.” They reflected that they would “try and use a lot of the My Performance 
language in my own language when I’m speaking to them, just so they try and 
engage with it.” Again we see varying tactics of persuasion that managers’ employ in 
their attempts to encourage Partners to enact the dual ideas outlined in My 
Performance when these Partners are unsure of how to act.  
 
On the other hand, as noted above, some managers highlight to Partners that these 
are expected behaviours: “it says on the paper here, you are supposed to get involved 
in it,” and if they weren’t displayed then the Partner could be made redundant: “it’s 
also a tool that […if] they’re not achieving [objectives…then] we need to think are 
you right for the business?” These instances again highlight the skills managers 
employ in their attempts to influence others: they ‘befriend’ Partners, attempt to 
influence slowly and over time instead of “blitzing it,” use familiar language which 
has the authority of the Partnership behind it or use this authority to reiterate the 
implications of non-conformance.  
 
Reflective of more overt attempts to persuade, Partners often employ similar tactics 
when attempting to convince their peers to enact the dual prescriptions of My 
Performance. For instance, a Partner described how some other Partners just 
“weren’t Partnership” and didn’t “get it.” Similarly, others described how some 
people were “standing in a corner chatting all day” and that this was “not acceptable” 
according to the “John Lewis way”. In these instances other Partners attempt to 
remind these Partners of the dual Partnership values by resorting to “confrontation as 
well I suppose.” For example, one Partner reflected that they would ask: “are you 
going to be able help me because you’re just standing there?” whilst another noted 
they had informally sanctioned others by “just saying: ‘look this needs done, that 
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needs done […] who’s going to do what?’” Similarly, another reflected that they had 
informally sanctioned others by reflecting: “I’m a very sarcastic person and I will 
walk up and say: ‘is anyone going to do any bloody work today?’”  
 
Finally, Partners themselves were also not afraid to sanction managers where they 
were felt to be failing to live up to expectations: 
I’ve lost my rag big style, standing on the till, no one answers the bell [to call 
for assistance], so you ring a bell, no one answers it [the call for assistance], 
ring a bell, no one answers it. And I stood there and I broke the bell. Because 
I was so angry. I just held onto it. And I had a queue [of customers]. Then I 
went up to a manager: ‘excuse me, these people are talking, where is 
everyone, what’s everyone doing?’ I lost my rag big style and shouted at the 
manager. 
 
In sum we see a variety of methods, varying in success, which attempt to persuade or 
coerce others into acting in a particular way by convincing them of appropriateness. 
These situations of external influence occur after internal reconciliation has failed to 
provide a seemingly appropriate course of action in response to the prescriptions of 
My Performance. Thus Partners look outside themselves to see what others think is 
appropriate when they cannot reconcile such tension themselves. In other words, 
these situations display the most tension and highest degree of uncertainty about how 
to act. Because of the increased tension in these settings, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to combine ideas and instead more significant effort must be made which 
interprets current focus in accordance with, but not reinterpreted according to, the 
alternative idea. In such attempts the outcome is not guaranteed and is indeed 
contingent upon a number of things, most notably the skill of the manager in being 
able convince. 
 
4.4 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter outlines the case site and empirical story that informs the theory 
presented in the following chapter. Specifically this Chapter introduces the case 
company, outlining briefly its history and detailing how the performance appraisal 
process works in practice. It then moves to outlining the empirical story from which 
the theory is built and the research questions answered. It begins by outlining how 
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the ideas of Partner happiness and business success are manifested in practice in the 
case study. Section 4.3.2 documents empirical material highlighting both the 
formalised and material versions of each of the ideas and also the informal practices 
of those same ideas. It outlines how Partners perceive there to have been a “big 
cultural shift” which follows the introduction of My Performance. Following this, it 
details empirically how My Performance works in practice to engage and enrol 
actors and become a taken for granted aspect of organizational life within John 
Lewis. Similarly, this section documents how My Performance constructs certain 
kinds of knowledge and then instructs Partners of how to behave through various 
facilitators which aid the instrument in its ability to influence behaviour. 
 
Building on these preceding sections, the chapter then outlines how Partners respond 
to the introduction of My Performance’s prescriptions. Sub-sections within section 
4.3.4 document practices which vary from neatly reflecting the ideas of Partner 
happiness and business success formalised in My Performance through to substantial 
interpretation of these ideas which in fact reflect the alternative idea in practice. 
These sections highlight a continuum of increasing tension, until the extreme end of 
the continuum where reinterpretation is complete and thus tension is once again 
reduced. Such increasing tension reflects the increasing difficulty Partners face in 
reconciling the prescriptions of My Performance against what they feel their role 
ought to look like.  
 
Section 4.3.5 documents three factors which moderate highlight how Partners justify 
their behaviour under each section by documenting how ideas can be obvious, 
require internal reconciliation or require external persuasion. Firstly, where ideas 
seem obvious Partners experience little tension and ideas are either reflected neatly 
into practice or reinterpreted so substantially that their enactment neatly reflects the 
alternative idea in practice (as in the case of deleting objectives from the 
performance appraisal process). Secondly, as tension builds Partners seem unsure of 
how to behave but are able to reconcile this themselves through internal reflection. 
Thirdly, and in contrast, as internal reconciliation fails to provide Partners with a 
seemingly appropriate course of action, they turn to, or are open to, external sources 
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of influence. These situations demonstrate increasing tension which cannot be 
overcome internally and thus a more serious concern arises over the compatibility of 
the combined ideas; as such they cannot simply be combined as they are but instead 
require some redefinition by others. Such redefining is not easy, reflective of the 
increased tension in these instances, and relies upon the skill of others to be able to 
successfully convince of an appropriate course of behaviour. Thus we see instances 
where skill has been employed successfully and where dual ideas are successfully 
practiced (such as apportioning objectives across multiple Partners but nonetheless 
delivering the objectives for the Department as a whole) and other instances where 
skill is less successful and dual ideas are not enacted in practice (for instance where 
objectives are deleted or Partners leave the Partnership). Teasing out the theoretical 
implications of this unfolding empirical narrative remain the aim of the following, 
Discussion, chapter which explicitly answers the research questions and comments 




















































Chapter 5: Discussion 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the empirical storyline presented in the previous chapter 
through the proposed theoretical framework: that is, it presents a theorised narrative. 
As such, this chapter explicitly answers the three research questions and hints at how 
such answers contribute to an understanding of how ideas come to be made real in 
practice. 
 
The chapter is split into four sections which document: (i) the characteristics of the 
ideas and how these ideas can be considered as governmental programmes or 
institutional logics, (ii) the role of My Performance in making these ideas real and 
thus how My Performance can be considered as a mediating instrument, (iii) the 
factors which moderate whether this mediating instrument is likely to govern 
according to these dual ideas and (iv) a summary to detail the holistic description of 
how ideas are made real in practices. The latter three sections, respectively, answer 
the three research questions, which for sake of clarity are: (i) How do actors respond 
to a mediating instrument? (ii) What factors moderate actors’ responses to this 
instrument? and (iii) How can actors ‘step out’ of one logic and come to recognise 
the legitimacy of an alternative?  
 
After documenting the characteristics of each idea and how these can be described as 
‘governmental programmes’ or ‘institutional logics’ in the first section, the second 
section, Section 5.3, outlines that My Performance acts like a mediating instrument 
because it: constructs new knowledge; instructs actors how to behave based on this; 
and mediates between multiple actors, domains and ideas (with a penultimate section 
documenting why it is so successful at doing so). The section then moves on to 
outline that My Performance finally acts like a mediating instrument by governing, 
although this section documents the multiplicity and variations that arise as the 
mediating instrument attempts to make real its symbolic logics in practices. This 





The third section, Section 5.4, then moves on to the second research question and 
outlines three moderating factors which explain such variation: underlying ties to 
existing logics, self interest and others’ persuasion. This section outlines how 
multiple ideas can be added, merged or re/framed to, or under, actors’ existing 
understandings and, accordingly, how likely the enactment of dual ideas are in each 
of these situations.   
 
The fourth section, Section 5.5, then summarises these arguments and provides an 
overview of how ideas are made real and the factors that moderate the effective 
performativity of a mediating instrument. In so doing it provides a conceptualisation 
in response to the third research question by highlighting the relationship between 
these three moderating factors. Specifically, this section highlights that the latter two 
moderating factors are less existential and more instrumental and can thus provide a 
temporary override; such an override allows actors to recognise the legitimacy of 
alternatives when ideas are added or merged without causing them existential stress 
which would cause them to ‘retreat’ deeper into one logic and thereby promote 
reframing. The implications, contributions, future research questions and summary 
arising from such discussion are then presented in the following, final, chapter. 
 
5.2 Ideas, Programmes or Logics 
The ideas of Partner happiness and business success represent ideational-level value 
systems and provide distinct sources of legitimacy and rationality: ways of framing 
and making sense of actors’ interactions with the world. As summarised in Table 2 in 
Section 4.3.2.2, each value system provides a distinct aim, rhetoric, audience for 
legitimacy, identity, appropriate structure and roles for Partners, Managers and My 
Performance. In other words, we can conceptualise these ideas as governmental 
programmes or institutional logics.  
 
For instance, as demonstrated by Sections 4.3.2.1 and 4.3.2.2, the definition of a 
programme equally applies to the ideas of Partner happiness and business success: 
“high level discourses that frame and legitimate local change and articulate the plans, 
projects, policies, aspirations, political ideals, discursive frameworks and utopian 
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goals of reformers.” (Thomson et al., 2014, p. 454) Similarly, we can see how each 
of the ideas can be considered as particular “styles of thinking, ways of rendering 
reality” which appeal “to virtue, to what is or is not possible or desirable” (Miller & 
Rose, 1990, p. 6) by providing “varieties of rationality, forms of reason” (Miller & 
Rose, 2008, p. 16). Likewise, the ideas of Partner happiness and business success can 
equally be considered as distinct logics: as the “rules of the game” (Thornton & 
Ocasio, 2008, p. 112). Again the definition of a logic equally applies to the ideas of 
Partner happiness or business success as they are shared, taken for granted social 
norms and prescriptions which define legitimacy and rationality: they provide 
sources of authority, legitimacy, identity and bases of attention, strategy and norms 
(Thornton et al., 2012, p. 73). Indeed they parallel many of the characteristics of 
logics in prior work (see, for example: Lounsbury, 2007; Muzio et al., 2013; Smets et 
al., 2015 etc.). 
 
Similarly, the ideas and values of Partner happiness and business success are 
instantiated in those instruments conceptualised as ‘calculative technologies’ in 
governmentality (Jeacle & Carter, 2012; Mennicken, 2008; Miller & Rose, 2008; 
Thomson et al., 2014) or ‘material artefacts’ in institutional theory (Christiansen & 
Lounsbury, 2013; Espeland & Sauder, 2007; Gawer & Phillips, 2013; Raviola & 
Norbäk, 2013). Specifically, they are instantiated in My Performance and it’s 
associated documents: for example in The How or The What measures within My 
Performance or the associated Role Descriptions or Job Profiles which outline, 
explicitly in material technologies or artefacts, how actors should behave under each 
of these value systems (see sections 4.2.3, 4.3.2 and below for examples). In addition 
to the ideas of Partner happiness and business success both having symbolic values 
and being instantiated in material technologies, both, again, have practices associated 
with each idea (see sections 4.3.2.1, 4.3.2.2 and below) and which are intertwined 
with, and constitutive of, these symbolic values and material technologies 
(Czarniawska, 2008; Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 20; Powell & Colyvas, 2008; Thomson 




Accordingly, the terms programmes and logics can be applied to what has previously 
been described throughout this thesis as ‘ideas’. Furthermore, the terms ‘logic’ and 
‘programme’ are interchangeable (see Arjaliès & Raynard, 2014, Section 2.4 and the 
definitions above). Indeed work drawing on each theory explicitly uses the 
terminology of the other; for example, see Jeacle & Carter (2012, p. 745) for use of 
“logics” within a governmentality study and Greenwood et al. (2008, p. 6) for use of 
“governmental programmes” within institutional theory. For sake of clarity, the 
remainder of this thesis will adopt the term symbolic logics when referring to 
ideational level programmes or values. The characteristics of each symbolic logic are 
briefly reiterated below to highlight how they can be considered as symbolic logics, 
before the material practices of these symbolic logics are discussed in the following 
section. 
 
The idea of Partner happiness can be summed up as the “John Lewis way” (Selling 
Partner) of doing things where: partners are given autonomy and “trusted to do [their 
job]” (Selling Partner); managers act in a supportive capacity towards Partners; 
managers communicate in a respectful and inclusive manner; Partners are provided 
with information about the business and are able to influence decisions; and where 
professional service is about making the customer happy. Comparing Tables 1 and 2 
we can see that the idea of Partner happiness mixes the characteristics of the family, 
community, state and profession institutional orders to form what is termed here ‘the 
partnership logic’. Whilst this partnership logic demonstrates elements of the 
aforementioned orders: such as a focus on common boundaries, democratic 
participation, patriarchal domination, association with personal craft, group 
membership etc. (see table 1 or Thornton et al., 2012, p. 73), these orders do not 
appear as distinct value systems within the case and instead amalgamate into the 
specific value system observed here: hence the description of it as the partnership 
logic rather than any of the institutional orders or ideal types of logics themselves. 
Such a categorisation reflects the constructed nature of logics and hints at the fact 
that whilst they adopt some values from the institutional orders, they are fluid: the 
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partnership logic is quite specific to this empirical setting20 and is similarly 
constructed differently in different settings and by different actors (Carlsson-Wall et 
al., 2015; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Smets et al., 2015). 
 
Likewise, the idea of business success also provides actors with a value system and 
way of framing and making sense of the world (Thornton et al., 2012), although this 
is often in contrast to the symbolic elements of the partnership logic. For instance, 
the idea of business success focuses actors on profit (through both explicitly 
increasing revenue and increasing “efficiency” (Manager)) to become more 
“business orientated.” (Manager) Standardisation and centralisation are promoted 
over autonomy, and are rationalised as presenting a “logical, business-headed stance” 
rather than an “emotional stance” (Head of Branch). Manager’s roles are directive 
rather than supportive and partners are expected to have responsibilities delegated to 
them. Finally, it also implies a more individualistic focus, which promotes 
competition, individual reward and a ‘harder’ selling focus where successful 
customer service involves maximising sales revenue.  
 
Again comparing Tables 1 and 2 we see elements of the market and corporation 
orders such as: a focus on transactions and revenue, an interest in the market position 
of the Partnership, the authority of top management, a self-interest, a strategy of 
increasing efficiency and profit etc. (again see table 1 or Thornton et al., 2012, p. 
73). Whilst these ideal types provide the basic elements, the particular construction 
of this value system is again not reflected directly in these typologies and, 
accordingly, these characteristics are instead categorised here as ‘the profit logic’20 to 
distinguish them from the institutional orders and highlight their particular 
construction within this setting. 
 
As noted above, the symbolic values of each logic are instantiated in calculative 
technologies (Jeacle & Carter, 2012; Miller & Rose, 2008) or material artefacts 
(Espeland & Sauder, 2007; Gawer & Phillips, 2013) since these symbolic logics 
																																																								
20 See sections 4.3.2.1, 4.3.2.2, and Table 2, for more details on the specific 
characteristics of the partnership logic and the, following, profit logic. 
	
166	
cannot live by themselves and instead must be continually constructed through these 
technologies (Czarniawska, 2008; Hoskin & Macve, 1986; Miller & Rose, 2008; 
Powell & Colyvas, 2008). Specifically, they are constructed through the mediating 
and governing function of these material, calculative technologies, which, as outlined 
in Section 2.2.1.3, can be conceptualised as ‘mediating instruments’ (Miller & 
O’Leary, 2007; Thomson et al., 2014). The next section turns to explore how these 
symbolic logics are attempted to be made real through such instruments and how 
these attempts are responded to. 
	
5.3 Mediating Instruments Making Ideas Real 
Whilst many of these characteristics were evident before the introduction of My 
Performance, the introduction of a performance appraisal process which explicitly 
focuses on both symbolic logics, instead of just one: as per the previous appraisal 
process which was “very, very behaviourally based” (Operations Manager of 
Commercial Support), has material implications. For instance, it constructs a “new 
world” where Partners feel the focus has “completely changed […] to Profit, 
Customer, Partner” and where the expectation for Partner performance has increased: 
as reflected in the manager’s comments that “if we don’t ask more of every single 
Partner by framing it like that then we’re never going to get anywhere”. In other 
words, the implementation of My Performance has a material effect.  
 
Firstly this section outlines how this effect occurrs – how My Performance acts: (i) to 
construct new knowledge, (ii) to instruct based on this new knowledge, (iii) to 
mediate between multiple actors, domains and ideas and (iv), therefore, to act like a 
mediating instrument by governing (Thomson et al., 2014). The following section 
then documents why My Performance is able to so effectively act as a mediating 
instrument before returning, at the end, to ask if this mediating instrument is 
effectively performative: and when, why, where, or not?  
5.3.1 Construction 
My Performance constructs new forms of knowledge that legitimise particular 
policies of “intervention and regulation” (Miller & Rose, 1990, p. 5) and which are 
directed towards a new, and particular, end. For example, when compared to the 
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previous performance appraisal process, Partners repeatedly reflected that My 
Performance was more “fit for purpose,” “structured,” “clearer”, “black and white”: 
“it’s a completely different way of working” and “a bit of a shock to the system” 
(Selling Partners and managers). In other words, Partners felt it was different to the 
previous performance appraisal process. Whilst in the previous process managers 
would try to “find [a] way of ensuring that you were bringing that [profit focus] into 
their appraisal somehow […] the system wasn’t set up in a way that that was easy to 
do, so you had to be quite clever” (Operations Manager of Commercial Support), the 
new process was felt to be “more streamlined”, less open to interpretation and more 
able to capture these dual expectations without such a need to be ‘clever’.  
 
My Performance constructs this new form of knowledge by formally outlining the 
“guidelines” (Manager) and expectations of behaviour for Partners. It lets them ‘see’ 
“exactly what I need to do to take a step up” (Manager). In other words, it prescribes 
a “black and white” notion of what Good performance is: a “new world” where the 
focus has “completely changed […] to Profit, Customer, Partner” (Selling Partners). 
Specifically, My Performance constructs a new form of expected behaviours where 
Partners are no longer simply assessed by “how nice the person [is]” (Operations 
Manager of Commercial Support), but instead by whether or not they deliver both 
symbolic logics in practice: as reflected in the managers’ comments that “they’ve 
made it very clear that there’s two things that the Partnership wants: [a)] is that you 
do it right, and b) that you actually do it in the first place,” or that: “it makes them 
realise there’s a balance towards being a Partner and the responsibilities of being a 
Partner.” This means for Partners who were previously heavily sales driven that they 
have to recognise and enact practices which promote Partner happiness, and vice 
versa, for those “very nice people that weren’t really that geared up on delivering 
results” who now have to “earn their way” by delivering sales (Managers). In other 
words, the new construction of Good performance must demonstrate both the 
partnership logic and the profit logic in practice.  
 
The previous definition of Good performance becomes illegitimate with the force of 
authority behind the implementation of My Performance (see Sections 4.2.3, 4.3.3 
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and 5.3.4 for summaries of how this implementation occurred and why it occurred so 
effectively). For instance, My Performance allows Partners to “see where you need 
to be performing […] if you want your pay to go up” (Selling Partner). It allows 
actors to ‘see’ their performance in the new light of the dual expectations of both 
logics: without My Performance, or managers being “quite clever”, the old appraisal 
process only encouraged the partnership logic, whereas My Performance reconstructs 
Good performance as an enactment of both the partnership and the profit logic. 
Additionally, because My Performance is perceived as more “streamlined” and “less 
wooly” (Selling Partners), Partners feel less able to interpret it. This again highlights 
the legitimacy afforded to My Performance and its newly constructed knowledge of 
Good performance: as demonstrated in the quotes about there being “no point in 
adding in any bits yourself and doing other bits because that just gets messy, this is 
what you’re working towards.” (Selling Partner)  
 
Here we see the way new ways of thinking about performance construct new 
knowledge (Miller & Rose, 2008). Similarly, such knowledge ‘makes up’ actors in a 
way which did not exist before (Hacking, 1983; Rose & Miller, 1992) and thus 
presents new forms of knowledge and expertise which can be used to govern actors 
who, ‘rationally’ and willingly, might want to improve against such knowledge 
(Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 174). Thus we see that in measuring an object under a new 
construction of knowledge, we not only define it but can also then compare it: to 
others, to itself over time and over space etc. (Hoskin & Macve, 1986; Rose & 
Miller, 1992, p. 175). My Performance thereby constructs the domains in question as 
susceptible to particular types of intervention (Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 185).  
 
Such constructions then have material implications since they afford instruction: 
since “you’re either doing this well or you’re not. If you’re doing it well: great […] if 
you’re not then actually it’s really clear on here why you’re not.” (Manager) This 
newly constructed knowledge sets new expectations which means managers can 
legitimately “ask more of every single Partner by framing it like that” and ask “them 
to do things in the exact way we need them to do it.” In other words, it allows them 
to instruct based on a very particular form of constructed knowledge: and to evaluate, 
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calculate and intervene based on this knowledge (Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 185). The 
following section documents more specifically how My Performance instructs. 
5.3.2 Instruction 
The “guidelines” (Manager) noted above in My Performance, focusing on the dual 
partnership and profit logics, explicitly direct behaviour towards this new 
construction of knowledge. Thus we see techniques of notation, computation and 
calculation in the examination and assessment of individuals which seek to 
instantiate government: which seek to instantiate the dual symbolic logics of 
partnership and profit (Hoskin & Macve, 1986; Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 183). My 
Performance formally outlines a “guide to the Partnership Behaviours and your 
Annual Review of Performance.” (My Performance, 2009, p. 1) Further, various 
displays are organised throughout the office space which remind Partners of these 
prescriptions: for example upon first entering the building there is a large reminder 
of the Commitments laid out in My Performance which is printed on the wall. 
Similarly, the various supporting documents: such as the hard-copy guidance booklet 
with various indicators, the Role Description or the Job Profile, alongside 
interactions around the notion of performance appraisal: such as formal and informal 
meetings or peer discussion, and coupled with the ethos of sharing information and 
therefore having multiple opportunities to interact, all provide instances where 
managers can attempt to instruct others of the ideas of My Performance and persuade 
them to act in this manner.  
 
This particular vision of the future is difficult to imagine without the formalised 
prescriptions of My Performance (Callon, 2007; Jordan et al., 2013, p. 171), as 
demonstrated by the quote above when a manager describes how they had to be 
“quite clever” to envision this particular view of the future under the previous 
performance appraisal guidance, but that My Performance was “much better.” With a 
different vision, it could be otherwise (Woolgar, 2015): different knowledges provide 





The ability of My Performance to instruct behaviour is reflected throughout the 
empirics: for instance when managers comment that they seek to “mould new people 
into the Partner we want them to be” or that My Performance provides them with a 
“mountain of tools,” “created a new vocabulary” or is a “Bible” for presenting 
Partners with expectations. My Performance is about “pushing every Partner” 
towards this newly constructed notion of Good performance (Manager). Partners 
themselves repeatedly referred to My Performance as outlining expectations and 
providing “clarity” and “mak[ing] it clear what [they] want,” or that it “sums it all up 
for you, exactly what is expected.” ‘Exactly what is expected’ is the dual focus on 
both the partnership and the profit logic: of realising the “balance” (Manager) 
required of working within the Partnership. Thus we see various “local tactics of 
education, persuasion, inducement, management, incitement, motivation and 
encouragement” (Rose and Miller, 1992, p. 175) which seek to instruct actors to 
construct the dual logics which are embedded in these various instruments. 
 
The empirics (see sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.4 particularly) document various situations 
where Partners respond to these instructions in the desired manner: in a way that 
reflects the dual prescriptions of My Performance. For instance where Partners feel it 
is obvious for them to focus on both enhancing profit and building the partnership 
logic by maximising and sharing the bonus whilst at the same time conducting 
readings at local primary schools and being involved with Partnership decisions. 
Even where Partners begrudgingly accept selling a Partnership Credit Card they can 
still enact the dual prescriptions of My Performance. Such enactment of the dual 




Despite My Performance seemingly making it “very clear that there’s two things that 
the Partnership wants” (Manager) to some, others found this very unclear, to the 
point where they would delete objectives from performance appraisals: in order to 
enhance the partnership logic, or where they would not help Partners to understand 
the prescriptions of My Performance at all, because that was not their responsibility: 




Thus we see, as explored in more detail below, the continual and on-going 
construction of logics in practice in a fluid and hybrid manner (Friedland & Alford, 
1991; Quattrone, 2015). In other words, there are various responses to attempted 
governance, rather than a homogeneous and ‘successful’ outcome where both logics 
are enacted in equal measure all the time (c.f. Jeacle & Carter, 2012; Kurunmäki & 
Miller, 2011; Miller & O’Leary, 2007; Rose & Miller, 1992 etc.). Nonetheless, by 
creating such a “bible” (Manager), My Performance instructs actors how to behave 
according to the knowledge and expertise which it has constructed (Espeland & 
Sauder, 2007; MacKenzie & Millo, 2003): a new understanding of Good 
performance which is difficult to imagine under different circumstances (Callon, 
2007). For such instruction to occur, however, My Performance needs to connect and 
enrol a multitude of ideas, actors and domains: it needs to mediate between these in 
order to construct a “common narrative” (Miller & Power, 2013, p. 581) so that 
actors can make sense of the instructions, and then (attempt to) follow them. 
5.3.3 Mediation 
My Performance presents the “perfect Partner” (Manager) as a goal to strive for. It 
constructs a particular combination of symbolic logics and measures Partners against 
this; as such, it instructs actors to enact these logics at a local-level in the practices of 
Partners (Miller & Rose, 2008). We see this explicitly above when a manager 
comments on both doing the right things, and doing them well: without the mediating 
instrument against which to measure both of these things they would take on a 
different meaning or be more difficult to achieve. This “perfect Partner” (Manager) 
enacts all of the prescribed behaviours in both what they do, and how they go about 
doing this. Despite the combination of symbolic logics being questioned, at least in 
some instances, there is no questioning of performance appraisal itself: indeed the 
Head of Branch suggests it is “ingrained with[in] us […] it’s almost like a 
responsibility of managers and a right that Partners have […] to sit down with their 
manager once a year and have a frank discussion about their performance.” Such a 
comment reflects the ability of My Performance to successfully bridge links 




Firstly, My Performance mediates between these dual symbolic logics: they are 
brought together and presented as compatible in My Performance. Despite conflict in 
practice, the material instantiations of these logics in My Performance are presented 
as compatible and complementary. Such complementarity is highlighted, for 
example, where managers comment that “they’ve made it very clear that there’s two 
things that the Partnership wants.” Accordingly, My Performance is the legitimated 
instantiation of the dual logics in explicit, material form (Christiansen & Lounsbury, 
2013; Gawer & Phillips, 2013; Raviola & & Norbäk, 2013) and presents the dual 
logics to Partners in a way which suggests compatibility between them (Jeacle & 
Carter, 2012). They are put on the same page in the My Performance guidance 
booklet, and despite the What being positioned visually above the How, it is 
explicitly highlighted that the two are equally weighted. Indeed the system ensures 
that the two measures are given equal weight (since a Developing classification in 
either can pull an Outstanding grade down to Good overall; see Figure 5). Such a 
combination proposes these two logics as compatible and instructs actors to 
behaviour accordingly. For instance, My Performance instructs that Partners who 
were previously “too nice” (Manager) should focus on sales, and those who were 
overly ‘sales driven’ should also focus on the partnership logic. As such it is My 
Performance which formally brings these ideas together: without My Performance, 
managers have to be “quite clever” in bringing the partnership logic into interaction 
with the profit logic; with My Performance it is easier, because it is clear on these 
dual logics and felt to be “really useful” (Manager).  
 
Thus My Performance acts as the medium through which these dual logics are 
combined and which then allows actors to interpret how to act based on this 
prescribed combination. Firstly, though, My Performance allows the partnership 
logic to be proposed alongside, and intermingle with, the profit logic: My 
Performance makes this interaction between the two symbolic logics legitimate and 
therefore facilitates the transformation of the interests of one logic into those of the 
other (Jeacle & Carter, 2012). In other words, it provides the medium through which 
a “common narrative” (Miller & Power, 2013, p. 581) can develop and by which the 
interests of one logic are presented alongside, as compatible with, or in the terms of, 
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the other (Miller & O’Leary, 2007; Thomson et al., 2014; Wise, 1988). It suggests 
that these two logics can be enacted in a complementary manner in practice (Davila 
et al., 2009; Jeacle & Carter, 2012; Moll, 2015). 
 
As well as mediating between these dual logics and presenting them as compatible, 
My Performance must also be able to link these logics to multiple actors. As outlined 
above, the process of performance appraisal around My Performance brings Partners 
and their line-managers physically together on multiple occasions. It facilitates these 
meetings and discussions because it is perceived as “structured,” “black and white,” 
“scientific” and having “no hidden agenda.” (Selling Partners and Manager) For 
instance at the conclusion of every Annual Review of Performance (ARP) meeting, 
the Partner must agree with their manager on what their Objectives will be for the 
upcoming year. Once these have been agreed they are electronically and explicitly 
recorded in My Performance. Additionally, these Objectives are automatically 
transferred to the Partner’s Personal Development Plan: which acts as a reminder of 
what these Objectives are throughout the year. As highlighted in the empirics, such 
agreement is not always straightforward, given the degree of possible interpretation, 
and thus such a process allows an understanding to become (at least temporarily) 
agreed between the Partner and their manager. This meeting, and associated 
processes, translate the messy combination of many potential Objectives into a 
concise number (4+1) which are supposed to reflect the dual prescriptions of both the 
partnership and profit logic formally: thus My Performance links the dual logics to 
front-line actors. 
 
In addition to facilitating various meetings and the appraisal itself, My Performance 
also links actors through a “common narrative” (Miller & Power, 2013, p. 581) 
outside of the formal ARP meetings. As multiple Managers mention, a key thing 
they worked on during the implementation phase of My Performance was outlining 
what it all meant: helping Partners understand it. For example, managers repeatedly 
spoke about using “My Performance language” so as to ingrain it into Partners. This 
caused difficulties where Partners “misinterpreted” a Manager complementing them 
on a “really good” day’s work as suggesting they were a Very Good Partner. Again 
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such interactions present opportunities where the dual logics prescribed by My 
Performance can mediate between these multiple symbolic logics: facilitate a 
(temporary) agreement on what the aims should be, between Partners and managers 
– between actors with potentially different interests and different ways of 
interpreting and making sense of the world (Miller & O’Leary, 2007; Wise, 1988).  
 
Finally, My Performance must also mediate between multiple domains. Specifically, 
it mediates between the domains of senior management and the shop-floor. Despite 
instances of both of these logics existing before the introduction of My Performance, 
they were not as clearly or explicitly specified and thus caused different realities 
(Hacking, 1999; Woolgar, 2015): the introduction of My Performance might ‘only’ 
have formalised these already existing ideas, but such a formalisation was felt to 
have created a “new world” or “cultural shift” (Selling Partners) and had material 
consequences for Partners. As outlined in Section 4.2.2, My Performance was 
developed by the Operations Development team as part of the Retail Revolution 
Strategy which aims to continue the Partnership’s position as “Britain’s leading 
retailer” (Manager) by reiterating the importance of both the partnership and the 
profit logics in the practices of Partners. Whilst various Partners were involved in the 
design and testing of My Performance, it was ultimately the Operations Development 
team who developed it and the Management Board who signed off on its final 
design. Despite any involvement, the final design is undoubtedly different to what 
went previously or even what was developed during the design and testing stages; 
thus the finalised construction of what it means to be Good under both the 
partnership and profit logic was left to the Management Board.  
 
Accordingly, the final design can be said to represent the Management Board’s (in as 
much as it is not the Partners’) interpretation of what Good performance is; we see, 
for instance, situations where Partners both agree and disagree with such an 
interpretation, however the point remains that such an interpretation is not solely 
constructed by the Partner themselves, but instead they are subject to the instruction 
of My Performance and thereby the definition of Good performance determined by 
the Management Board. For example, such non-local definitions instructing actors on 
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the shop floor are highlighted by the Partner who noted that: “if I say ‘oh, that 
[cushion] should go there,’ [my manager is] like ‘oh no, we can’t have that there […] 
that’s not what it says in the book.’” Accordingly, My Performance can be said to 
link the domains of senior management to the shop floor by attempting to instruct 
non-local actors to behave in a certain pre-determined manner (Mennicken, 2008).  
 
Similarly, My Performance links other domains together through the actors who 
enrol into it (Kurunmäki & Miller, 2011; Mennicken, 2008). Because it is taken for 
granted it encounters little resistance as it travels, thus allowing comparisons 
between Selling Sections, between Departments, between Branches and even 
between Regions. Without My Performance’s aggregation and measurement, one 
could not compare the ‘performance’ of one Branch with that of another, at least not 
on the same terms legitimised by My Performance; any talk of comparison would, by 
necessity, be based on some other comparison, not My Performance (MacKenzie, 
2006; MacKenzie et al., 2007; Miller & Rose, 1990, 2008). It is this representation 
and intervention which facilitates a perception of usefulness for senior management 
since they are able to represent a remote domain in their local one and act on it at a 
distance (Dambrin & Robson, 2011; Latour & Woolgar, 1979; Millo & MacKenzie, 
2009; Quattrone & Hopper, 2005).  
 
It is in this sense that My Performance mediates between multiple domains; it not 
only brings the domain of senior management into contact with those of shop-floor 
Partners, but also brings the shop-floor Partners (or Departments or Branches or 
Regions) into the domain of senior management and allows them to make 
comparisons (based on a very particular set of measurement criteria) between these 
entities. Comparisons that would be impossible, or at least very different, were My 
Performance not to exist. 
 
Accordingly, since My Performance calculates, constructs, instructs, mediates and 
has material implications: in other words it governs, it can be considered as a 
mediating instrument (Miller & O’Leary, 2007; Miller & Rose, 2008; Thomson et 
al., 2014). Whilst various other things help to facilitate mediation, it is My 
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Performance which, firstly, acts as the medium through which such diverse things 
interact and, secondly, alters the state of affairs. Specifically, My Performance as a 
mediating instrument can be conceptualised as the electronic tool which provides the 
explicit ratings, where Partners input their evidence, agree their Objectives and 
finalise their ratings with their manager. As such it is a material instrument which 
helps to translate the interests of one party into terms understandable by another 
(Miller & O’Leary, 2007; Wise, 1988). Furthermore, it is the instrument which 
explicitly attempts to influence actors be more like the world which it describes as 
Good; it is the instrument through which both mediation and (attempted) governance 
occur (Thomson et al., 2014).  
 
Whilst the electronic element of the performance appraisal process can be considered 
as the mediating instrument itself (see Figure 6), there are a number of other 
activities which aid such governance by facilitating mediation and thereby assisting 
in stabilising the assemblage and attempting to govern actors. For instance the hard-
copy guidance document to assist My Performance helps actors come to an 
understanding of what senior management is requesting of them whilst also 
presenting more information on what each of the ratings in My Performance actually 
mean: for example in the Indicators. Similarly Role Profiles and Job Descriptions 
also provide further information which facilitates My Performance as a mediating 
instrument by helping actors come to an understanding of what Good performance 
means. Other formal documents which facilitate My Performance’s mediation and 
governance include: the Personal Development Plans which remind Partners of their 
Objectives; in-house magazines which help engender an ethos of commitment, 
sharing, being involved etc.; the annual Partner Survey which also helps create an 
atmosphere whereby Partners feel their voice is heard; and sales targets being 
displayed throughout the branch to remind Partners of the need to also focus on the 
profit logic.  
 
Likewise, other formal structures or procedures assist in encouraging actors to 
respond to and acknowledge My Performance, such as: the Registry function which 
is in place to hold the Management Board and managers up to the standards 
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demanded by the Partners; the various Committees to feed Partner Voice back up the 
channels; the Pay Review process and attempts to make My Performance consistent 
across managers which encourage managers to perceive My Performance as 
objective; and the Regional Operations Improvement Team, Operations 
Development and Management Board who are all perceived as legitimately able to 
develop tools and strategy for the business and which helps Partners feel secure that 
the process is designed well. Finally, various formal and informal practices also help 
facilitate My Performance to act as a mediating instrument, for instance: the culture 
of being involved with business decisions, and indeed with having input into the 
design of My Performance, helps Partners to perceive the process as worthwhile; the 
large number of formal and informal interactions legitimised by such a culture, for 
example in Town Hall Meetings, Morning Meetings, informal floor-walks, coffee- 
and lunch-breaks etc., also aids the ability of My Performance to both mediate and 
govern.  
 
Many of these practices and documents encourage interactions between (parts of) 
My Performance (for example, its Objectives) and one, two or multiple human actors 
who then attempt to negotiate an understanding of what My Performance is asking of 
them. Thus, whilst such interactions, practices and processes might facilitate such 
mediation, it is My Performance itself which finalises, formalises and acts as the 
medium through which such interactions occur. In other words, My Performance acts 
as a mediating instrument to both mediate and govern (Miller & O’Leary, 2007; 
Thomson et al., 2014), but such mediation and governance is facilitated by various 
interactions, processes and documents (Jeacle & Carter, 2012; Kurunmäki & Miller, 
2011; Wise, 1988). 
 
Only where My Performance and these various facilitators successfully mediate and 
link multiple domains, actors and ideas together into an assemblage can the 
instrument begin to successfully instruct actors and thereby constitute its values in 
practice: in other words, be effectively performative (MacKenzie, 2007). Put 
differently, My Performance must first mediate between these multiple entities 
before it can govern them (Thomson et al., 2014). Before exploring how such 
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governance occurs, the following section highlights why My Performance is 
seemingly able to successfully mediate between these diverse ideas, actors and 
domains as a mediating instrument. 
5.3.4 Why So Effective? 
A perception of objectivity, consistency and adaptability in My Performance 
provides actors with enough security to ‘buy in’ to the process. It is perceived as 
neutral, objective and as showing the “truth” (Operations Manager) which aid in it 
appearing as “a facticity […] beyond the fray of politics or mere opinion.” (Miller & 
O’Leary, 2007, p. 559) For example, Partners speak about how My Performance is 
“better” than the old process because it is “much clearer,” “very focused” and “tells 
you there in black and white what’s acceptable and what’s not” (Selling Partners). 
Others described how the new process wasn’t as open to interpretation. For example 
where Partners had a different interpretation of the requirements to the managers 
(which could lead to “difficult conversations” (Manager) in the previous 
performance review process), this was down to Partners “not reading it properly” or 
“not understanding” (Managers) it by not putting in enough effort themselves, rather 
than the wording or process being open to interpretation (Operations Manager of 
Commercial Support).  
 
Here we see a perception that My Performance is objective and consistent; any 
inconsistency is put down to Partner’s misinterpretation which can, and should be, 
corrected. In more extreme circumstances, some managers reflected that they asked 
Partners to be “really honest” when rating themselves and providing their evidence: 
implying that, rather than misunderstanding it, they were being actively dishonest. 
Such findings also highlight the perception that performance is measurable in an 
accurate, consistent and fair way through the performance appraisal process. An 
Operations Manager reflected this, commenting that My Performance measured what 
Partners were “truly worth.” Others, similarly, reflected these ideas when 
commenting that the required evidence for their appraisals made Partners “prove” 




Where other Partners do note the interpretability of the wording and process, they 
suggest it is “one big giant umbrella” and that “almost everything you do could fit 
under them [the criteria in My Performance] because they are massive headings.” 
(Manager) This again highlights the possibility of combination between logics and 
makes the criteria “pretty comprehensive” (Selling Partner) which allows for “the 
goal posts [to] change slightly” with “some of the littler things” (Manager) on a daily 
basis for Selling Partners. In other words it provides “freedom within a framework” 
(Business Partner) and allows localised flexibility and adaptation which again assist 
in the instrument enrolling actors and them coming to a translated, albeit potentially 
temporary, understanding of the instructions of the instrument (Kurunmäki & Miller, 
2011; Mennicken, 2008; Miller et al., 2008).  
 
Counter-intuitively, this familiarity and flexibility, which facilitates both the 
mediation and governance of the mediating instrument, can lead to the practice 
variation observed in Section 4.3.4 (Mennicken, 2008; Thomson et al., 2014): it’s 
language is loose enough to encapsulate a broad range of meanings (hence the 
practice variation) and as such it links a multitude of actors who enrol because they 
feel they are talking about the same thing (Mennicken, 2008; Star and Griesemer, 
1989). Likewise, such characteristics also increase the perception of the instrument 
as being useful for actors in their own particular way since the instrument can be 
applied to different ends, as highlighted in Section 4.3.4 (Cruz et al., 2011; Dambrin 
& Robson, 2011; Millo & MacKenzie, 2009).  
 
Additionally, the perception that the process was developed in-house and that prior 
feedback had been, and future feedback could be, taken into consideration also made 
it easier for Partners to successfully enrol into the process. For example, the Regional 
Registrar noted that the process had been “partner influenced when it was created” 
whilst a manager reflected similarly that: “we can still actually feedback [upwards] 
now we’re all using it […] but it’s been well tested to make sure everything’s okay.” 
Others highlighted that they had “confidence” in the “central teams” who designed it 
because it had been trialled in other branches. A manager noted that “they took a 
long time bringing this out and they actually pulled [an earlier version of] it […] 
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because they found it wasn’t going to work, they needed to go back and look at it 
again.” Again these factors increase the legitimacy of the process and help Partners 
to consider performance measurement as a taken for granted aspect of their activities. 
 
Partners reflected how My Performance meant everyone was “fully accountable 
now” (Operations Manager) because “I have this book, every other manager in the 
business is working to this book, when I walk into my ARP I’m being graded on 
exactly the same things, so it doesn’t matter what level I’m at, we’re all graded the 
same.” (Manager) The perceived objectivity of the process means that Partners see it 
as “fair,” “helpful,” and that it is therefore “pretty good because those who are giving 
their all will be rewarded.” Partners perceive some use from the tool, as evident in 
quotes about it being a “Bible,” creating a “mountain of tools” or of it advising them 
on how to progress their career or “kicking them into touch” when underperforming, 
and this further aids their enrolment (Millo & MacKenzie, 2009; Wagner et al., 
2011). 
 
Familiarity also aids this enrolment process (Thomson et al., 2014): since managers 
“use My Performance language” and its message is written on the walls as the “first 
thing you see when you come into work every day.” (Manager and Selling Partner) 
Furthermore, despite constructing a “new world,” it was often suggested as not being 
overly different from, or “updating”, the previous performance appraisal process 
which also make it seem familiar. It appears to have been institutionalised as a 
practice within John Lewis and is taken for granted as objective, neutral and 
providing the ‘truth’ (Bromley & Powell, 2012; Miller & Power, 2013). Recall how 
the Head of Branch went as far as describing how performance measurement is 
“ingrained with[in] us.” 
 
Additionally, it “makes visible and calculable the ideas and objects at the heart of 
management” (Miller & Power, 2013, p. 559). Specifically, The What focuses on 
business targets, rationalised by the profit logic, and which aim to increase the profit 
and efficiency of the business. For example, the What outlines that Partners should 
deliver all Objectives set, and that the Business Objectives should directly relate to 
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the 4+1 goals of the Partnership (Profit, Partner, Customer, Sales and Shrinkage). In 
contrast, the How details that Partners should be “committed to guiding others and 
supports less experienced Partners” (My Performance, 2009, p. 12) and that they 
should increase the happiness of Partners. Here we see how the mediating instrument 
“carries” the symbolic elements of the logics and attempts to enact these in the 
material practices of the Partners (Czarniawska, 2008; Powell & Colvyas, 2008); 
however, as we have seen, the constructed reality in practice is a translation, rather 
than a diffusion, of these symbolic elements (Czarniawska, 2008; Dacin et al., 2010). 
In other words, each performance is constituted anew and material enactments of 
each logic are multiple (Butler, 1993, p. 13; Mol, 2002). 
 
In sum, it is through My Performance that the logics of profit and partnership are 
brought together and combined into a singular ideal (Jeacle and Carter, 2012; Miller 
& O’Leary, 2007); an ideal described by managers as the “perfect Partner.” My 
Performance presents senior management’s ideals to Partners; it prescribes “[a)] that 
you do it right, and b) that you actually do it in the first place.” (Manager) In other 
words it suggests both what you should do, and how you should do it. Without this 
problematisation, actors would focus on different things: a Partner can only be 
described as performing at a ‘Good’ level when they perform the prescriptions laid 
out in the instrument (Butler, 1993; Miller & Rose, 1990). Without these 
prescriptions, ‘Good’ would mean something else, as highlighted in the quotes 
above, and would be problematised differently (Miller & Rose, 2008). Thus, the 
mediating instrument can be said to constitute, or realise, a ‘Good’ performing 
Partner; it constructs this particular reality (Miller & Rose, 2008). My Performance 
then acts as the mediating instrument between these logics: linking them together in 
a “common narrative” (Miller & Power, 2013, p. 581). It combines the partnership 
and profit logics in one space and presents them as compatible and complementary 
(McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Smets et al., 2015). The measures under each of these 
criteria detail how these symbolic logics should be enacted in practice by providing 
targets, KPIs, Indicators, and Objectives. The objective, unifying, consistent and 
adaptable perception of My Performance provides Partners with enough security to 
enrol or ‘buy in’ to the process with relative ease (Kurunmäki & Miller, 2011; 
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Mennicken, 2008). Accordingly, My Performance can be considered as a mediating 
instrument (Miller & O’Leary, 2007). 
 
Having detailed how it is that the mediating instrument enrols actors and thereby 
mediates between various actors and ideas, the following sections turn to the second 
characteristic of mediating instruments; how they govern and (attempt to) constitute 
the reality which they propose (Thomson et al., 2014).  
5.3.5 Governing 
Whilst My Performance acts effectively to link these multiple ideas, domains and 
actors, how it influences the reality of those it interacts with is not homogeneous but 
multiple and fluid; as highlighted in Section 4.3.4. (c.f. Miller & Rose, 2008). 
Particularly, such fluidity follows patterns depending upon how the dual logics of 
My Performance are combined; such patterns are described below and summarised 
in Table 3. 
 
As highlighted above, Sections 4.3.4.1 through 4.3.4.6 document how a single 
symbolic logic is enacted in practice when interpreted from various positions. The 
first section documents how symbolic logics are tightly reflected into practice when 
the prescriptions of the mediating instrument are perceived as reinforcing the actors’ 
current perspective (Thornton et al., 2012). For instance, where an actor makes sense 
of the world through the partnership logic and finds prescriptions of this logic (such 
as building a community spirit or being involved in decision making) within the 
mediating instrument, then they accurately reflect these symbolic prescriptions in 
their practices: they conduct their practices in a way which, for example, helps build 
a community spirit by helping others or which allows their voice to be heard and 
valued by attending Town Halls and feeding their opinions back up through the 
given channels. Likewise where actors make sense of the world from the perspective 
of the profit logic and observe profit logic prescriptions then they too enact practices 
which are highly reflective of the profit logic; for instance, Partners who are “hungry 
for money” (Manager). Such notions seem obvious to the actors and they experience 
little tension when faced with prescriptions from the logic in which they are 
embedded (Thornton et al., 2012). In other words, these actors frame the 
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prescriptions of the mediating instrument under the logic in which they are 
embedded. However, in these instances the alternative logic is ignored and thus is 
unlikely to be combined with the existing understanding: only one logic is enacted in 
practice. In these instances logics are kept separate and those actors who make sense 
of the world through one logic only enact closely reflective practices of the symbolic 
values of that logic (Lounsbury, 2007; Rao et al, 2003; Muzio & Faulconbridge, 
2013). Hence the goal of the mediating instrument in encouraging dual logics is 
unlikely to be obtained: here the instrument fails to govern actors according to the 
notion of dual logics. 
 
Likewise at the alternative end of the spectrum (see Section 4.3.4.6), the instrument 
again is unlikely to cause the enactment of dual logics. However, in contrast to the 
above example, at this end of the spectrum, actors who make sense of the world 
through one logic do interact with the alternative. For instance, here actors who make 
sense of the world through a partnership logic are faced with the prescriptions of the 
profit logic and therefore feel legitimate in deleting Objectives from Partners 
appraisals in order to ensure that Partners ‘deliver all objectives set.’ In other words, 
they reframe the profit logic prescriptions under the symbolic values of the 
partnership logic. Despite significant tensions, actors still perceive such actions as 
the ‘right’ thing to do and as ‘obvious.” In these instances, in contrast to those at the 
other end of the spectrum, the alternative logic is combined, but in a manner which 
reframes the prescriptions of that alternative to the point that it is again not enacted 
in practice. Because of such reframing, despite the alternative logic being combined 
with an existing understanding, the goal of the mediating instrument in enacting dual 
logics is again unlikely since actors significantly reframe the prescriptions under the 
logic in which they are embedded (Muzio & Faulconbridge, 2013; Thornton et al., 
2012). 
 
However, in the middle of the spectrum there are situations where the enactment of 
dual logics becomes increasingly likely. There are three situations where such 
enactment is more likely. The first situation, albeit with the least likelihood of 
occurring, comes under the first example above where actors interact with a logic 
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which they use to make sense of their situation. However, in contrast to both the first 
and second examples above, the dual logics of the mediating instrument can be 
constructed in practice where an actor is embedded in both, rather than one (as in the 
first and second examples) logics. For instance, some Partners illustrated that “this 
has always been me” or that they hadn’t changed but had instead simply found the 
‘right’ organisation to work for when they enacted both the profit and partnership 
logics: by, for example, trying to increase profit for the collective annual bonus 
whilst at the same time doing so in a way which encouraged community spirit by 
also conducting local readings to primary schools. In these instances actors again feel 
there is an obvious way to behave and experience little tension. Here actors once 
again highly reflect the symbolic logics of the mediating instrument into practice 
(Thornton et al., 2012; Lounsbury, 2007), but because they are embedded in both 
logics, reframing, such as that in the second example, does not occur for the 
‘alternative’ logic. Thus in these instances the dual logics are enacted in practice 
and, accordingly, the mediating instrument can be described as more successfully 
governing. In these instances actors are institutionalised under institutional 
complexity and are able to balance the competing prescriptions between logics in a 
way that the actors in the above two examples are not (Greenwood & Suddaby, 
2006; McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Muzio et al., 2013). However, such instances 
where actors take for granted a focus on both of these logics is relatively rare 
empirically: reflective of existing literature which documents the difficulty actors 
face in managing such multiplicity (Smets et al., 2015).  
 
The second situation where the mediating instrument is able govern actors to perform 
dual symbolic logics in practice is documented in sections 4.3.4.2 and 4.3.4.3. Under 
these sections the empirics detail actors who are interacting with alternative logics, 
but who do not reframe them as in the second example above. Rather than the 
symbolic logics being reflected (or framed, as in the first example) or completely 
reframed (as in the second example), here they are combined in a way which adds 
the prescriptions of one to the other. For instance, such addition occurs where 
Partners begrudgingly sell Partnership Credit Cards or take on roles within the local 
community. Such adding of logics can only occur where actors feel that the logics 
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are compatible in practice: where they do not feel that enacting the prescriptions of 
the alternative logic would conflict, to a sufficient degree, with their current framing 
(McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Smets et al. 2015). In these instances actors are less 
sure of how to act: it seems less obvious to them. Accordingly, they are less 
institutionalised under either logic (relative to the first two examples) since 
alternatives are not unthinkable. Accordingly, in these situations practice does reflect 
the dual logics of the mediating instrument. Such situations are most likely to cause 
dual practices since there is an openness to alternatives and these alternatives are 
considered, instead, as complements (Smets et al., 2015). 
 
Finally, sections 4.3.4.4 and 4.3.4.5 detail situations where the enactment of dual 
logics is again possible, but where it is again less likely than in the above example 
where logics are added together and perceived as legitimate complements. These 
sections also demonstrate situations where logics are combined, but where they are 
merged. Here actors feel there are more serious conflicts and incompatibilities 
between the two logics and thus they cannot simply be added but instead require 
merging. Often this merging requires external influence (McPherson & Sauder, 
2013; Smets et al., 2015; Zilber, 2006); since the actor considers the two logics as 
incompatible and cannot, themselves, reconcile them, they instead turn to others for 
help (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Thornton et al., 2012). For instance, such 
processes are reflected in managers who, over time, are able to ‘ingrain’ practices 
such as organising fund-raising events for local charities into Partners who are 
heavily sales driven. Here the dual logics of the mediating instrument have the 
potential to be enacted in practice, but they are less likely than where logics are 
simply added since merging, instead, relies upon the skills of some third party in 
order to reconcile the conflict which the initial actor themselves couldn’t (Fligstein & 
McAdam, 2012; McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Rao et al., 2003): thus in these 
situations the actor may begin to reframe the alternative prescriptions under one of 
the logics, which closes the continuum and takes us back to the second example 





Continuum: Highly Reflected … … Highly Refracted 
Combined? No Yes Yes Yes, then No 





actors tied to 
both logics 
Most likely Somewhat 
likely 
depending on 
skill of others 
Most unlikely 
Table 3: A summary of how dual ideas are combined through the mediating 
instrument and whether this is likely to enact dual logics, or not. 
 
Table 3, and the above sections, document various patterns in responses as the 
mediating instrument governs. As expected, there are a variety of practices rather 
than one homogeneous outcome where governance occurs, or not; governance is 
fluid and multiple (Mol, 2002). Such a conceptualisation answers the first research 
question by documenting how actors respond to a mediating instrument. What then 
explains such patterns? How do actors rationalise and justify their actions under each 
of the above scenarios? In other words, what factors moderate whether dual logics 
are more or less likely enacted in practice? Such questions are considered by the 
second research question, which is answered in the following section. 
	
5.4 Moderating Factors 
As detailed in Section 4.3.5, three factors moderate how likely the enactment of dual 
logics in practices are as actors respond to the mediating instrument. First, some 
practices seem obvious and alternatives are not considered by actors. Second, these 
alternatives become more salient and some tension emerges as these alternatives are 
considered. Here a decision is made based upon a concern for enhancing an actor’s 
own position. Third, where self-awareness and internally-directed reflexivity fail to 
provide what seems as a rational course of action, actors turn to external persuasion 
or coercion in order to rationalise their behaviour.  
 
At each end of the continuum outlined in Table 3 above, things seem obvious. Here 
ideas are either ignored and thus not combined, or combined but reframed so 
significantly that they are also effectively ignored. In both instances, at each end of 
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the continuum the enactment of dual logics is unlikely: except in those relatively rare 
circumstances where actors are institutionalised under both logics.  
 
In contrast, in the middle of the continuum where dual logics are added or merged, 
the enactment of dual logics is more likely. In these instances actors are more 
reflexive, since alternatives are not unthinkable (Zucker, 1983, p. 5), and actors 
consider how to behave based upon a concern for enhancing their own position or, 
where such a rationalisation is unsuccessful, based upon the ability of other actors to 
convince them a particular course of action is rational. These three factors are 
conceptualised as: underlying ties to existing logics, self interest and others’ 
persuasion. Each is explained below before the following section documents a model 
summarising the discussion and answering the third research question. 
5.4.1 Underlying Ties to Existing Logics 
There are three situations where actors rationalise their behaviour as obvious: where 
they frame and reflect one logic’s symbolic prescriptions into practice; where they 
significantly reframe and refract the alternative logic’s symbolic prescriptions so 
they enact the initial logic; and where actors are equally tied to both logics. Only in 
the final set of circumstances are dual logics likely to be enacted in practice.  
 
The first situation illustrates actors who feel little tension when rationalising how 
they behave. Not only do they think how they behave is “obvious” or “common 
sense,” (Selling Partners) but there is little acknowledgement of potential alternatives 
and thus little reconciliation required between conflicting prescriptions. Such 
situations are evident, for example, where Partners talk about helping each other as 
“common decency” or talk about voicing their opinion to their manager as “the John 
Lewis way of doing things.” Likewise they are also evident when Partners talk about 
centralisation being the “right way” to “drive the business forward” or about the need 
for Partners to take responsibility for understanding what My Performance asks 
because it’s “not my job to go through this with a fine toothcomb.” (Manager) In 
these instances the alternative is not considered. In other words, it is unthinkable and 
the way to act seems ‘obvious’ because it is taken for granted. Thus these first set of 
actors can be categorised as having a strong underlying tie to one, or the other, logic. 
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They frame the prescriptions under the logic to which they have a strong underlying 
tie. In the above examples, where Partners talk about the expectation of voicing their 
opinions to their manager in order to maintain autonomy without any recognition of 
the alternative perspective (of the push to standardise and remove such autonomy), 
then we can conceptualise them as having a strong underlying tie to the partnership 
logic. The partnership logic frames how they interpret the world and which 
alternatives are unthinkable (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 84; Zucker, 1983; p. 5). 
Likewise, those actors with a strong underlying tie to the profit logic have no trouble 
in enacting profit logic prescriptions: it seems obvious. Hence we see actors who 
have no trouble enacting the symbolic elements of competing logics in practice 
(Lounsbury, 2007; Rao et al., 2003; Thornton et al., 2012). In these circumstances 
the enactment of dual logics is unlikely since actors only recognise prescriptions 
which are salient with the logic to which they have a strong underlying tie: actors 
with an underlying tie to the partnership logic enact partnership logic symbols in 
practice, and vice versa. Accordingly, there is little tension as actors feel there is an 
obvious way to behave. 
 
The second situation illustrates instances where actors, instead, do experience tension 
and where they interact with prescriptions which are not salient according to the 
logic to which they have a strong underlying tie. Despite their action being justified 
as the “right” thing to do, these actors expand upon their justifications and 
demonstrate increased tensions as they seek to reconcile perceived incompatibilities 
from the prescriptions of the alternative symbolic logic. Such situations are 
demonstrated, for example, where actors ask if it was “right” to be so strict as to 
measure whether Partners delivered “all objectives set” or, vice versa, whether they 
note that some Partners were “really nice” but didn’t “deliver” and needed to “earn 
their way”. In these situations actors did reflect upon and consider alternatives, as 
reflected in the tension they experience and in their questioning of what to do, yet the 
alternative is eventually considered as illegitimate and irrational: it is considered 
wrong to measure Partners according to whether they delivered all objectives, or 
considered irrelevant if Partners are nice and instead their sales results should matter. 
We see, respectively, actors with a strong underlying tie to the partnership logic 
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interacting with profit logic prescriptions and, vice versa, those with a strong 
underlying tie to the profit logic interacting with partnership logic prescriptions. 
Because actors deem these prescriptions as ‘wrong’ or illegitimate, they then 
reframe, re-label or reshape the meanings of these prescriptions under the value 
system of the logic with which they have a strong underlying tie so that the 
prescriptions become ‘right’ or legitimate (Gioia et al., 2013; Lawrence, 1999; 
Mazza, et al., 2005; Rao, 2004).  
 
Hence in these situations actors still have a strong underlying tie to one logic, but 
when interacting with prescriptions from the alternative logic they reframe the 
prescriptions so significantly that they actually enact the alternative logic in practice. 
In other words, they have such a strong underlying tie to one logic that this entirely 
defines what they consider as legitimate, rational and logical (Lounsbury, 2007; Rao 
et al., 2003; Thornton et al., 2012). Such strong underlying ties allow actors to resist 
the implementation of a new logic by reframing the prescriptions of that logic under 
the terms of the logic with which they have a strong underlying tie (Muzio and 
Faulconbridge, 2013). In these circumstances the enactment of dual logics is again 
unlikely since actors have such strong underlying ties to one logic that they fail to 
see how any alternatives could be legitimate: to the point of completely reframing 
prescriptions. 
 
The third, and final, situation again demonstrates instances where it seems ‘obvious’ 
what to do, and where there is again little tension. In these circumstances actors do 
recognise alternatives but do not perceive tensions between them. For instance where 
one Partner described “every penny [as] a prisoner” but with an aim of increasing the 
collective bonus as “just what I do,” this demonstrates a taken for granted 
perspective that both value systems are legitimate. Such actors do not reframe 
prescriptions according to one logic but are, rather, able to maintain the distinction 
between these whilst at the same time drawing upon both value systems in practice 
(McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Smets et al., 2015). In other words, such actors have 
underlying ties to both logics and again frame such prescriptions under a combined 
and holistic understanding of how to act. Here actors take complexity for granted 
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(Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Smets et al, 2015) and experience little tension in 
enacting both logics in practice. These situations demonstrate actors who are able to 
‘work with’ the complexity of having underlying ties to dual logics (McPherson & 
Sauder, 2013) which is a difficult task to accomplish (Smets et al, 2015); and perhaps 
hence the rarity of such situations. In these situations the enactment of dual logics is 
likely, but recall that the situation itself is relatively unlikely to arise.  
 
In summary, where actors feel it obvious how to act then we see that this value 
system defines legitimacy for that actor to the point that alternatives are not 
considered (Thornton et al., 2012). In other words, actors are deeply embedded in 
that logic and have a strong underlying tie to that logic. In these instances, since 
alternatives are not considered, the enactment of dual logics in practice is unlikely: 
instead actors are likely to focus solely on the aspects salient to the initial logic by 
framing them neatly under this logic (Lounsbury, 2007; Thornton et al., 2012, p. 84). 
In contrast, where actors with such a strong underlying tie to one logic are presented 
with prescriptions from the alternative logic, then these alternatives continue to seem 
illogical and it becomes rational to significantly reframe those prescriptions so that, 
again, the original logic is enacted in practice. Again, despite alternatives being 
considered, the enactment of dual logics in practice is unlikely since reframing 
occurs to the point that the prescriptions of one logic are made sense of under the 
other by editing or translating the prescriptions (Czarniawska, 2008; Sahlin & 
Wedlin, 2008). In both instances the two logics are kept distinct and are not 
combined.  
 
In contrast, dual logics may be enacted in practice in those rarer circumstances where 
actors use both value systems to make sense of the world and have underlying ties to 
both logics (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Muzio et al., 
2013). Here action again seems obvious, but because the actor has underlying ties to 
both symbolic value systems they do not experience tension in coming to an 
understanding of how to respond to the dual prescriptions of the mediating 
instrument. In these situations underlying ties to both logics represent the 
institutionalisation of complexity and the ability of actors to frame the world under 
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dual logics (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Smets et al., 2015); thus the enactment of 
dual logics in practice is likely, albeit rare, since such complexity is difficult to 
manage and requires a highly developed skill set (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Smets 
et al., 2015).21 
5.4.2 Self Interest 
Secondly, where actors do not have strong underlying ties to these logics and action 
is not taken for granted then they more reflexively consider alternatives (Hallett & 
Ventresca, 2006; Seo & Creed, 2002; Smets et al., 2015). These actors do not have a 
sufficiently strong underlying tie to either logic that causes them to reframe the 
prescriptions of the alternative logic under the value system of the first. Thus they 
experience more tension than above, since they recognise conflict between the two 
logics and try to reconcile this and combine these logics. Such reconciliation occurs, 
firstly, internally and based on a consideration of how this decision directly affects 
the individual actor; in other words it reflects a self interest in sustaining, or 
enhancing, their position – an instrumental, rather than existential, concern. Thus this 
reconciliation also incorporates elements of authority (Bromley & Powell, 2012; 
Thornton et al., 2012). For example where actors have a strong underlying tie to, for 
instance, the partnership logic, then they might feel legitimate in deleting Objectives. 
Such activities demonstrate that the actor employs the partnership logic as the source 
of authority in their sense making: the prescriptions of the mediating instrument are 
seen as less legitimate than their own value system since they reframe the 
prescription to measure against the achievement of “all objectives set.” In contrast, 
where actors seek to reconcile tension arising from the combination of logics through 
self interest, they often employ the hierarchy as the source of authority: suggesting 
‘this is what they want’ or that ‘it’s written in black and white,’ and written by those 
‘in charge’. For these actors authority is defined by hierarchical position within the 
Partnership; whereas where underlying ties are strong this authority can be overcome 
in lieu of what feels ‘right’ to the actor. There are again three situations where actors 
																																																								
21 Whilst such situations reflect the coexistence of multiple logics within one site 
(McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Muzio et al., 2013), these situations do not, yet, tell us 
much about how multiple logics coexist in one site: the remit of the third question 
which is hinted at in the following sections and more explicitly documented in the 
penultimate section in this chapter.  
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revert to self interest to reconcile such tension when combining logics: (i) going with 
the flow, (ii) strategic decisions to enhance one’s career and (iii) making a stand. 
 
The first situation where tension between conflicting prescriptions is reconciled 
demonstrates examples where actors accept the authority of the Partnership over 
their conceptualisation of what is problematic. For instance, the Partner above who 
dislikes selling the Partnership Credit Card, because they felt it was pushing sales 
onto customers, accepts that they have to do this as part of their role because “that’s 
been installed for years […] you know you have to do it.” In other words, the tension 
they experience is insufficiently strong to warrant resisting and they are happy to 
forget about this tension and overcome it by enacting both logics in order to make 
their life a little easier; it would cause them work to resist and consider dealing more 
explicitly with these tensions, whereas it makes their life easier to keep their manager 
happy: Partners don’t want to ‘rock the boat’ and instead feel they have to say “yes 
Sir!” (Selling Partner) to managers. In such situations the prescriptions of the 
alternative logic are added to the actor’s existing understanding: for instance by, 
albeit begrudgingly, attempting to sell the Partnership Credit Card and other ‘add on’ 
products. Despite making sense of their role through the partnership logic by 
rationalising ‘good’ customer service as keeping the customer happy, rather than 
maximising sales, the profit logic is added to this actor’s practices when they ask 
customers if they would like to sign up to the Partnership Credit Card.  
 
In these situations actors do not have such strong underlying ties to one logic that it 
causes them to reframe, re-label or reshape the meanings of the alternative symbolic 
logic under the rationality of the first (Gioia et al., 2013; Lawrence, 1999; Mazza et 
al., 2005; Rao et al., 2003): instead they are happy to accept the legitimacy and 
authority of their superiors and enact dual logics in practice by adding additional 
prescriptions to their current understanding of their role; in other words, these actors 
enact and deal with complexity and multiple logics rather than retaining the 
distinctiveness between them (McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Muzio et al., 2013). 
Accordingly, where these situations occur, dual logics are combined in practice 
(Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Smets et al., 2015). In these instances then, where 
	
193	
actors do not have strong underlying ties to one logic and are happy to add a second 
logic to their understanding of appropriate behaviour (based on a concern for their 
own self interest), the enactment of dual logics in practices is most likely (see Table 
3 above). 
 
Similarly, other situations again demonstrate instances where rationality is defined 
by the Partnership, rather than by an underlying tie to logics. Here, again, actors 
rationalise how to behave with a concern for their own self interest. In these 
situations however, in comparison to the first set of circumstances, actors are more 
instrumental and instead of making their life easier, more proactively consider how 
to improve their own position (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Lounsbury, 2007; Smets 
et al., 2015; Trenk & Washington, 2009). Accordingly, these actors afford more 
legitimacy to the mediating instrument than those actors mentioned above and 
attempt to enact its prescriptions as closely as possible, with little concern of any 
underlying ties they might have to logics which would rationalise how they perhaps 
should behave; in other words the mediating instrument defines rationality for these 
actors. For instance, whilst some actors clearly feel tensions between the 
prescriptions of the mediating instrument and their underlying ties, others do not and 
feel instead that the mediating instrument is “very clear” and “really key” in showing 
them “exactly what I need to do to take a step up.”  
 
In these instances actors do not construct tension between the prescriptions and, 
again, accept the rationality defined by the mediating instrument rather than from 
underlying ties to logics in an attempt to respond as closely as possible to the 
mediating instrument: which defines their performance, promotion and pay. Again 
rationalisation is provided by the mediating instrument and actors seek to follow 
these prescriptions with little concern of any underlying ties (Rose & Miller, 1992): 
they seek to follow them to improve their performance rating which improves their 
career and salary (Espeland & Sauder, 2007; Raviola & Norbäk, 2013; Trenk & 
Washington, 2009). Accordingly, these actions are described as strategic decisions to 
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enhance one’s career22. Again in these instances dual logics are combined in practice 
without any requirement to frame or merge them, since they are perceived as 
compatible since the mediating instrument is afforded primary legitimacy and 
defines this combination as rational. Thus, additional logics can again be added to 
actors’ practices where these actors are self interested in sustaining or enhancing 
their own career. Accordingly, the enactment of dual logics in practice is again 
likely23. 
 
The third set of circumstances is the opposing perspective to the first example within 
this section. Here actors do not, in contrast to the first section, accept the authority of 
the Partnership over their understanding of what is problematic; the tension they 
construct between these logics is recognised, but cannot be reconciled by their self 
interest. In other words, these actors are not sufficiently interested in sustaining their 
career that the authority of the hierarchy alone can reconcile such conflict (Muzio & 
Faulconbridge, 2013). Indeed some Partners feel that “this isn’t for me, this isn’t the 
world I want to operate in.” (Manager) Such Partners feel that these prescriptions are 
irreconcilable: they cannot “shut up and put up with it.” (Manager) These actors feel 
so strongly that they conclude they have to take a stand against these prescriptions by 
offering their resignation: their self interest in sustaining their career does not 
overcome the conflict they experience and they are not willing to add competing 
logics to their current sense making of their role. In contrast to actors re-labelling or 
re-shaping the meanings of the prescriptions under the alternative logic 
(Czarniawska, 2008; Gioia et al., 2013) and attempting to undermine such 
prescriptions ‘from the inside,’ these actors can be described as having such strong 
underlying ties that they cannot sustain exposure to the alternative. In other words, 
																																																								
22 Such rationalisation contrasts with that of the first example where actors have 
underlying ties to both logics, despite the practices being similar under both 
circumstances, since in these first instances rationalisation seems obvious; instead, 
here, rationalisation is provided by a concern for enhancing one’s own career.  
23 However, it should be reiterated that enacting dual logics is, again, not guaranteed; 
actors may still fail to enact dual practices, for example, if they are not successful at 
selling Partnership Credit Cards. In other words, whether dual logics are enacted in 
practice is no longer a translation of value (as in the first scenario of underlying ties), 
but rather a translation of ability: a matter of how successful the actors is at 
following, realising and enacting these prescriptions. 
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rather than resisting ‘from the inside’ they attempt to make a strong statement by 
permanently removing themselves from the situation (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012): 
in the hope of finding an alternative role somewhere ‘outside’ which does align with 
their sense making of their role. Again such extreme instances are relatively rare but 
demonstrate instances where actors’ self interest cannot overcome the conflict they 
construct between competing logics: in contrast to the first example within this 
section, where it can. Accordingly, and unlike the first example within this section, 
such instances are relatively unlikely to reflect enactment of dual logics in practice. 
 
In summary, the stronger an actors’ self interest, the more likely they are to enact the 
dual prescriptions of the mediating instrument. Here we observe how actors can 
work with the institutions that they inhabit and are not merely culturally duped into 
performing taken for granted activities (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; Seo & Creed, 
2002; Quattrone, 2015). The more self interested an actor is the higher the dedication 
they have to sustaining their career and the more willing they are to overlook and 
overcome tensions between what they feel their role should entail, and what they are 
asked to do (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). Accordingly, actors with a higher degree 
of self interest afford more legitimacy to the Partnership’s hierarchy, to the 
mediating instrument and to instrumental concerns of enhancing their own position 
rather than to their own sense making (Espeland & Sauder, 2007; Raviola & Norbäk, 
2013; Trenk & Washington, 2009). In other words, they have relatively weak 
underlying ties to these logics: apart from where their self interest is low and they, 
instead, feel warranted in making a stand against these prescriptions by offering their 
resignation.  
 
In contrast to the first moderating factor, instances where self interest determines 
how actors respond to the mediating instrument documents instances where there are 
tensions, since action isn’t taken for granted and does not seem obvious. Such 
tensions are attempted to be reconciled internally according to the level of self 
interest an actor has in making their life easier, enhancing their career, or (where self 
interest is low) by making a stand against these prescriptions. Accordingly, the 
higher the level of instrumental self interest, the higher the likelihood of dual logics 
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being enacted in practice since a second symbolic logic can be added to the actor’s 
sense making because of weak underlying ties to these logics. 
5.4.3 Others’ Persuasion 
Third, and finally, where actors do not consider it obvious how to behave, and where 
they do not have sufficiently strong self interest to overcome tensions between these 
logics, they are left, still, experiencing tension. Where the first two factors cannot 
reconcile this tension, and if actors do not make a stand by removing themselves 
from the situation, then this tension grows further. Such indecisiveness about how to 
act then presents an opportunity for others to try to persuade and convince these 
initial actors of how to act (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). In other words, where 
actors do not consider activities as obvious and are not self interested enough to add 
competing prescriptions in the interest of sustaining their position, then they look to 
external parties to persuade them of an appropriate way to act: where action is not 
taken for granted and cannot be reconciled through internal reflexivity then an 
opportunity for external persuasion presents itself and which may, still, reconcile the 
tension and cause enactment of dual logics in practice. 
 
In these instances of others’ persuasion, dual logics cannot simply be added together 
since actors cannot themselves reconcile these competing prescriptions, as reflected 
in the comments that some Partners “just didn’t see it [alternative prescriptions] as 
part of their job, didn’t understand why they had to do it.” (Manager) Such actors do 
not take multiplicity for granted and are not willing to compromise on what they feel 
their role should entail in order simply to enhance their own position. Similarly, they 
do not have such a strong underlying tie to the alternative logic that they reframe 
these prescriptions and they do not have such a low level of self interest that they are 
willing to make a stand by leaving the Partnership. Accordingly, they remain in a 
position open to persuasion: they don’t know precisely how to act because they 
cannot make sense of how to combine the alternative prescriptions, yet don’t want to 
loose their job. As such they look to others to persuade them of a way in which these 
competing prescriptions can be merged, rather than simply added, in a way that 
reconstructs the prescriptions as complements rather than substitutes. Merging 
implies additional work, over adding, and the assistance of others in reconciling 
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these increasingly severe tensions between logics: some tensions cannot be 
reconciled, even with external persuasion, and Partners leave the Partnership, others 
are easily overcome or added with recourse to a self interest and still others “take 
time” and are “really difficult” to embed, but can become “built in” (Manager) to 
practices over time where these others are successful in their persuasion.  
 
Section 4.3.5.3 documents a variety of this additional work: a number of techniques 
actors employ in their attempts to persuade others of an appropriate way to make 
sense of merging these dual logics. The frequency of such opportunities is 
rationalised by the partnership logic’s notion of inclusivity and involvement whereby 
all Partners expect to know what is happening in relation to business decisions: such 
symbolic values are instantiated in the various Committees, Magazines, meetings and 
also in the time managers allocate to communicating with Partners. Throughout these 
opportunities of persuasion, actors employ a variety of techniques in their attempts to 
merge dual prescriptions by convincing actors of their complementary nature, 
including: emotive language, such as the Head of Branch “painting a picture of a 
burning platform”; personal stories, such as managers speaking of the “really nice 
glow” they get from helping raise money for local charities; a personal relationship, 
such as managers getting to know Partners over a cup of coffee before “blitzing” the 
department; managers attempting to ingrain a certain mind set through repeated use 
of My Performance language “just so they try and engage with it”; resorting to the 
authority of the hierarchy, such as Partners feeling they have to say “Yes, Sir!”; 
resorting to the authority of the mediating instrument, since it “tells you there in 
black and white what’s acceptable” (Selling Partner); confrontation by “shout[ing] at 
the manager” (Selling Partner); or the use of sarcasm to make a point about, for 
example, laziness (see Section 4.3.5.3 for more details). Each of these instances 
highlights situations where actors attempt to persuade others by ‘working with’ 
symbolic logics and existing framings like a ‘cultural toolkit’ (McPherson & Sauder, 
2013; Zilber, 2006). Specifically, many of these attempts reflect ‘rhetorical 
strategies’ (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005): like ‘stories’ (Zilber, 2009) of being on 
top of a ‘burning platform’ which is going to ‘burn away’ leaving everyone to drown 
(Head of Branch). Similarly, they also demonstrate examples where actors attempt to 
chastise others in an attempt to persuade them of the legitimacy of a certain position 
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(Dacin et al., 2010) through measures such as sarcasm or confrontation. Likewise, 
they also reflect the rare skill that some actors have to be able to ‘hijack’ another 
actor’s logic (McPherson & Sauder, 2013) and use it to emphatically relate to their 
alternative perspective, frame things under this perspective (Fligstein & McAdam, 
2012) and convince them that such a combination is compatible (Smets et al., 2015), 
without encouraging them to retreat deeper into the logic to which they have a strong 
underlying tie (c.f. Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Muzio & Faulconbridge, 2013). 
 
Such emotive language seeks to merge the dual prescriptions in a way which 
reconciles the conflict that an actor is experiencing and cannot themself resolve 
(Thornton et al., 2012; Zilber, 2009). Specifically, actors do this through seemingly 
‘mundane’ activities which seek to persuade others how to act (Dacin et al., 2010; 
Lawrence et al., 2009; McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Trenk & Washington, 2009). 
Similarly, where such covert persuasion fails, actors also resort to more overt 
attempts to coerce others to behave in a manner which reflects dual logics through 
recourse to more instrumental concerns such as the authority of hierarchy (Bromley 
& Powell, 2013; Fligstein & McAdam, 2012) or of the mediating instrument (Miller 
& O’Leary, 2007; Raviola & Norbäk, 2013; Rose & Miller, 1992). 
 
Such persuasion appeals initially to existential concerns through emotive language 
and rhetorical strategies which seek to make sense of these dual logics as 
complementary. Where this fails actors may resort to more coercive and instrumental 
threats by outlining that actors could be made redundant if they fail to follow such 
prescriptions. In both situations the alternative logic cannot simply be added to the 
existing sense making since the actor feels the tension is too great to be overcome by 
self interest and thus they turn to others to help them reinterpret and make sense of a 
way in which this combination of symbolic logics can be enacted in practice without 
tension. Such combination requires more than just adding the alternative logic and 
instead requires some editing, translating or additional work (Czarniawska, 2008; 
Gioia et al., 2013; McPherson & Sauder, 2013) to make sense of both prescriptions 
as complementary. If actors have a strong underlying tie to one logic then they may 
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begin to reframe the alternative prescriptions under this logic, which as demonstrated 
above, fails to engender dual logics in practice.  
 
The trick, then, is for actors to translate or merge these logics so that they do not 
reframe one under the other but instead reconstruct them as complementary. Such a 
task is difficult (McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Smets et al., 2015) and relies upon the 
skill of those persuading (Dacin et al., 2010; Fligstein & McAdam, 2012), or 
‘engineering’ (Miller & Rose, 2008, p.5), to reconstruct these logics as 
complementary, non-distinct and without tension (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; 
Muzio et al., 2013; Smets et al., 2015). Hence, in these situations the enactment of 
dual logics is again likely, but is less likely than where self interest drives dual 
enactment since these situations require skilled persuasion by others: thus dual 
enactment in these situations becomes increasingly less likely as both (i) tensions are 
perceived as increasingly severe, and (ii) as others’ persuasive abilities decline.  
	
5.5 Governing 
In sum, the above sections present parts of a model of governing, rather than of 
goverance, and thereby contribute by developing understanding about the 
effectiveness of attempted governance through a mediating instrument (Bourdieu, 
1991, p. 71; Espeland & Sauder, 2007, p. 34; MacKenzie, 2007, p. 69; Revellino & 
Mouritsen, 2015, p. 47). In exploring this process of how governance comes to be, or 
does not come to be, the above sections document answers to the first two research 
questions. The final research question is answered in this section, which presents 
these answers and synthesises the above sections into a coherent description of 
governing through a mediating instrument and according to dual logics. Such a 
description explains when logics are made real through a mediating instrument, when 
they are altered, ignored or re-framed, and why: thus also contributing to an 
understanding of how symbolic logics are made real in practice (Czarniawska, 2008; 
Powell & Colyvas, 2008; Smets et al., 2010; Thornton et al., 2012) through material 





Section 5.2 outlines how the aforementioned ‘ideas’ from the empirical sections can 
be conceptualised as symbolic institutional logics with associated practices: 
specifically the partnership logic and the profit logic, and various constructions 
thereof, in this case. Each symbolic logic provides different forms of rationality and 
legitimacy, and has different aims, identities, focuses and roles which provide a 
cognitive sense making schemas for actors (Thornton et al., 2012). Such distinctions 
are highlighted above in Table 2. Alongside these symbolic value systems, various 
practices exist which instantiate these values in action: in the only realm in which 
they can be said to truly exist (Czarniawska, 2008; Lawrence et al., 2009). Section 
5.3 then discusses this realm of practice in more detail, firstly highlighting how it is 
through mediating instruments that symbolic ideas come to be made real in the 
practices of individuals (Gawer & Phillips, 2013; Hoskin & Macve, 1986; Miller & 
O’Leary, 2007; Miller & Rose, 2008; Powell & Colyvas, 2008). Specifically, this 
section documents that My Performance can be considered as a mediating instrument 
since it constructs a certain kind of knowledge (based on the requirement for Partners 
to practice both the partnership and the profit logics) and then instructs based on this 
knowledge. Such instruction is only possible where the mediating instrument is able 
to mediate between multiple actors, domains and ideas, as documented in Section 
5.3.3; such mediation is facilitated by, amongst other factors, My Performance 
appearing objective, neutral, familiar, useful and as able to hybridise (as outlined in 
Section 5.3.4 and see also: Busco & Quattrone, 2013; Miller et al., 2008; Miller & 
Power, 2013; Millo & MacKenzie, 2009; Thomson et al., 2014).  
 
However, such an ability to hybridise, whilst facilitating enrollment and mediation, 
provides scope for reinterpreting the prescriptions of the mediating instrument and, 
accordingly, causes much variation in the practices of those governed, as detailed in 
Section 5.3.5. Thus governance is not a homogeneous outcome, but instead the 
mediating instrument allows a “multiplicity of roles, concepts and practices” to 
emerge (Mennicken, 2008, p. 389). In other words, the effective performativity of 
the mediating instrument is by no means guaranteed and instead varying degrees of 




Such conceptualization provides an answer to the first research question: how do 
actors respond to a mediating instrument? They do not respond in a homogeneous 
way and neatly reflect the programmes or logics of the mediating instrument directly 
into practice, but, instead, such symbolic logics are “refracted through context and 
individual experience” (Dacin et al., 2010, p. 1414). Various factors influence the 
effective performativity of this mediating instrument and Section 5.3.5 highlights 
patterns in these various degrees of effective performativity before Section 5.4 then 
outlines the factors which determine these patterns: which determine the degree of 
effective performativity. Accordingly, these sections provide an answer to the second 
research question: what factors moderate the effective performativity of a mediating 
instrument? The factors are: underlying ties to existing logics, self interest and 
others’ persuasion.  
 
Table 3 in Section 5.3.5 documents how dual logics are more likely to be combined 
in practice, and therefore how effective performativity is more likely, when they are 
added, or merged and less likely to be combined in practice where they are framed or 
reframed. Section 5.4 then documents the factors which determine whether dual 
logics are framed, added, merged or reframed and, accordingly, the factors which 
moderate effective performativity.  
 
Section 5.4.1 outlines situations where actors have strong underlying ties to existing 
logics. In these situations action is often taken for granted and actors experience little 
tension when faced with the prescriptions of a mediating instrument. There are three 
situations where actors rely on underlying ties to existing logics to make sense of the 
prescriptions of the mediating instrument and which, therefore, impact upon whether 
the instrument is effectively performative or not. In the first situation actors have a 
strong underlying tie to one logic and interact directly with the prescriptions of that 
logic alone. Here, actors ignore the prescriptions of the alternative logic since it does 
not appear salient to them and simply frame the prescriptions according to the logic 
with which they have a strong underlying tie (Thornton et al., 2012). They are happy 
to enact these prescriptions, but do not enact both logics in their practices. 
Accordingly the mediating instrument is likely to demonstrate, at best, generic 
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performativity since actors use or interact with the mediating instrument but do not 
enact dual logics in practice. The second situation demonstrates actors who, 
similarly, have a strong underlying tie to one logic but interact with the prescriptions 
of the alternative logic. Here actors have such a strong underlying tie to one logic 
that they completely reframe the prescriptions of the alternative logic under the logic 
which they have a strong underlying tie to (Gioia et al., 2013; Muzio & 
Faulconbridge, 2013; Rao et al., 2003). Accordingly, in these situations the 
mediating instrument is likely to demonstrate counter-performativity where not only 
is one logic ignored, but it is completely reframed so that practices reflect the 
opposite of the logic’s symbolic prescriptions in the mediating instrument: that the 
prescriptions of the profit logic end up being reframed and acted out under the 
symbolic values of the partnership logic, for example by deleting objectives from an 
appraisal. Here, again, action is taken for granted and seems obvious. 
 
In contrast, three situations demonstrate instances where dual logics are more likely 
to be enacted in practice and where the mediating instrument is more likely to be 
effectively performative. The first still falls within underlying ties to logics and is 
thus taken for granted by the actor who, accordingly, experiences little tension or 
indecision about how to behave: echoing the previous two examples. In contrast to 
the first two examples above, however, these third instances document situations 
where actors have underlying ties not to one logic, but to both. These actors feel it is 
obvious that they should enact both logics in their practices and thus experience little 
tension when faced with the dual prescriptions of the mediating instrument. In these 
instances the mediating instrument demonstrates effective performativity since actors 
frame both sets of prescriptions as salient, rational and legitimate and thereby do not 
construct any tension between them. However, it should be noted that such 
complexity being institutionalised is reasonably rare because of the difficulty in 
balancing these conflicting prescriptions (McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Smets et al., 
2015). Thus whilst such situations are likely to demonstrate effective performativity, 




However, in more frequent circumstances where actions are not taken for granted 
and actors do experience tensions in their attempts to combine these logics, effective 
performativity can still occur. The second and third factors which moderate whether 
such effective performativity occurs are self interest and others’ persuasion. Where 
actors are self interested in making their life easier or in more strategically enhancing 
their own position, they afford the mediating instrument with legitimacy and instead 
rely on it, and the hierarchy of the Partnership, to define such legitimacy; rather than 
an underlying tie to one logic or the other. In each instance the alternative 
prescriptions can simply be added to the actors current understanding because their 
level of self interest is high enough to overcome any concerns they have about how 
they should behave according to either logic. Where self interest is sufficiently high 
to overcome any underlying tie to each logic, then effective performativity is again 
likely, although it is influenced by how effective the actor is at translating these 
prescriptions into action: if they cannot sell, then they will still fail to promote 
effective performativity by enacting both the partnership and profit logics.  
 
Where the level of self interest is insufficiently high for actors to overcome any 
underlying ties, then tension increases yet again as actors struggle to make sense of 
how to behave. Such situations present opportunities for others’ persuasion to 
influence how actors make sense of the world and, accordingly, behave. Where 
others’ persuasion is successful, through various ‘rhetorical strategies’ (Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2005), ‘stories’ (Zilber, 2006, 2009), ‘toolkits’ (McPherson & Sauder, 
2013) or skilled segregating, bridging and demarcating (Smets et al., 2015) dual 
logics can be merged together under a constructed reality which does not cause 
conflict (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; McPherson & Sauder, 2013) and which, 
thereby, demonstrates effective performativity. Such situations require skilled actors 
who are able to instrumentally or existentially convince others that such a 
combination is complementary by merging the prescriptions into a singular, non-
distinctive construction (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012): in other words, to 
institutionalise complexity (Smets et al., 2015). Thus, again, effective performativity 
is by no means guaranteed since such merging relies upon the success of another 
actor, who may well fail despite their best intentions. The degree to which they fail 
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to construct a schema which makes sense of these dual logics as complementary 
determines the degree of effective performativity: where persuasive actors fail to 
reconcile all of the tension, then generic performativity may occur where actors 
interact with the mediating instrument but fail to enact both logics, however, where 
persuasive actors fail to reconcile much, if any, of this growing tension, then the 
tension and uncertainty can eventually overcome an actor’s level of self interest in 
sustaining their position within the organisation to the point that they decide to make 
a stand by offering their resignation. Here counter-performativity occurs as actors 
respond in way which definitively does not enact the desired dual prescriptions, but 
instead attempts to undermine them. 
 
We thus observe two situations where actors are reflexive and uncertain about how 
to respond to the mediating instrument. They do not have such strong underlying ties 
to logics that they feel there is an obvious way to behave and instead reflect upon a 
level of self interest and the persuasion of others in order to make sense of the 
situation presented to them which, here, requires dual logics to be enacted. 
Accordingly, these two moderating factors outline instances where actors are able to 
‘step out’ of the logic to which they have an, albeit potentially weak, underlying tie 
to, and to recognise the legitimacy of the alternative. Where underlying ties to logics 
are not sufficiently strong to present an obvious course of action, actors experience 
increasing tension as they attempt to make sense of how to behave based upon a 
consideration for their level of self interest and also based upon the successful 
persuasion of others around them. Where self interest is high, or where others are 
successfully persuasive, then dual logics can be combined by being added or merged. 
In other words, these actors recognise the legitimacy of the alternative logic which 
they were initially experiencing tension about: they are able to, however temporarily, 
override their initial sense making based on internal reflection or external persuasion 
of a more instrumental, pragmatic and immediate nature. Accordingly, such a 
conceptualisation provides an answer to the third research question by demonstrating 
that these latter two moderating factors can overcome underlying ties to existing 
logics and cause actors to temporarily step out of the logic in which they are 
embedded, recognise the legitimacy of alternatives and thereby demonstrate the 
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effective performativity of a mediating instrument which seeks to govern according 
to dual logics. 
 
In sum, actors respond to a mediating instrument in a multitude of different ways 
which are moderated by three factors: underlying ties to logics, self interest and 
others’ persuasion. These latter two more pragmatic and immediate concerns can 
cause an actor to temporarily step out of the logic with which they have an 
underlying tie and to recognise alternatives. The above description explains how 
ideas come to be made real: how the effective performativity of a mediating 
instrument is moderated by three factors in its attempts to govern according to dual 
logics.  
 
The patterns described above between these various moderating factors and the 
likelihood of effective performativity are reiterated visually below in Table 4, which 
builds on the previous Table 3 to include the degree of performativity and where 
rationality arises from under each situation. The contributions, implications, 
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Table 4: Factors moderating the effective performativity of a mediating 




5.6 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has presented the empirical narrative under the theoretical framing 
outlined in the second chapter. Specifically it documents, see Section 5.2, that what 
have previously been described as ‘ideas’ throughout this thesis can be considered as 
symbolic institutional ‘logics’, or, using an interchangeable term, as ‘governmental 
programmes’: namely the partnership logic and the profit logic. Building on this, 
Section 5.3 documents how such symbolic logics come to be enacted in practice: the 
only realm in which they can be considered to be real (Czarniawska, 2008; Lawrence 
et al., 2009; Thornton et al., 2012).  
 
Specifically, this section documents how such symbolic logics come to be made real 
through a mediating instrument (Hoskin & Macve, 1986; Miller & O’Leary, 2007; 
Powell & Colyvas, 2008). Firstly, Section 5.3.1 documents how My Performance 
acts to construct a new form of knowledge based upon a definition of “Good” 
performance as enacting both the partnership and profit logics in practice. 
Accordingly, My Performance then instructs actors to behave according to these 
symbolic logics and thereby (attempts to) constitute them in practice (Miller & Rose, 
2008). Before such instruction can occur, however, actors must enrol into this 
instrument and it must present them with multiple ideas originating in a non-local 
domain and which are compatible; in other words it must mediate. Section 5.3.3 
documents how My Performance is able to mediate between and link up the 
partnership and profit symbolic logics, various actors and multiple domains within 
the Partnership since it is perceived as neutral, objective, useful and familiar (Busco 
& Quattrone, 2014; Bromley & Powell, 2013; Miller & Power, 2013; Millo & 
MacKenzie, 2009; Thomson et al., 2014). Finally, Section 5.3.5 documents how My 
Performance also acts to govern, albeit it not in a homogeneous manner but, instead, 
in a manner which reflects fluidity, variation and multiplicity (Mol, 2002; Quattrone, 
2015). Accordingly, Section 5.3 highlights that we can consider My Performance as 
a mediating instrument because of these characteristics. In conclusion, this section 
documents precisely what the mediating instrument is (the electronic tool where 
Partners input their evidence, provide their self-rating and where managers sign off 
on agreed ratings) and the other mechanisms which help facilitate mediation and 
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governance (various meetings, formal and informal documents, an ethos of 
inclusivity etc.). As such, this section documents the process of governing, rather 
than considering it as a homogeneous and single outcome. It is only through 
analysing this process (Moll & Hoque, 2011) than we can come to understand how 
ideas are made real and, therefore, the factors which moderate the effective 
performativity of a mediating instrument (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 71; Espeland & Sauder, 
2007, p. 34; MacKenzie, 2007, p. 69; Raviola & Norbäk, 2013; Revellino & 
Mouritsen, 2015, p. 47). Such an enquiry answers the first research question by 
highlighting that actors respond in a multitude of different ways to a mediating 
instrument. 
 
Determining what factors moderate such variation is considered by the second 
research question, which is answered in Section 5.4. This section documents how 
three factors influence whether or not dual logics are enacted in practice: underlying 
ties to logics, self interest and others’ persuasion. These three factors explain how 
actors rationalise their decisions as they frame, reframe, add or merge the 
prescriptions of dual symbolic logics in relation to their existing understanding. 
Table 3 concludes the section by reiterating the types of likely performativity under 
each of these methods of combining dual logics. 
 
As documented in Table 3, there are instances where the mediating instrument is 
effectively performative and where dual logics are likely to be enacted in practice. 
Accordingly, the third research question asks how this can be: how can actors step 
out of one logic and recognise the legitimacy of an alternative? In summarising and 
documenting a holistic overview of how governing through a mediating instrument 
occurs under dual logics, Section 5.5 documents an answer to this third research 
question. Specifically, it documents that actors do not step out of their cognitive 
schema when they frame or reframe situations: that is, when their underlying ties to 
existing logics are strong. It is only when such underlying ties are weak, when dual 





Where such recognition occurs, actors experience tension: such tension is not evident 
where actors have underlying ties to both logics since they have already constructed 
this combination of logics as compatible and therefore do not need to step out of 
their existing understanding in order to make sense of these dual symbolic logics as 
complementary. This penultimate section goes on to argue that as logics are added or 
merged, actors are able to step out of their existing sense making because they have 
relatively weak underlying ties and are more concerned with their own self interest 
or are able to be persuaded by others that this combination is compatible. Such 
factors are of a more instrumental, pragmatic and immediate concern and arise in 
day-to-day work activities and may thus not be considered as existential threats, 
which may cause actors to ‘retreat’ deeper into one logic (Muzio & Faulconbridge, 
2013) and which cause an actor, then, to reframe the prescriptions under this logic. 
Accordingly, it is theorised that such factors provide a temporary override and allow 
actors to step out of the logic with which they make sense of the world in order to 
recognise, and enact, alternatives. Such a theorisation provides an answer to the third 
research question and concludes the discussion chapter. The following, concluding, 
chapter presents an overview of the research: noting its contributions, implications 

















Chapter 6: Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction 
Having presented a theorised narrative in response to the noted gaps in current 
understanding, this chapter seeks to summarise what the research finds. As such it 
documents the current level of understanding in the enactment of multiple logics in 
the material practices of individuals through the governance of a mediating 
instrument. It begins by reflecting on the aim of this project: briefly reiterating the 
gaps in existing understanding of how ideas are made real when conceptualised 
through both lenses of governmentality and institutional logics, before commenting 
on how this research extends such an understanding. This section reflects on the 
research outcomes and the answers to the three research questions in summarising 
the holistic explanation of the factors which moderate the effective performativity of 
a mediating instrument and how actors come to recognise, or not, the legitimacy of 
alternatives. 
 
Having summarised the research project, the contributions and implications to both 
governmentality and institutional theory are then discussed. Upon completion of 
reflecting on the project itself, the final section then turns to a more forward-looking 
orientation and details some of the limitations inherent in this project and how these 
might be overcome and the agenda furthered in future research. 
 
6.2 Goals of the Project 
The aim of this project is to understand how ideas are made real in the practices of 
others: how do symbolic ideas come to be enacted in the practices of non-local 
actors? How do we explain differences as these ideas are enacted? How can some 
actors interact with multiple ideas whilst others become increasingly insular in the 
face of alternatives? The goal of asking such questions is to deconstruct a particular 
reality within one organizational setting in order to understand how actors make 
sense of, and interact with, these ideas: all the while keeping in mind that such ideas 
are an attempt to ‘engineer’ conduct and to govern the behaviours of these actors 
(Miller & Rose, 2008). Understanding such a process remains important for 
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organisations: in the efficacy of their attempts to direct employee behaviour in the 
desired manner, for individuals: in understanding the processes and effects of such 
attempts in order to better deal with them, and for society: in reflecting upon the 
moral and ethical implications of such attempts.  
 
In order to theorise a response to these research interests, a theoretical framework is 
required to explain two sides of the same coin: first to conceptualise how control is 
manifest in contemporary settings, and second to conceptualise how actors make 
sense of, and respond to, such attempted control. Through the iterative process of 
comparing data and theory proposed by the abductive approach, governmentality and 
the institutional logics perspective were selected, respectively, to conceptualise a 
framework of how actors might be exposed to and make sense of multiple attempts 
to control their behaviour. 
 
Governmentality builds on Foucauldian notions of willing compliance under the 
power of seemingly mundane technologies which, nonetheless, have material, and 
often significant, impacts upon reality (Foucault, 1973, 1977). Distinguishing 
between programmes of government and those technologies that constitute 
programmes in practice (Rose & Miller, 1992; Thomson et al., 2014), 
governmentality argues that it is only through such technologies that governmental 
programmes are instantiated (Miller & Rose, 1990). Governmentality argues that 
these technologies do much more than merely describe pre-existing realities, but 
instead are actively involved in the on-going construction and constitution of those 
realities (Hacking, 1999; MacKenzie et al., 2007; Miller & Rose, 2008). Reality is 
therefore assumed not to be a natural progression and as being given, but instead as 
having been constructed: reflective of the successful alignment of various contingent 
parts of an assemblage (Miller & Rose, 2008). Accordingly, much focus should be 
given to the seemingly mundane “calculative practices” (Miller, 2001, p. 379) which 
are prevalent and pervasive in so many areas of organisational life (Bromley & 
Powell, 2012) since these are fundamentally involved in constituting such 




Specifically, such technologies can be considered as ‘mediating instruments’ which 
both ‘mediate’ and ‘govern’ in their attempts to construct certain realities (Miller & 
O’Leary, 2007; Thomson et al., 2014). Such governance occurs as these instruments 
‘construct’ and ‘instruct’ both spaces and persons under, and according to, certain 
forms of knowledge and expertise which thereby induce, motivate, compel, pressure 
and incite certain behavioural responses (Hoskin & Macve, 1986; Miller & O’Leary, 
1987; Miller & Rose, 1990; Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 175). Given the pervasiveness 
of accounting (Bromley & Powell, 2012), it is perhaps unsurprising to discover the 
ability of accounting instruments to act so effectively as mediating instruments in 
both their attempts to mediate and govern (Jeacle & Carter, 2012; Miller & O’Leary, 
2007; Thomson et al., 2012). Particularly, the ability of accounting to ‘hybridise’ 
(Kurunmäki & Miller, 2011) allows different actors to feel it is of some use to them 
(Millo & MacKenzie, 2009), despite such uses often being vastly different in practice 
(Busco & Quattrone, 2014; Mennicken, 2008). Accordingly, the behavioural 
responses incited in practice vary (Mol, 2002); they are not homogeneous and 
governance is not a guaranteed outcome. Instead many factors influence the 
‘effective performativity’ of these instruments (MacKenzie, 2007) and we can only 
explore these factors by investigating governance as a process rather than an 
outcome: as a verb rather than a noun (Bourdieu, 1991; Revellino & Mouritsen, 
2015; Thomson et al., 2014; Moll & Hoque, 2011). 
 
In order to investigate such a process, a conceptualisation is required of how actors 
make sense of these instruments at a cognitive, individual level: a conceptualisation 
which governmentality does not provide. Given a similar research interest, 
epistemology and ontology (see Section 2.4 for more details) and again reflective of 
the abductive iterations between data and theory (see Section 3.4.2), the institutional 
logics perspective was selected as a secondary lens to provide such a theory of how 
actors make sense of the world: based on culturally defined and socially constructed 
‘institutional logics’ (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012). Despite 
recognising and beginning to theorise the multiplicity of these logics (Greenwood et 
al., 2011), institutionalists are still theorising how multiple symbolic logics come to 
be enacted ‘on the ground’ (Barley, 2008; McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Smets et al., 
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2015). Likewise, the institutional logics perspective does not provide a holistic 
framework to conceptualise how symbolic logics are enacted in practice through 
material instruments or artefacts (Czarniawska, 2008; Espeland & Sauder, 2007; 
Gawer & Phillips, 2013; Powell & Colyvas, 2008; Raviola & Norbäk, 2013). 
Accordingly the institutional logics perspective cannot, by itself, explain the research 
findings and thus also requires additional insights on reification and material 
artefacts: which governmentality helps to provide. 
 
Accordingly, whilst the institutional logics perspective cannot fully answer the 
research questions it provides a conceptualisation of how actors make sense of the 
world based on socially constructed value systems that define rationality and 
legitimacy (Thornton et al., 2012). Such symbolic logics can condition actors to the 
point that alternatives are literally unthinkable (Zucker, 1983, p. 5). Likewise, these 
symbolic value systems can be used like a ‘cultural toolkit’ (Swidler, 1986) to 
convince others of legitimacy through ‘hijacking’ (McPherson & Sauder, 2013), 
translating (Czarniawska, 2008), re-labelling (Gioia et al., 2013; Mazza et al., 2005) 
or reshaping the meanings of (Lawrence, 1999; Rao et al., 2003) these multiple 
logics. Despite the institutional logics perspective showing us that these logics can 
render alternatives unthinkable (Lounsbury, 2007; Thornton et al., 2012), but that 
this does not occur all the time (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Smets et al., 2015), 
what causes such variation remains unclear: what causes some actors to be able to 
recognise the legitimacy of alternatives and others to not? What causes some actors 
to be open to alternatives (Smets et al., 2015) whilst others become increasingly 
insular when exposed to these alternatives (Lounsbury, 2007; Rao et al., 2003)?  
 
Such a line of theoretical insights highlights the gaps in the literature to which the 
research questions enquire. Firstly, in taking governance as an outcome and not 
exploring the process, governmentality assumes that governance is a homogeneous 
and fixed entity. However, insights from various alternative theoretical lenses 
suggest this is a dubious assumption and that governance should instead be 
investigated as a process to unravel its continuous, unfolding nature and the different 
processes contained in mediation and governance (Moll & Hoque, 2011; Thomson et 
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al., 2014). Accordingly the first research question enquires into the validity of this 
assumption by asking how do actors respond to a mediating instrument? Secondly, if 
actors do indeed respond in a multitude of different ways, then neither 
governmentality nor the institutional logics perspective can explain the factors which 
moderate the degree of variation (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 71; Espeland & Sauder, 2007, 
p. 34; MacKenzie, 2007, p. 69; Raviola & Norbäk, 2013; Revellino & Mouritsen, 
2015, p. 47). Accordingly, the second research question explores this variation by 
asking what are the moderating factors upon the effective performativity of a 
mediating instrument? Finally, under such conditions of evident multiplicity, the 
question remains of how some actors are open to multiplicity whilst others become 
increasingly insular in the face of alternatives. Despite the logics perspective 
highlighting that some actors take action for granted (Lounsbury, 2007; Rao et al., 
2003; Thornton et al., 2012) whilst others don’t (McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Muzio 
et al., 2013; Smets et al., 2015; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006), it remains unclear 
how some actors can manage multiplicity whilst others cannot (Raviola & Norbäk, 
2013): when are actors cultural dopes (Seo & Creed, 2002) and when do they 
reflexively inhabit institutions (Hallet & Ventresca, 2006)? Accordingly, the third, 
and final, research question asks how do actors ‘step out’ of the logic in which they 
are embedded and recognise the legitimacy of alternatives. 
 
Taken together, these three research questions enquire into the processes of making 
ideas real: they explore the moderating factors upon the effective performativity of a 
mediating instrument and how such variation arises in responses to this instrument. 
In answering these questions, this thesis has shown that: (i) actors respond in a 
variety of different ways to the prescriptions of a mediating instrument and that 
effective performativity is by no means guaranteed – and thus we cannot treat 
governance as a homogenous outcome and instead should investigate the variation 
evident in practices; (ii) such variation in effective performativity can be explained 
by three moderating factors – underlying ties to existing logics, self interest and 
others’ influence, which explain whether ideas are framed, added, merged or re-
framed as they are combined and which thereby explain the type of performativity 
evident; and, (iii) whilst actors who do have a strong underlying tie to one logic are 
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unlikely to acknowledge the legitimacy of alternatives, where these underlying ties 
are weaker then self interest and others persuasion can cause a temporary override 
which allows actors to recognise the legitimacy of alternatives – and therefore for the 
mediating instrument to be effectively performative in its dual prescriptions. 
 
In other words, if decisions are taken for granted and actors have strong underlying 
ties to existing logics (apart from in those rare instances where actors have 
underlying ties to both existing logics) then, despite experiencing little tension, a 
mediating instrument is likely to be ineffectively performative. If actors have a 
strong underlying tie to one logic then they frame or reframe the prescriptions of the 
instrument according to this logic: accordingly the likelihood of the mediating 
instrument being effectively performative in respect of dual logics is low. However, 
in those instances where actors do have underlying ties to both logics, then the 
likelihood of effective performativity is high since actors perceive such dual requests 
as obvious and take them for granted already. Thus, underlying ties to logics is the 
first factor that moderates the effective performativity of a mediating instrument. 
 
However, in other instances actors seemingly have weaker underlying ties to logics 
and instead of reframing alternatives are able to combine them through adding or 
merging them. Where actors do not have a strong underlying tie to existing logics 
then these logics do not completely define rationality for these actors and they are 
able to ‘step out’ of this framing in order to interact with alternative ways of making 
sense of the world. Accordingly, such actors do not become insular in the face of 
alternatives but instead can become adept at dealing with such multiplicity 
depending upon the remaining two moderating factors.  
 
Firstly, actors attempt to reconcile such tension by reflecting upon their self interest: 
where self interest is high then actors are happy to afford the mediating instrument 
with legitimacy and thereby follow its prescriptions as closely as possible: thus 
engendering effective performativity. Here actors are able to add an alternative way 
of making sense of situations to their perspective because they ascribe the mediating 
instrument with more legitimacy than either logic: in other words they have a 
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stronger self interest than an underlying tie to either existing logic. Thus self interest 
acts as the second factor which moderates the effective performativity of a mediating 
instrument.  
 
Secondly, where actors cannot reconcile such tension themselves and still experience 
tension and uncertainty of how to respond to these dual prescriptions, then actors 
look externally for sources of persuasion. In these situations actors perhaps have a 
stronger underlying tie to one logic or are less self interested and thus more seriously 
struggle to see how these prescriptions can be reconciled into one rational and 
appropriate response. In other words, alternatives cannot simply be added but must 
instead be merged through reinterpreting the prescriptions in such a manner as to 
make them compatible. In these situations the mediating instrument can again be 
effectively performative where these others are successful in persuading the original 
actor of the legitimacy of this combination, however such performativity relies upon 
the particular skills of those persuading (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012) and is thus less 
likely to generate effective performativity than where actors act out of self interest. 
Thus others’ persuasion is the third factor which moderates the effective 
performativity of a mediating instrument. 
 
Accordingly these three moderating factors impact whether a mediating instrument 
demonstrates effective or ineffective performativity. Where actors have strong 
underlying ties to existing logics then they are likely to frame or reframe 
prescriptions and thus engender ineffective performativity (except where actors have 
underlying ties to both logics). Where actors have a strong self interest then they 
perceive the mediating instrument itself as legitimate and therefore experience a 
relatively small amount of tension and are thus able to simply add alternatives to 
their sense making; here actors are likely to demonstrate effective performativity. 
Where actors cannot reconcile such tension internally then alternatives must be 
merged into their existing understanding through the persuasion of others; here, 
again, effective performativity is possible, but less likely given the skill required of 
those persuading. These latter two moderating factors are more pragmatic, practical 
and of immediate concern in comparison to the existential nature of underlying ties 
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to existing logics and can thus aid actors who have relatively weak underlying ties in 
‘stepping out’ of these ties and recognising the legitimacy of alternatives. 
 
Such a description answers the proposed research questions and thereby enhances 
understanding of how ideas are made real in practice24. A number of contributions 
arise from such an explanation to both governmentality and the institutional logics 




As Miller and Power (2013) document, there seem to be complementarities between 
institutional theory and governmentality. Indeed the above framework and discussion 
suggests that such theories can be combined to complement each other by 
illuminating the other’s blind spots and helping to conceptualise theory to fill these. 
By combining governmentality with institutional logics, the framework proposed 
above brings sense making and a focus on individuals into governmentality whilst 
simultaneously bringing a focus on materiality and calculative instruments into 
institutional theory. Accordingly, the first contribution of this project is to document 
the compatibility of these theoretical lenses at a practical level to answer specific 
research questions. In documenting a specific set of research questions that can be 
answered by such a combined framework, this project highlights a concrete example 
of the benefits of such combination. Additionally, in answering these specific 
research questions, this project has formally addressed the philosophical 
compatibility of these two theories in a manner which extends previous 
recommendations of their combination (Greenwood et al., 2008; Jeacle & Carter 
2012; Miller & Power, 2013). Particularly by drawing on the arguments of Elder-
Vass (2012), this thesis outlines the philosophical compatibility between these two 
theoretical lenses and demonstrates how they can be usefully applied to research 
questions. Outlining such compatibility forms the first contribution of this research 
project. 
																																																								




Additionally, whilst the framework has been used here to illustrate the moderating 
factors of effective performativity, it undoubtedly opens up other avenues of 
theoretical or empirical questioning. By linking the sense making of institutional 
logics with the focus on calculative practices of governmentality, the framework 
provides a holistic conceptualisation of how symbolic ideas come to be made real in 
practice. As outlined below, such a conceptualisation opens up a number of areas for 
future enquiry. Accordingly, the second contribution of this project is the theoretical 
framework itself: which can be useful applied in other projects and for other research 
interests, and which additionally provides a holistic theoretical conceptualisation of 
how symbolic ideas come to be made real (in a variety of different ways) through 
calculative, material practices. 
 
Beyond the contributions of combining these theories and of the framework itself, 
this project also contributes to both governmentality and the institutional logics 
perspective respectively. 
6.3.2 Contributions to Governmentality 
The main contributions to governmentality arise from considering governance as a 
continuous and unfolding process rather than a homogeneous outcome (Moll & 
Hoque, 2011). Whilst previous work documents situations of ‘completed’ 
governance, such as those: in which “principles are disseminated out […] into the 
field of […] practice” (Hoskin & Macve, 1986, p. 127, emphasis added); whereby 
neo-liberalism comes to have an effect and does, therefore, exist (Rose & Miller, 
1992); where initiatives succeed and departments do become cooperative and 
partnership driven (Kurunmäki & Miller, 2011), cost conscious yet fashionable 
(Jeacle & Carter, 2012) or managed by risk management (Jordan et al., 2013), we 
still know little about the “felicity conditions” of such governance and what causes 
actors to act in the desired manner, or not (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 71; Espeland & 
Sauder, 2007, p. 34; MacKenzie, 2007, p. 69; Revellino & Mouritsen, 2015, p. 47).  
 
In developing an answer to such questions by exploring the process of governing at 
an individual level, this project makes three contributions to governmentality. Firstly, 
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in answering the first research question and showing the multiple ways that actors 
respond to a mediating instrument, this project details indeed that governance is not a 
homogeneous outcome and instead should be considered as a contingent, emergent 
and fluid process in which sense making, alteration and reflexivity can continuously 
occur.  
 
Secondly, in seeking to explain the factors which moderate the emergence of such 
variation, the theorisation to the second research question highlights the fourth 
contribution by detailing how underlying ties, self interest and others’ persuasion 
moderate the effective performativity of a mediating instrument. Whilst the third 
contribution highlights that governance is not always effectively performative, this 
fourth contribution details three moderating factors which impact upon the likelihood 
of generic, effective and counter-performativity arising as actors respond to a 
mediating instrument.  
 
The fifth contribution this project makes overall is to detail more fully the process of 
governance that occurs as mediating instruments act. As Thomson et al. (2014) note, 
mediation and governance are often conflated and assumed to contain the same 
processes. In unpacking how a mediating instrument is made sense of under these 
three moderating factors, this project highlights the processes through which 
governance occurs and thereby helps to distinguish between mediation and 
governance. By highlighting the distinct processes through which both mediation and 
governance occur (see sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.4 in comparison to Section 5.3.5) this 
project avoids such conflation and helps to reiterate how mediation occurs whilst 
going on to then theorise how governance occurs. 
 
In sum, by considering governance as a contingent and emergent process, this project 
contributes by detailing (i) the accuracy of such a consideration, (ii) three moderating 
factors which impact the variation in responses to such contingencies, and (iii) that, 
accordingly, the processes of governance are different, and therefore should be 
considered independently, to the processes of mediation. It is only by considering the 
process of governing (Moll & Hoque, 2011) as made up of both governance and 
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sense making that such contributions arise (Thomson et al., 2014). In addition to the 
contributions to governmentality this project also makes six contributions to 
institutional logics by conceptualising how symbolic ideas are made real in practice. 
6.3.3 Contributions to the Institutional Logics Perspective 
The first contribution to the institutional logics perspective is the theorisation of the 
role material artefacts or “calculative practices” (Miller, 2001, p. 379) play in the 
enactment of symbolic logics. Despite institutional theory recognising these material 
instruments as important or even fundamental (Christiansen & Lounsbury, 2013; 
Gawer & Phillips, 2013), little has been done to theorise how it is that calculative 
practices help to construct symbolic practices in material practice (Czarniawska, 
2008; Powell & Colyvass, 2008). Thus the combined theoretical framework 
developed here additionally helps to explore how it is that institutional logics in their 
symbolic form come to be enacted in practice: thereby also contributing to the 
‘micro-foundations’ of institutional logics by detailing the role of mediating 
instruments in the enactment of symbolic logics (Barley, 2008; McPherson & 
Sauder, 2013; Thornton et al., 2008; Powell & Colyvass, 2008). Accordingly, this 
project makes an additional two contributions to the institutional logics perspective 
by (i) developing a holistic theoretical framework which includes material 
instruments, and (ii) which helps to explain how individual actors come to enact 
symbolic logics ‘at the coalface’ or ‘on the ground’ (Barley, 2008; McPherson & 
Sauder, 2013) through these material instruments. 
 
Such a framework, when applied to the empirics, highlights an additional three 
further contributions to the institutional logics perspective. Firstly, by highlighting 
how dual logics can be combined (to varying degrees of success) by framing, 
reframing, adding and merging, the project contributes by detailing the various ways 
in which multiple logics can be combined. Such a conceptualisation extends prior 
work which recognises that multiple logics can combine (Greenwood & Suddaby, 
2006) and work which outlines how actors attempt to combine dual ideas through 
hijacking, rhetorical strategies or bridging (McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Smets et al., 
2015; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Specifically, whilst this previous work 
documents that logics can combine, and how they might combine when they do, this 
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project provides a conceptualisation of when they are likely to combine, and when 
they are not: based on whether they are re/framed, added or merged. Secondly, the 
three moderating factors identified help to explain the conditions under which logics 
are enacted as they are prescribed, and the conditions under which they are adapted 
or reinterpreted. Such a contribution extends prior work by theorising an explanation 
of the factors which explain whether instruments cause ‘reactivity’ or not (Espeland 
& Sauder, 2007): whether they cause convergence, divergence or misvergence 
(Raviola & Norbäk, 2013). In other words, the fourth contribution (identifying 
moderating factors that influence effective performativity) can equally be applied 
within the institutional logics perspective. 
 
The final two contributions to the institutional logics perspective relate to actors 
recognising the legitimacy of alternatives. Whilst the institutional logics perspective 
recognises that actors can ‘step out’ of the framing that conditions their current sense 
making into an alternative, we know little about which actors can do this successfully 
(Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Muzio et al., 2013; Smets et al., 2015) and which 
actors, instead, become increasingly insular and ‘retreat deeper’ into their original 
logic when confronted with alternatives (Lounsbury, 2007; Muzio & Faulconbridge, 
2013; Rao et al., 2003; Thornton et al., 2012). In other words it is unclear which 
actors act like cultural dopes (Seo & Creed, 2002) and which more reflexively 
inhabit these logics (Hallet & Ventresca, 2006) and use them like a cultural toolkit 
(Swidler, 1986; Zilber, 2006). Accordingly, the theorisation presented above 
suggests that actors have varying degrees of underlying ties to existing logics: that is, 
actors can be embedded in logics to different degrees: thereby explaining how some 
actors can ‘step out’ of their framing (where these underlying ties are relatively 
weak) and how others ‘retreat’ further into this framing (where underlying ties are 
relatively strong). Accordingly, this project additionally contributes to the 
institutional logics perspective by highlighting (i) that actors have different degrees 
of underlying ties to existing logics, and (ii) that where these underlying ties are 
relatively weak (in comparison to self interest and others influence) then these actors 




In sum this thesis contributes to both governmentality and the institutional logics 
perspective by: demonstrating the practical use and philosophical compatibility of 
these theories; developing a holistic framework to explain how symbolic ideas are 
made real by bringing a focus on sense making at the individual level into 
governmnetality and a focus on material instruments and governance into 
institutional logics; demonstrating governance as a continuous and unfolding 
phenomena; highlighting three moderating factors which impact how such 
governance unfolds; distinguishing between mediation and governance; developing 
the micro-foundations of institutional logics by demonstrating how symbolic logics 
are made real through material instruments; highlighting when multiple logics are 
likely to combine and when they are not based on the three moderating factors; 
highlighting when these logics do combine that they are likely to converge, diverge 
and misverge based on whether they are added, merged or reframed, respectively; 
that actors have different strengths of underlying ties to logics; and, finally, that 
where such underlying ties are weak, then actors are able to ‘step out’ of this framing 
and recognise alternatives based on a concern for their self interest or on others 
persuasion. 
 
Despite such contributions, this project is, of course, not complete; various 
limitations and further ideas promote suggestions for future research: which are 
outlined below following a discussion of the implications of these findings. 
 
6.4 Implications, Limitations & Future Research 
6.4.1 Implications 
The findings highlight a number of contributions to accounting, governmentality and 
institutional theory. As such, our understanding of how these literatures intermingle 
and connect has been increased, as has our understanding of the processes through 
which governance is constituted in the enactment of ideas, or logics, in practice. 




Perhaps the most prominent implication applies to studies that stop at the 
organizational level. In stopping at this level one assumes that institutionalisation, 
governance or legitimacy is an outcome and thus ignores that it is a process; a 
process which involves much nuance and variation at the practice level (Busco & 
Quattrone, 2014; Moll & Hoque, 2011). The findings from this thesis urge 
researchers to continue down to the practice level; we know that translations occur 
and that variations happen, but what does this mean for the specific setting, questions 
and cases at hand? What effects does this have? This implication applies to 
accounting, governmentality and institutional logics studies; since each accepts the 
world is socially constructed then we must get to the level of practice to see what 
these constructions are, and to try and theorise about why they may be as they are. 
 
A second implication is to consider the links between enacted practice and symbolic 
ideas. If a mediating instrument creates so much variation in practice: some of which 
is relatively far removed from the ideas which are embedded in it, then can it really 
be said to be governing? How far can the enacted reality ‘stretch’ from the symbolic 
ideas before the two can no longer be described as a translation of the same thing, 
but as independent things? This is a question of the ontology of logics or ideas as 
simultaneously symbolic and material. This has implications for both 
governmentality and institutional theory: since both are premised upon programmes 
or logics being described as ideals and technologies, or symbolic and material; 
however if this link between symbols and material practices is so loose, can we even 
say such a thing as a logic or programme exists as simultaneously material and 
symbolic? Or does it change what we mean by the term? In what way? These 
implications pose future research questions, some more of which are detailed after 
the limitations section below. 
6.4.2 Limitations 
Perhaps the largest limitation of such a project is inherently tied into its 
methodological approach: that of constructionism. If one accepts that reality is 
socially constructed and each representation is a re-presentation, then the threat of 
relativism is that no knowledge is any more true or valuable than any other. Thus, 
this construction of the story could have been different and indeed could be 
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deconstructed itself to show how it has been constructed. However, the point of such 
research, given one cannot say it is ‘truthful’, is to re-present the narrative in a 
manner which hopes to interest – to be between people in the sense of facilitating 
conversations (Quattrone, 2006). Despite this limitation, this narrative seeks to 
interest by convincing the reader of the validity of its construction through outlining 
the processes involved in constructing it, including; justifications and reasoning for 
various decisions, review of analysis by independent researchers, presenting the 
emerging story to various audiences and by providing examples of the raw data, first 
order codes, second order categorisations and third order themes in the Data Tables 
(see Appendix C) for the reader’s perusal.  
 
Other limitations more specific to the research project itself relate primarily to time 
constraints which had to be balanced with the practicalities of completing a PhD. 
Primarily there are constraints of time inside the organization: each interview 
committed a member of staff for at least a full hour and these hours accumulated to a 
significant amount of time for the organization. Undoubtedly, the empirics would 
have been deeper and richer were a longer study conducted, or more time in the 
branch secured. Despite selecting a case-study method informed mainly by 
interviews in this study, future research on such a topic might be extended through a 
more heavily ethnographically-informed approach: either from the outset, with the 
aim of also conducting interviews once a strong reputation had been built with the 
company’s members, or throughout, so as to be able to maximise exposure to the 
organization. Similarly, whilst it was fortunate to be able to secure access and 
explore in depth one entire branch, the findings resulting from a number of branches 
would have been extremely interesting: although requiring more time to analyse. 
Perhaps such tensions between the snowball approach versus an upfront ‘selling’ of a 
smaller amount of contact will be a repeated tension which has to be balanced in 
future work. However, the project was fortunate to be able to secure interviews 
across the entire branch so as to allow sufficiently detailed exploration of the 




A final limitation relating to time was the amount of time allocated to each 
interviewee. Whilst perhaps untenable in an organizational setting, it would be 
extremely interesting to explore how embedded in a particular logic each actor is, 
and see how this affects their reproduction of symbolic logics in practice. In other 
words, exploring what causes actors to have relatively strong or weak underlying ties 
to logics. However, this would require a very detailed understanding of the actor’s 
lived experience, with considerable longitudinal data on their experiences and 
reflections, which was unfortunately limited due to the time constraints of the Ph.D. 
However, this is a question which could well be explored in future research. 
 
In sum, the research project was undoubtedly limited through the case study 
approach which reflects a compromise on both ethnographic and phenomenological 
methods which would both have provided empirics allowing for a deeper unpacking 
of the highlighted issues and contributions. However, the upside of such a 
compromise was access to an organisational setting which provided the opportunity 
to answer specific research questions by analysing an entire population: something 
which would be unlikely with the level of access the researcher had. As implied 
above, a number of these limitations could be explored in future research. 
6.4.3 Future Research 
Other questions arising from this project include whether these three underlying 
factors (underlying ties to logics, self-interest and others’ influence) hold in other 
branches of John Lewis, in similar organizations, in other organizations, with similar 
logics elsewhere or with different logics elsewhere? These related questions would 
further extend understanding of how symbolic ideas are made real in practice and 
whether or not these findings hold in other settings, or whether they can be extended 
to include other factors. Similar future inquiry could also examine in more detail how 
it is that mediating instruments gain traction: that is, to explore how these 
instruments enrol actors more or less successfully in different settings and theorise 
why this might be.  
 
A related question arises in relation to the institutional logics perspective. Given this 
research has shown the multiplicity of material enactments arising from logics, the 
	
225	
question arises of what holds these enactments together as part of a particular logic 
and not another one? How far can we stretch material enactments from the symbolic 
elements of logics before they break and cannot be said to then be material 
enactments of that logic? What, then, are these ‘broken’ material enactments of? 
Further theorising on the nature of the relationship between symbols and material 
enactments of logics is required to deepen our understanding of the institutional 
logics perspective. Likewise, whilst this research highlights that actors become 
insular in the face of alternatives when they have strong underlying ties to these 
logics, the psychological processes and influences of how and why this occurs would 
further enhance understanding of how actors interpret and deal with multiplicity and 
alternatives. Furthermore, despite this research highlighting that actors can use 
certain skills to persuade others of how to act, more precisely what these skills are, 
why they work, where they fail and how actors use them remains outside the scope 
of this project. Finally, it seems from the empirics that adding may be less difficult 
but require more continuous work in comparison to merging: which may require 
more difficult initial work but may sustain itself, when actors are convinced to enact 
dual logics. Testing such intuition would again enhance our understanding of how 
(multiple) ideas come to be made real. 
 
A final question for future work, and again impinged by the time constraints in this 
study, focuses around the notion of time and how stable both the multiple logics and 
the mediation and governance are. For example, whilst existing Partners felt that the 
market logic was impinging on the community logic, do earlier Partners feel that the 
partnership logic was ever dominant, or has it always been subjected to the profit 
logic? Likewise, is the mediation provided by the instrument stable or is it likely to 
crumble as these underlying influences play out: are the actors likely to revolt against 
such a system if, or when, they realise it is so open to interpretation? What factors 





6.5 Concluding Remarks 
This final chapter reflects briefly upon the research project and design, reiterating the 
current gaps in the literature, proposed research questions and the holistic analytical 
framework developed to conceptualise an answer to the question of how multiple 
symbolic logics come to be enacted in practice through a mediating instrument. It 
then goes on to outline the explicit research questions and documents how the 
empirical findings have answered them. As such, this chapter summarises how this 
research project contributes to knowledge by developing our understanding of how 
mediating instruments govern, how institutional logics come to be enacted in practice 
and how actors interact with multiplicity.  
 
This chapter, and thus the thesis, concludes with a summary of the implications, for 
both governmentality and institutional theory, highlighting the continuing need to 
focus on the processes of things occurring, rather than taking them for granted as an 
outcome (Moll & Hoque, 2011). It contextualises these implications by suggesting 
potential limitations of the project and ends with a list of suggestions for future 
research which could build upon these limitations and further extend understanding 
in these, and related, areas. 
 
To close, this thesis argues from a constructionist perspective to increase 
understanding of how realities come to be constructed in a particular setting. It seeks 
to describe, and thereby explain (Latour, 2005), how accounting is implicated in 
governing actors through making real those ideas which management deem 
important. Through an abductive case-study of John Lewis, the presented findings 
contribute to both governmentality and institutional theory. The presented model 
argues on three moderating factors (underlying ties to existing logics, self interest 
and others’ influence) which influence the effective performativity of a mediating 
instrument. Based on these underlying factors, actors seek to frame, add, merge or 
reframe additional prescriptions as they are presented with alternatives. Such 
methods of combining determine the likelihood of effective performativity as well as 
highlighting how actors can be embedded in logics to different degrees; thereby 
explaining how some actors become increasingly insular when presented with 
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alternatives, whilst others can recognise the legitimacy of these alternatives and work 
with multiple logics. As such, this thesis contributes to governmentality by 
describing in more detail the processes by which mediating instruments encourage 
performativity and the realisation of the ideas they prescribe. Additionally, it 
contributes to the institutional logics literature by deconstructing the factors which 
are at play in the construction of certain realities, and by highlighting the role of 
material instrument in this process of governance: a construction which has 
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Appendix A: Record of Interviews Conducted 
 
Position Number of Interviews 
Head of Branch 1 
Regional Registrar 1 
Assistant Registrar 1 
Operations Manager of Commercial 
Support 
1 
Operations Manager of Selling 1 
Personnel Manager 2 
Business Partner 2 
ROIT Administrator 1 
Operations Development Officer 1 
Section Managers 14 
















Appendix B: Interview Schedules 
Senior Managerial Interview Schedule: 
Tell me about what’s changed at John Lewis over the last 10 years. 
What was their strategy and what is it now, how has it changed? 
What effects has this had? 
 
Specifically in terms of FMS: 
What was the rationale behind this? 
Were there cost targets involved? 
Where and how was it justified? 
Was it a problem before the initiative? 
 
What conflicts had to be reconciled during this: 
I’ve heard the expression “hearts and minds” – what does that mean to you? 
Were there other conflicts going on? 
How are these balanced and worked through? 
 
Does it appear to be working? 
Is it going according to schedule and plan? 
 
Landing this with engagement: 
Can you remember your initial speech? 
What were you trying to capture in it? 
Did you use examples? 
Can you tell me about how you developed the content. 
 
Did you adapt it during? 
Did you notice anything in particular that you said which really worked? 
Did you use numbers or ratios to illustrate any points? 
Do you feel these helped? 
 
How had you been convinced? 
What other support was there for it? 
How did you mobilise this? 
How did support spread throughout the company? 
 
Can you tell me about the other things that helped (or didn’t) get buy-in? What else 
preceded or followed it that helped or hindered? 
 
What about My Performance? 
Is that going according to plan? 
What do you think is the purpose of it? 
Do you think it works? 
Is it better than its predecessor? 
 
Tell me about how you use My Performance and the associated language; 
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How do you use it to get the best out of your staff? 
How do you use it to direct them to a goal? 
How do you use it to communicate? 
How do you use it to reconcile differences of opinion with staff? 
 
Do managers use it in the same way? 
Do role transfers assist or hinder in this?  
What is the rationale behind these? 
 
Can you tell me about the reports you rely on to get an overview of the branch? 
Are these reflective of the ones you are measured on? 
Can you give me an example of something you have changed or focused on based on 
these reports? 
 
How do you incentivise staff? 
How do you grade them? 
How do you get their buy-in and support? 
 
Section Manager Interview Schedule: 
Introduction: 
How long have you been here? 
Tell me a bit about what has changed since you’ve been here. 
What do you think customers see in John Lewis, what does John Lewis mean to 
them? 
Tell me a bit about your role in the business. 
 
Logics: 
What are your main goals? 
How have these changed over time? 
 
What is the goal of John Lewis do you think? What’s their vision? 
How do they plan on getting there? 
How do they communicate this? - example 
How has this changed over time and in the recent past? (P’ship cards, £ 
services, opening hours etc?) 
Why do you think this is? 
Are these goals shared throughout the Partnership or do you see tensions? 
Are there silos of tension or in your experience is it mostly individuals? 
Do the people in your team share the same vision of John Lewis do you 
think? 
Who do you consider is in your team? 
How does this all link in to the Corporate Strategy? 
Where do you fit in this? 
 
Are there multiple goals or aims within John Lewis (profit, customer, partner)? 
How are these balanced or prioritised? 
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What do these mean to you? - example 
Have the priorities changed over time? 
Why do you think that is? 
What effects does this have? - example 
Where and when do these differing goals become a problem? 
Do people still relate to older ways or priorities of doing things? 




Talk me through MyPerformance: how does it work, what is it, what are the stages 
and process? 
 
What are the rules around it? (written and unwritten) 
 What do you do every time? 
 What do you take into every meeting? 
 Where do you do it? 
 
What is the aim of My Performance? 
 What is it’s focus, does it focus on one of those aims? 
 Where is the value in it for you: what does it/not help you with? - example 
What do you think is the picture of Partner performance that My Performance 
paints? 
How do you translate this focus to an individual level? – example: talk me 
through a goal you hit this year that related to Partners – how did you get their 
attention focused on it?  
What about the opposite where you’ve tried but to no avail? 
 
 
Is it useful for measuring performance? 
 What else do you use for measuring performance? – example (quant/qual, 
what devices, how often, how do you analyse, what happens after – communication) 
 Who else is involved in measuring their performance? 
Where else is it useful? – example  
Where is it not useful? – example 
Talk me through a good ARP you’ve just had. 
Talk me through a bad ARP you’ve just had. 
 
Is it useful for measuring your own performance? 
 What are your goals this year?   
What are you focusing on? 
How does this tie into the business strategy? 
How were your goals set for this year? (n+1, negotiated, self-driven etc.) - 
explain + example 
 Were there any struggles or tensions in the process? Did you have the same 
understanding and plan as your manager?  
  How did this come to be or how did you manage it? 




How do you get Partners to change their behaviour? How did you get their buy in to 
the new business model? 
What was the situation? 
How did you approach this? 
 How did the new PMS help in that respect? – example 
 
Does My Performance tell Partners what they are supposed to be doing? Or can you 
talk me through an example when you and the Partner started at different places:  
How did you get to the middle?  
How did you clarify meanings for them? 
Do they understand it? 
Do they all understand it in the same way? 
Does this cause problems? – example 
Was it clearer than last year? 
 
Social Skill: 
How often do managers move around the business? 
 What’s the aim of this? 
 Is this common across John Lewis? 
How does it help? – example? 
 How does it hinder? – example? 
 Does this provide a different focus or ways of working in different areas? – 
example? 
 How do you manage these?  
 
 
Selling Partner Interview Schedule: 
Introduction: 
How long have you been here? 
Tell me a bit about what has changed since you’ve been here. 
What do you think customers see in John Lewis, what does John Lewis mean to 
them? 
Tell me a bit about your role in the business. 
 
Logics: 
What are your main goals? 
How have these changed over time? 
 
What is the goal of John Lewis do you think?  
What’s their vision? 
How do they communicate this? 
How has this changed over time and in the recent past?  
What are the main things they’re focusing on? (P’ship cards, £ services, 
opening hours etc?) 
Why do you think this is? 
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How do they drill in this new focus? 
Are these goals shared throughout the Partnership or do you see tension? 
Are there silos of tension or in your experience is it mostly individuals? 
Do the people in your team share the same vision of John Lewis do you 
think? 
Who do you consider is in your team and what are their goals? 
How does this all link in to the Corporate Strategy? 
Where do you fit in this? 
 
Are there multiple aims with John Lewis (profit, customer, partner)? 
How are these balanced or prioritised? 
What do these mean to you? 
Have the priorities changed over time? 
Why? 
Where and when do these goals become a problem for you? 
How do you deal with tensions between them – e.g. opening earlier better for 
business but not for partner life, bonus better for partners but not good for business 
etc? 
Do people still relate to older ways or priorities of doing things? 




Talk me through your APR: how does it work, what is it, what are the stages and the 
process, how do you enter information? 
 
What are the rules surrounding it? (written and unwritten?) 
 Where do you do it? 
 What do you take in with you? 
 
What do you see as the aim of My Performance? What does it focus on? 
 Where is the value in it for you: what does it/not help you with? - example 
What do you think is the picture of Partner performance that My Performance 
paints? 
What focus or priorities does it provide? 
 
Is it useful for measuring performance? 
 Do you think it’s fair and good at measuring performance? 
 Do you think it does its job? – example? 
 How else is your performance measured?  
What problems have you come across whilst using it? 
How important is it, how often do you use it or refer to it? – example 
Did you have to push anything or argue with your manager this time? 
What was good about your ARP this year? Did it clarify anything? 
 
Is it useful for measuring your own performance? 
 What are your goals this year?   
What are you focusing on? 
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How were your goals set for this year? (n+1, negotiated, self-driven etc.) - 
explain + example 
 Is it clear do you think or does it need a lot of explaining? 
 Does your manager ever struggle to see your side of the argument ever? – 
example? 
 How do you get around this? 
 
What do you see as the role of your manager? 
 Do they do a good job? – example 
 Do you trust them? 




How often do managers move around the business? 
 What do you think is the aim of this? 
 Does it help you as a Partner do you think? 
How does it help? – example? 
 How does it hinder? – example?
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Need for change Efficiency 
improvements 
~ ...the competitive environment has pushed us into a situation where we have to take those difficult decisions. 
(Head of Branch) 
~ The logic behind it is around how our branches operate effectively, and therefore if you have all of the different 
layers then what happens is it takes longer, is what tends to happen, because it goes through all the levels. 
(Regional Registrar) 
~ We’ve gone from being quite an arrogant business, that thought it was, nobody could touch us, we’re John 
Lewis, we didn’t need to do anything differently, customers would come to us because we were John Lewis. We 
then had a change of senior directors and a chap came in and said “we don’t have any right to claim that we are 
the pinnacle and so what are we going to do to make sure customers feel that way?” (Operations Manager of 
Commercial Support) 
   Old culture 
didn't work 
~ some of them still think they should be spoon fed, some of them are better than others…We need to change it, 
it’s my job to change it. (Manager) 
~ ...a lot of people will do this automatically, existing people that have been here for years because of habit and 
through things, but a lot of people that have been here for years do half of the stuff, but not the other half. 
(Manager) 
~ as we move into where we are in the world at the moment, you’ve got to be really clear on what we’re promising 
and what we can deliver; based on that conversation of fairness and yes, you can have an opinion, but that 















   Old appraisal 
didn't work 
~ So partners have been crying out for clarity; just make it clear what you want, in a really straightforward, 
simple, succinct way...but equally whilst we think about the business we need to be for the future, actually just 
having, I am being really simplistic here, but nice people, isn’t good enough, it won’t get us where we need to be. 
(Operations Manager of Commercial Support) 
~ So...we sat down and looked at what’s the strategy for the next 10 years, how do we make sure we have all the 
parts of the business set up in a way that is right and fit for purpose, then we start to question, right, okay, what 
about our appraisal system, is that right, is it the best it can be? All these people have been telling us it should be 
a bit of this and a bit of that...It was quite a holistic approach before I would have said. (Operations Manager) 
~ Previously pay was far less structured and you’d come to a review meeting with you’re relevant Ops Manager, 
so the Department Managers would have come to a meeting with their Ops Manager and would have sat down 
and looked at what was the pay award that they wanted to give their teams. There was nothing really scientific 
about it. (Operations Manager of Commercial Support) 
  Old v new ways of 
working 
New appraisal is 
better 
~ This is probably clearer than anything we’ve ever had before in that it should take away some of the vagueness 
and does it mean this or does it mean that? (Selling Partner) 
~ ...it’s far more black and white than it was before. (Manager) 
~ But it is very, I mean appraisals used to sometimes last 2, 2 and a half hours, so this is a lot more 












~ Gone are the days when you could come in, do what you needed to do, and go home. Most of us have to manage 
and prioritise. And it’s working in a slightly different way, so it’s developing some of those most sophisticated 
management techniques… they’ve genuinely got to work as part of a wider team and operations group as we call 
it now, as well as having key responsibility for part of that wider remit. (Head of Branch) 
~ if we’re expecting to get our bonuses and all this nice fluffy stuff, then we’re going to have to expect to have 
more things asked of us, a lot of people in the past came in, did their job, went home, loved it, thought it was nice 
and great and blah, blah, blah, but now we have to ask a little more. (Manager) 
~ it’s trying to drill down what it actually means to be a Partner, and making them be more responsible. I think 
Partners did used to get more spoon-fed in the past and now they have to find a lot of it themselves and drive it 
themselves. (Manager) 
   Centralisation 
and  
standardisation 
~ There’s no point in me doing one thing one day and somebody doing something different the next day, so we’re 
starting to work, and it's new for us...together. (Manager) 
~ Consistency is probably the most used word in John Lewis. It’s one of our biggest challenges. (Manager) 
~ I had to go to see teams and tell them that as part of the work that the business has done that we would be doing 
that type of work in a different way and for many of them, those functions were either outsourced, regionalised or 
centralised and for many of those people it meant that, for them as individuals, their job would be made 
redundant. (Head of Branch) 
   Big change ~ ...in our new world next year…(Personnel Manager)  
~ I think its probably changes in the business because obviously they got rid of one layer of management and I 
think that for the Section Managers then to have jumped up to being the manager, I think it’s a huge step. (Selling 
Partner) 
~ So just last year we implemented a new process of development and evaluation, called My Performance, this is 




















~ As a new manager, I’d read over all my team’s PDPs and it seemed that, historically...there was very generic 
expectations and you could almost tell that it had been written by the same person and it seemed very one sided, 
and I think a lot of the Partners were just used to that, they didn’t have to set their own Objectives, and it was 
getting across to them, ‘this is what you want to do, it’s your job, it’s your performance,’ and just being there for 
support, coaching them through writing their PDP, keeping up to date with their PDP. (Manager) 
~ ...also make them more self sufficient, because they’ve always been used to managers coming on and helping 
them, if they’re short of staff or anything, but managers having a step back and having more of a one-to-one 
conversation with them, that’s very new for them. (Manager) 
~ I think Partners did used to get more spoon-fed in the past and now they have to find a lot of it themselves and 
drive it themselves. (Selling Partner) 
   Increased 
workload 
~ I’m coming and questioning the way things are done or thinking about, “how do we drive the business forward, 
how do we improve our sales, how do we act more efficiently?” So because it’s a completely different way of 
working from they’ve had they’ll probably a bit like “oh my goodness, this is intense!” (Manager) 
~ So it’s more, more, more, more, it’s constantly “we want more.” And it’s like nothing is good enough, you do 
one thing for one Section Manager, you know “they told me to do that, I did that.” “Okay, but for you to go up 
another point you need to [do] just that little but more.” And that sucks. You’re running round in circles, one 
manager says on thing, another manager says another. (Selling Partner) 
~ ...we co-own this business...and this [My Performance] is only a little bit of what we should be doing, there 
should be far more on this than there is, because we own this business and we need to be taking responsibility for 
this because quite frankly I’ve just had a 15% bonus, that’s crap, for the past year I have worked for two people 
because we’ve been short staffed, we’ve worked extra hours, we’ve been run off our feet with less staff doing more 








   Increased 
responsibility 
~ ...people have got to take a bit of responsibility themselves for actually going out and finding out some of the 
pieces of communication, we’re not here to go and feed them everything. (Operations Manager) 
~ ...there’s huge differences [from my previous job]...it’s a partnership so you have all these other new 
responsibilities and you’re responsible for the business and how well it does...it definitely brings it’s challenges 
but [it's] really good. (Manager) 
~ For me personally I was a very much a hands-on, if it was my baby I found it quite hard to let go and give that 
responsibility to somebody else, so now, it’s building that trust and trusting your Partners to do it for you. Taking 
that risk as well - that they will do it. If they don’t, well, you can sort of feed that back to them. (Manager) 
  Profit focus Goals - Profit ~ ...everyone will also have something in there about profit; because that’s our financial services and things like 
that – so our Partnership Card and our insurance which is pure profit, it’s a very easy way of making pure 
profit.(Manager) 
~ Also set them targets on add on sales, that’s the big one just now, because we changed from regular coffees to 
having large ones, and there’s not been an improvement on that, so the past couple of months we’ve been setting 
them targets;...say they sell eighty-five lattes, they’ve got to at least upgrade that to maybe twenty-five per cent of 
those to be large instead of just regular. (Manager) 
~ ...within my Fitted Kitchens team as an example...we set real specifics around “maintain above a sixty per cent 
average acceptance rate"...so it should be sixty per cent or above, which we always maintain...So one of the 
targets I’ve set my planner is “that’s great that we maintain our acceptance rate, but how do we grow our 
average order sale?” So we’ve agreed that we want to maintain an average order sale of fifteen thousand...so 
again it’s things like “so how do you do that? How are you introducing Alno kitchens, instead of our first 















   Examples of 
profit focus 
~ Obviously there are targets, and there are always targets, so ensuring that we are meeting all the targets that 
are set and they sit generally around customer, partner and obviously profit so sales and profit as well. 
(Operations Manager of Commercial Support) 
~ ...But they are, Ops Managers are certainly trying to help SMs at the moment with prioritising what they’re 
doing so that that helps with the workload and actually challenging a bit more; “do you really need to be doing 
that or could a Partner be doing that? Or actually does anyone have to do it? Can it just be something that 
doesn’t need to get done at all?” (Manager) 
~ There’s a fair mix to be honest, I don’t really have much in the way of Underperforming; I’ve got rid of 
them...[by] reiterating what’s expecting of them, every time they fail, you tell them that they’ve failed and tell them 
how to improve, but yeah there’s a bit of backhandedness to get rid of some of them. (Manager) 
   Profit rationality ~ And my approach often, with a lot of things, is to come in and look at it and see “right, so is that the best way of 
doing it? Is there a different way we could do it to make it more efficient?” And that approach has led me to look 
at some of the processes...So that’s been a big thing this year. (Manager) 
~ I’ve had where customers basically phone in and people will be like, “oh, we’ll just give them a new one if 
something’s slightly damaged.” And it’s like; “well offer them a little bit of money off to keep what they’ve got,” I 
said, “if we take back a second hand good, we then automatically have to sell it off half price. So offer them a 
little bit of money off and see if they’ll keep that.” Because we don’t want it back, things that come back get more 
damaged, they get delivered out to the customer again and get more damaged. (Selling Partner) 
~ ...there is a lot of change and everything is explained, so the Pension review; explained, FMS; explained, it was 
never a money saving thing, it was the fact that as a business with a lot of communication being diluted because 
there was that many layers, they needed to thin that out, there was a lot of successful businesses that base 








   Lack of trust ~ Branches are more closely audited [for] checking partners’ understanding about what they know about 
[procedures]. (Regional Registrar) 
~ ...so as the DM you were fully accountable and actually if your Section Manager mucked something up, 
generally you took the flak for that and you didn’t have to have that conversation and probably to a certain extent 
the Section Managers were a little protected by that, whereas now they’re working more directly as their 
managed directly by the Ops Managers, so they are fully accountable now of their section, the results in their 
section, how they’re driving their team, all the KPIs that we have, so all of that is fully to them. (Manager) 
~ ...so they walk out of the room, with a "right, you’ve now got to communicate that” because that’s generally 
how you cascade things, but they don’t always really understand the message that they’re about to give. Or by the 
time they come to it, they can’t remember exactly how that was put across. So by narrowing the amount of people, 
looking at who were absolutely the best people that could confidently deliver a message and would do it in a 
structured, sticking to the notes type format, we kind of alleviated some of that dilution of message by the time it 




Combines ideas Combines What 
and How 
~ So this has been developed to say, we’re going to recognise what people do, and how they do it. And actually 
the two things combined are actually really, really important, but the two things combined will form a rating for 
that partner. (Operations Manager) 
~ The pendulum has swung back to 50:50; between the behaviours and the KPIs and more measurables. That's 
the target; in the middle, and it should be focused on that 50:50 balance. (Head of Branch) 
~ I think this is trying to show what a well rounded Partner is, it’s someone that is delivering everything that we 
want in terms of shop floor, like what they’re doing and their process of how they’re going about it, its involving 
















   Creates and 
facilitates  
compatibilities 
~ I think it’s [My Performance] changed the focus slightly, because before there was a bit of a reluctance: if you 
had to order something from JohnLewis.com, they were seen as a competitor rather than an ally. So rather than 
classing it as a third stock room, which we’re trying to look on it as now...because when we look at sales now we 
look at the whole catchment sales piece rather than just the in-branch piece. (Selling Partner) 
~ we talk about “with rights comes responsibilities”, so as a partner you have rights: so you have the right to a 
bonus, you can share in the company’s good fortune, but with that comes a responsibility, and there’s a 
responsibility to think of this company as if its your own, to put the effort in as if its your own, because at the end 
of the day because everything comes back to you and your pockets. (Operations Manager of Commercial Support) 
~ The goals of the company right now is still to get the money through the tills, be top of the leader board on the 
market, which we are, be the best people for customer service and make a profit so we can give the bonus back to 
the Partners. (Selling Partner) 
  Enrols actors Familiarity ~ Yeah, the commitments have been around for quite some time actually. So the commitments have always been 
there, but they are far more visible and intrinsically linked now in everything that we do. So we would have 
started to talk to Partners about behaviours around creating real influence, building relationships, but when My 
Perormance came in, everything was then truly linked to those commitments. So they may have been talked about, 
but they weren’t measured. They were guiding principles I suppose is the kind of best way of describing it. 
(Operations Manager) 
~ As you walk through the corridor it’s there for everybody to see, the Principle. (Selling Partner) 
~ So it’s their PDPs, so like I’ve just explained, so its on the wall, in the Gazette’s, its in the bulletins, so Retail 
Revolution was launched, it’s four for Retail Revolution, it’s now four plus one, that’s why they’ve kept it four; 
because Retail Revolution was four. They’ve worded it differently, it didn’t used to be “delighting customers” but 








   Flexibility and  
open to 
interpretation 
~ You see it within a branch, so even within the walls we are in just now, we have run a forum, and one of the key 
things that partners talk about is lack of consistency. “My manager expects this of me, my manager expects that of 
me.” How can that be when we’ve got exactly the same structure, the same formal rules, but then the expectations 
are different. Because you’ve then got that interpretation thing added on, or personal expectations added in to 
that as well. (Operations Manager of Commercial Support) 
~ I suppose the expectation of everyone is different in the sense that what I perceive as Good might be different to 
what someone else perceives as Good and I think that’s a hard one to get consistent because obviously everyone’s 
natural style is different. (Manager) 
~ they’re quite broad statements as well, so if I say “Partner has the skill to do job” there’s different ways of 
demonstrating that. (Manager) 
   Social practices 
and examples 
~ After having the review it did become much clearer to say “right, okay, I now understand it a little bit” but first 
time filling this out I thought “aaaah”. (Selling Partner) 
~ I think it’s quite clear once you’ve sat down, I found it clearer once I sat down with [my manager], and he 
helped me go through it...and that made it much clearer. Reading through the booklet myself I thought; “uh oh, 
okay” [not understanding] but he clarified quite a lot and gave me some helpful tips as to how to fill it out. 
(Selling Partner) 
~...I mean it is pretty comprehensive when you go through it, when I first read through it I thought I’m not even 
sure what I’m supposed to write in these boxes, but after having the one-to-ones with our section managers it 
became much clearer. (Selling Partner) 
   Feeling of 
cohesion and 
neutrality 
~ So for me it gives me structure, so I know that every Partner has this book, I have this book, every other 
manager in the business is working to this book, when I walk into my ARP I’m being graded on exactly the same 
things, so it doesn’t matter what level I’m at, we’re all graded the same. And there’s no hidden agenda because 
it’s all there, so a Partner can see what I’m being assessed on and what I need to aspire to get to. (Selling 
Partner) 
~ Everyone knows this is what we are about now, this is what we are all measured on, doesn’t matter whether you 
are on the floor, whether you’re a manager, or whether you are Steering Group, you’re measured on this in some 
way, shape or form. (Manager) 
~ ...every manager needs to fully understand this, if you spoke to a manager that doesn’t fully understand it I’d be 















   Community 
tested 
~ actually as a tool it’s a really good tool to use and we will still be able to feedback, so we can still actually 
feedback now we’re all using it, we’ll have opportunity to feedback and say this just doesn’t work, or it does work, 
but it’s been well tested to make sure everything’s okay. (Manager) 
~ Yeah, I mean you’ve got to have confidence that they’ve set it up well, I am confident that they know what 
they’re doing. (Manager) 
~ So it was based on partner opinion at the beginning and partners will have, there were partners in this branch 
who were part of that trial, but it’s not every partners saying, but we do take groups of partners to trial things.  
(Regional Registrar) 
   Accountable ~ ...Oh yeah, your rating: you had your conversation, they give you your feedback, you said “well I think I deserve 
a five for that, you’ve only given me four.” And then you have to explain why you think, really prove that you’re 
worth that. (Selling Partner) 
~ Through evidence as well, so evidence through another Partner or a Manager, or you tell them or we’ve got a 
calendar that you get yearly and if you’ve achieved anything you write it in the month to keep it fresh so when you 
come into your appraisal you can say “oh, I’ve done this, I’ve done this.” (Selling Partner) 
~ They should be coming to their PDP meeting saying “I’ve done this, that and the other.” With evidence, 











Action aligned to  
community logic 
Ownership ~ it’s our business so we kind of try and protect our top line I guess for the bonus and wastage and stuff, so we get 
a lot of ownership put on ourselves…so it’s a good company to work for. (Selling Partner) 
~ I like the customers and it’s a happy, friendly place to work...we are a co-owned business so we take pride in the 
business because we own it as well, so you get what you give into it. (Selling Partner) 
~ I think it’s the fact that we’re co-owners as well, there’s this responsibility we have, so it’s not just we should be 
doing it, we know that we have to do it because it’s our company as well, so everything that we do reflects on our 
company and I suppose in the end reflects on our bonus as well. (Selling Partner) 
   Helping others ~ so we got everything so my manager turns round and says “you’re not ever getting to leave this department 
because, you know, look what you’ve just done!” But again I wouldn’t leave a colleague struggling in that 
situation, I wouldn’t leave my manager struggling in that situation, (Selling Partner) 
~ I know that I’m a respected Partner within this business, and the reason I know that is because Steering Group 
are now looking for a job for me in another John Lewis’ situated elsewhere, so I know I’m a respected Partner. 
(Selling Partner) 
~ there’s a few stars work within the store, in our department anyway...coming in and; “let’s see what needs done, 
and we’ll get this done today.” Making sure that the day’s operations run smoothly...They know their role, and go 
outwith their role and help other areas...for example...there’s a couple of Partners...can actually do the whole 
floor so they’re often helping out in every department, and some in particular are quite good at what they do and 















   Partnership 
identity 
~Because there’s a lot of stuff in here that Partners never used to get measured on...[like] a seller who’s been 
selling for twenty-five years, selling TV's, they’re like, "what do you mean I need to go and take an interest in my 
community? No, no, no, I’m all about selling." So there was some big challenges because you’ve got to say, "no, 
John Lewis have now recognised that there’s elements of the Partner stuff that’s nothing to do with selling and 
you need to understand that." (Manager) 
~ So I used to work closely with...the head of branch, because if they didn’t believe in partners being able to 
challenge and influence any decisions through our democracy...then if they didn’t...really believe in co-ownership, 
and they also needed to understand what that looked like. So some heads of branches think “well, I’ll just say 
what’s happening, and then we’ll just find a way to make it look as though that’s what happening [co-
ownership]” and that’s not really how it should happen, it certainly didn’t happen in this branch. (Assistant 
Registrar) 
~ ...they need to have an understanding that John Lewis is not just a shop that you go on the till, you put stuff 
through for people, if people ask you a question you answer it the best you can, it’s very much about developing 
yourself as a Partnership, you need to give in as much as you get out of it. So they’ve really got to have a 
commitment to the business. (Selling Partner) 
   Autonomy ~ it’s my domain, sort of bit...I just get left to it to be honest, so it feels like it’s mine and I take more pride in it I 
suppose. (Selling Partner) 
~ ...my line manager introduced me to one thing which was what we called a message board which is where you 
put messages up and you all initial it, but I actually then expanded that a lot further and created a whole 
department home screen that has all the links to everything we need and its got rotas there, and its got 
communication, just trying to improve the overall flow of communication. (Selling Partner)  
~ A lot of managers now have started talking to partners, and saying, “so-and-so has left, she was working 36 
hours, where do you believe that would be best spent in the department? Do we recruit 18 into fitting rooms, and 








   Expectations of 
information and 
influence 
~ Well you get the morning meetings and evening meetings and they tell you about the business, tell you any 
changes or anything, also we’ve got the Chronicle which is a magazine which has got information from 
throughout the whole of the business including Waitrose as well. So they feed you constantly information about 
changes so you’re really aware. (Selling Partner) 
~ ...because we’re a co-owned business we talk about welcoming ideas to improve our business, we’ve got to 
ensure that…partners feel that they still have an input into our business, because that’s part of our structure. 
(Regional Registrar) 
~ ...it’s also for partners being able to challenge and influence through the democracy: so in the branch, it was 
our branch forum, and be able to raise issues and have them debated and hopefully influence change if necessary. 
(Assistant Registrar) 
   Approachable 
and 
collaborative 
~ There is no decision, well none that I can think of, that’s made in the business that you cannot challenge, or that 
you cannot find a way, of through feedback back up the channels. (Operations Manager) 
~ ...you’re there to support them more than anything else, it’s not that you drive it but it’s about you’re there to 
support them so that they can drive it and get help from you, and a lot of the help comes from their peers as well, 
not just managers. I’m mentoring a Section Manager at the moment as well, so I suppose that’s the same thing as 
well. (Manager) 
~ You praise them. Peer support. So we had someone who’s done some merchandising, we have one Partner who 
is very self conscious of her merchandising and she’s now coming up to speed, she’s getting there with some 















   Providing 
explanations 
~ I would use the world challenge…question, test and challenge, but also we encourage heads of branches, and 
the business, to equip partners with knowledge, because, to educate people on the reason why things are 
happening and what we’re doing, because then that builds for a better understanding (Regional Registrar) 
~ it’s not always about giving partners what they want but sometimes they don’t see that big a picture, but it’s 
giving them a transparent explanation and the thought process. (Personnel Manager) 
~ ...also we’ve got Town Hall sessions...quarterly...for every Partner to have an opportunity to attend, the Head of 
Branch or one of the Steering Group do it, and it’s an update on how the branch and the business is doing, mainly 
the branch, based on the objectives; so they’ll tell us where we’re sitting with wastage, where we’re sitting with 
our profit currently, where we’re sitting with our sales and our customer, but they should be getting information, I 
suppose it’s just an opportunity to bring it all together, and for them to challenge and talk and communicate and 
hear it from somewhere above. (Manager) 
   Customer focus ~ [The perfect partner is] someone who delivers that excellent customer service all the time, someone who goes 
that extra mile for their customers: they want to meet the customer needs. (Manager) 
~ I suppose it has changed a bit but the main aim is customer service, the customers come first, and that has 
always been the ethos really. Making the customers happy. (Selling Partner) 
~ [Main goal of the company is] friendly, happy people, dressed well, then you’re delivering your service to your 
customers, you’re getting your knowledge, so that’s what, really, it’s all about, making sure that your customers 












way of working 
~ ...there’s much more focus now, in fact this is probably the biggest thing...there’s much more focus now on the 
Partner being self sufficient: when I first started we did a lot of hand-holding and basically the Partner really 
didn’t almost even to have to sometimes think for themselves they could just ask their manager something, they’d 
do that. Whereas this last year or two there’s been a big shift to the Partner taking ownership, being self 
sufficient, so if they’re coming to ask a question, actually what we should be saying back to them is; “okay, so 
where do you think you’re going to find that?”...Rather than just giving them the answer. Which to me is the right 
way forward. (Manager) 
~ That’s where, in the past, we probably used to really hand-hold, whereas now there’s more emphasis on; “right, 
do you understand it, are you happy with what you need to do? If you’re not you need to speak to your manager 
about it.” It’s not like we’re going to go and chase them to find that out, and that’s the bit that’s changed a bit; 
there’s more emphasis on them having to know about it. (Manager) 
~ …as I say, a Good Partner is someone I don’t need to tell them what to do, they just take care of everything 
themselves; they keep themselves up to date on mandatory training, they’re responsible enough that when they put 
their holidays in they look at the planner to understand who’s already off, none of that selfishness that you tend to 
find with some people, and very much a contributor to the team...whether it be sales or just communication or 
sharing knowledge or things like that, so a strong team player is Good, and then as I say, from my point of view, 
Very Good is that Partner that starts to take on the extra responsibility...and it’s more about the leadership and 
the coaching and the mentoring and the supporting of Partners, which I put in as the Very Good...it’s not so much 















   Focus on 'add-
on' sales 
~ So we looked at things that we thought were going to be more of a challenge and we ended up focusing on the 
attachment sales, so the smaller pieces, so let’s not look at the big stuff because that will take care of itself and 
that’s more market forces than our own influence, so our point of view was ‘well, lets measure the attachments.’ 
Which not every branch is doing but from our point of view we thought it was something we had more control 
over, and it’s something we can really drive. (Manager) 
~ [Focus is on]...customer Service, so looking out for the people that come into your department, speaking to 
them, making sure they’ve got everything and offering them all the services;...the MyJohnLewis card, Partnership 
card, about .com if they’re not familiar with it and showing them everything and getting it off second nature. 
(Selling Partner) 
~ [Main goals is to] make sure that I get every customer that I do have gets my full attention and they go away 
with whatever they need plus more if I can smooth that in. (Selling Partner) 
   Additional 
responsibilities 
~ I’m just taking on a little bit more responsibility in other areas which I can see won’t stand me in bad stead for 
when it comes to the next annual review...[and that's not necessarily something I would have done before My 
Performance] because Sarah has mentioned “would this be something you’d be interested in doing?” And I’m 
thinking “yeah that would interest me” and plus I can then add it into My Performance to say I now do this as 
well. (Selling Partner) 
~ So that’s when you can tie it into this [My Performance], because what I’ll say to them is “so, just to be Good, 
you need to checking RSS everyday and those kind of things, I shouldn’t be having to have that conversation with 
you, you should be doing that just to be Good.” And when you put it into that context they’re suddenly like “oh 
right, see before I never checked that because it was a High Performing Partner’s responsibility to check that.” 
(Manager) 
~ I had an appraisal last night...and the example I used with the Partner there was, so...she was rated Developing. 
That is because...she’ll come in...and she’ll just wait, she’ll just wait to be told what to do, so there’s a 
communication book, so; “do you go and check the communication book? Do you check Retail Support Site? If 
there’s no manager here or there’s no one else, no full time Partner, how do you go and make things happen so 








   Consistency ~ It helps you reach your goal and keep a, and not just reach your goal but maintain it, because you’ve got to 
make sure you’re doing that every day on a consistent level to keep where you should be. (Selling Partner) 
~ A lot of things are things that you do daily anyway, but it’s just consistently doing them. (Selling Partner) 
~ I have really good Partners but that doesn’t mean that they’re absolutely consistent and bang-on the whole 
time. (Manager) 
   Pass on 
responsibility 
~ ...you’re always trained and taught to “look for the next you”...So that gives managers the encouragement to try 
and find the next person, plus in a way I’m gauged on that as well, so if you look at the very last point; Develop 
Self and Others, an aspect of that is “what have you done to develop other people in the business?” (Manager) 
~ ...and it actually worked quite well because the Partner ended up saying “well, I don’t take on a lot of 
responsibility from you however I do want to.” And then I said “what area are you interested in?” And he said 
“mandatory training. I’d quite like to do that.” “Perfect.” So I gave him the responsibility of mandatory training 
in my department, which has helped me out big time because...it meant that my Partners were getting the skills to 
do their job because he was ensuring it was done in a consistent way and it was up to date and complying with 
rules and regulations, which normally I would just do myself, but...I’m giving him a role which involves a bit 
more. (Manager) 
~ ...“I need time to take Hannah away, she’s one of the girls, to do a bit of training and learning on what kind of 
stone’s we’ve got.” That’s the kind of thing [my goals are based on]. (Selling Partner) 
   Feedback to 
others 
~ So one of them might be Challenge Others Constructively, that’s a hard thing to do, but you need learn to do it 
in this business, “oh, I saw such and such taking too long for their lunch and I last time I said something like this 
and it didn’t go very well, what do you suggest I do?” (Manager) 
~ ...one of my things was to give feedback to other Partners in my department on what they’re doing, because a lot 
of them have been there for so long they’re set in their ways, and then when three new full timers come in that’s 
when they’re not wanting to change, so to give them feedback daily, and it does help actually. (Selling Partner) 
















   Flexible ~ It is now because this [My Performance] has come out, going back to the Underperforming, if you’re not doing 
all of this, you’re scuppered because...you shouldn’t be in the business...I have seen people who won’t step outside 
their comfort zone, won’t step outside of their department; “no I won’t go outside of linens, no I won’t go 
downstairs, no I won’t go on the till.” I’ve done it all, I go everywhere because I don’t give a flying fig, you have 
to, and that’s what the business now expects from you and now, since this has come out, you see people actually 
stepping over the borders and doing it. (Selling Partner) 
~ [Our Manager] wants us to be more flexible so we can round and serve in China as well and for them to be able 
to come round here, so if we’re struggling for Partners on that day, sickness or whatever, we can move into that 
area and at least help out, so that’s my goals for this year I think. (Selling Partner) 
~ a lot of stock management Partners on the whole were not particularly flexible, so one of my first objectives was 
to develop flexibility...there’d be examples where you’d ask someone to work in an area that wasn’t their area and 
they’d just say, "no." So it’s a bit of a surprising reaction to have, so it’s something that I’ve tried to encourage 
and it’s something that, definitely, my team have really bought into, a lot of their Objectives revolved around 








   Stops people 
chatting 
~ since we’ve had the Selling Coach and Love to Sell roles going on, I think people are more aware of customers 
where you’d be like “oh come on, stop standing in the corner huddling and having a wee conversation.” It does 
seem to be more aware. Whether that’s because there’s someone watching them now, I’m not sure. I don’t think 
so. (Selling Partner) 
~ since this has come out, you see people actually stepping over the borders and doing it, but you still have the 
odd one that thinks “I’m going to get away with this.” (Selling Partner) 
~ ...actually since this has come out, if I’m completely honest, I have seen it [people talking and not working] and 
I’ve put my head down and just got on with my job and I’m thinking “you’re a fool to yourselves.” [because they 
can't hide from My Performance] (Selling Partner) 
   Sensor checking ~ ...that’s where those that have been working with and are used to it, that’s where we can help and support, and 
they will ask questions before they go into an ARP, or we’ll say as you’re through your ARPs is there anything I 
can help you with, do you want to just sit down and see how it’s going? Or sensor check with them; “tell me how 
you’re going to conduct that ARP?” (Manager) 
~ ...so pre us going into what I would call, "ARP season," we will sit down as a group of...managers and have 
everyone’s name on the table, and I’ll have my team and say where I see them and then we’ll just go around the 
room and say “do we all think that, or do we think there’s a difference, or what are you seeing different that I’m 
not seeing?” And have that conversation. (Manager) 
~ Also being aware of other Partners because I had a Partner who we’d agreed was Good, she had a Partner who 
she said was Good, but actually if you put them together, they were nothing alike, the person who she said was 



















focus on market 
logic 
~ So if I was appraising somebody [under the old appraisal system]...rather than stick to the words that were 
written down on the piece of paper, what you did was take in that piece around were they selling, were they 
actually ambassadors for things like partnership card, John Lewis insurance, those services, so you would have 
brought that in...if you were clever enough, you could use the wording to get what you were trying to get out of it, 
i.e. the partner’s nice but actually they don’t sell, and you would manage to communicate in that way. (Operations 
Manager of Commercial Support) 
~ I had a Partner the other day that came to their appraisal with no prep at all, and there’s just not that 
connection that; “so do you understand that not coming to this appraisal with the right [documents] is going to 
reflect on how you’re rated?” Because I’m not going to cancel the meeting because you’ve not come prepared. 
(Manager) 
~ ...I’m expecting to see that every single day; they’re ready for it every day, they’re heads up and ready to help, 
they’re not getting distracted, the customer is their absolute focus. That’s a really achievable goal. I have a 
Partner who has that as their goal who has kind of wavered throughout the year...(Manager) 
   Managers not 
assisting 
~ Because when I do my ARPs, I don’t expect to be doing the talking to be quite honest, they have to be doing the 
talking. As I constantly tell them, if I go for an ARP, my line manager is not going to be the one holding the 
conversation, it’s me that’s got to sell myself and come with the evidence and they have to do that. (Manager) 
~ ...they’re the ones who have the biggest input, because they have to demonstrate, it’s like they have to prove why 
they’re Good rather than me prove why they’re not Good if that makes sense. (Manager) 
~ ...my colleague who’s joined just now, he just had a mini appraisal and his feedback that he got was he’s not 








   Lack of focus on 
customer service 
~ ...others can say “I’m not wrapping that sofa, I don’t have to do that, I’m not the sofa wrapper”, but it needs to 
be done for it to go to the customer you know.  (Selling Partner) 
~ ...some people have problems with their [part-time Partners] where they come in, they just chat, they’re not 
here to work, you ask them to do stuff and they don’t do it. (Selling Partner) 
~ A classic example was when I came in on Tuesday, there was things that should already be done ready to be 
delivered the next day, but they weren’t even wrapped...so although that person was on the department by herself, 
I had to say this morning; “look, you could have combatted that and just phoned a manager and said ‘this is the 
situation, these need to get wrapped to go,’” but it was just left. (Selling Partner) 




~ ...I remember when we were moving and I was lugging sofas all over the shop and there was young guys in the 
section just looking over and it’s so frustrating, it’s just, oh, some of the younger guys just think, you know, 
respect to their, would be there, but it’s just not. A new breed and new people, they’re lazy, very lazy. It’s not 
typical of young partners, you can get older ones who are equally the same. (Selling Partner) 
~ I had some big challenges with the Fitted Kitchens gang, that’s who I was managing at the time, and they’re 
like, "no, no, no, my job is to make kitchen, I don’t need to go and see school kids or get involved in charity events 
or anything." (Manager) 
~ ...so one of the examples I’ll give is, so the whole 4+1, so last year at the appraisals, so I said to everyone; 
“right, you tell me you take a pride in our business and how it’s lead and what we achieved, so what are the four 
objectives the business wants to achieve this year?” and if they couldn’t tell me that, it was; “well how can you 
tell me, that you are doing that? So it’s an interest in how it’s led and what we achieve, so our four business 
priorities, you can’t tell me what they are? Why can’t you tell me?”  (Manager) 
   Influence ~ We’re an industrial democracy. We say we’re a democracy, we have to do a lot of explaining to partners that in 
our democratic structure in the UK, you don’t have a say on everything, what you do is elect a party to...run the 
business for you. (Regional Registrar) 
~ People believe that the co-ownership means, in some ways, that you can challenge and you can change 
everything. There are still people who make business decisions that you might not agree with, you can challenge it 
through the right channels but, as a manager, sometimes you have to set that aside. (Operations Manager of 
Commercial Support) 
~ I think sometimes in some Partners you do, I think as a business, no, I think they do have the priorities right, I 















   Business case 
language 
~ ...you’re not going to walk in and say “I’ve done all that,” because there’s evidence you need to provide. 
(Manager) 
~ I think in the past John Lewis has been far too soft on some of its employees in the sense that they come in, they 
do a lovely job, they walk around behaving very nice to everyone, but they don’t sell anything or they don’t deliver 
enough…[but, now] there’s an expectation that, as a company, we want to get our money from them; they’ve got 
to earn their way. (Manager) 
~ ...generally when we do that we drive costs down, we drive efficiency up and we standardise quality and 
visibility. (Head of Branch) 
   Relationship 
with manager 
rather than 
equality or effort 
or time served 
~ Well if you don’t get on with the manager they can put you in a category, even if you can sit and fight for 
yourself...I mean I’ve done it, I’ve sat there and said “no I disagree with that.” And I’ve still walked out with 
exactly the same rating. (Selling Partner) 
~ I mean, if you don’t get on with somebody, it’s not going to work, it doesn’t matter how the appraisal system 
works; you can have your information in front of you but it’s mostly the way they interpret it. (Selling Partner) 
~ ...if you do not get on with your Section Manager and you have to sit in four walls and talk about yourself, if 
they don’t like you for you any reason, now I know the hierarchy will turn around and say, “it shouldn’t affect it.” 
My personal feeling, yes it does, and I’ve seen it. In the 11 years that I’ve been here, I’ve seen it. I know who 
doesn’t like me, who I’ve gelled with...who I’ve not worked well with, I’ve seen it myself and that has been 








  Amended action 





~ We’ve all got targets, we know the store target per week, which is broken down into section targets, every 
partner is accountable to get one a month, and that’s a spit in the ocean, I mean that’s so achievable, but yet 
you’ll still get those that won’t do it. I was having a conversation with someone this morning and their whole 
attitude towards it was just, you know. (Selling Partner) 
~ They should be doing more along the way but I don’t think they’ve got the confidence to do it at the moment. So 
they’re meant to be updating their Personal Development Plan and things, and they’re meant to be asking you for 
meetings but you still find that you’re calling them yourself. (Manager) 
~ I just don’t like it [selling the Partnership (credit) Card], I think it’s just selling something to somebody that 
they don’t particularly need. I came to John Lewis with the idea that you wouldn’t have to be pushing stuff upon 
people, and then, to then be told like, “you’ve got to say it to four customers a day,” kind of makes you feel a bit, 
“eek,” you know what I mean? I don’t really particularly like it...obviously I’d say to someone that I was working 
with that I don’t like doing it, but you know you have to do it. (Selling Partner) 
   Simplification ~ I think Partners get a bit overwhelmed by these boxes as well and how to work things out from there. There 
were a few section managers who...[created] various guidelines for Partners that you can hand out to them in 
advance of them having the appraisal, so it’s like a checklist of things as well, so instead of just saying “look at 
this [My Performance]” it kind of narrows things down as well and it blocks out some of these things as well, 
because for some of them it’s difficult to know exactly what they’re meaning, so we’ve got some guidelines and 
some examples. (Manager) 
~ So I try and keep it really simple for the Partner...I don’t actually go into too much detail on that [My 
Performance]...don’t get so bogged down to going by every page of that book, because that’s probably over 
complicating it; use it in this way to try and keep it a bit more simple. (Manager) 
~ ...when I first read through it I thought I’m not even sure what I’m supposed to write in these boxes, but after 















   Additional ~ [My line manager] has created a bit of a pro forma that she wants to use in her monthly meetings with the 
Section Managers...which covers a few different areas that she wants us to update her on. (Manager) 
~ ...what we did was we actually condensed all the How behaviours into one bit of paper...(Manager) 
~ ...we created a PDP Objective bank, that was myself and the other Section Managers...[and] created some 
generic PDP objectives...We put an objective in on the different levels, so you could very quickly take someone 
who’s been here twenty-five years and actually give them something. (Manager) 
   Dilution ~ ...they would keep that to themselves. Yep, there can be lots of alternatives and I’ve had conversations with a 
couple of section managers when I’ve done their appraisals who said, “oh, that’s all well and good, I think it’s 
good for partners, but actually for me personally I don’t agree because…” But if that starts to leak through into 
the message the partners get, then we have a problem. (Operations Manager of Commercial Support) 
~ ...really basic stuff so the way that we manage absence management, so the processes that we took down there 
were different to what the guys were doing up in Home, and we’re thinking “well, how is that happening,” 
because that’s not fair that the Partner on the ground floor is in a recorded conversation because they’ve been 
absent twice in six months, but the person on the third floor isn’t getting that. And that is the right process 
because that’s our actual processes for absence management are really clear when you look on the Partner 
intranet, but for some reason these other guys weren’t buying into that and they weren’t doing it. (Manager) 
~ The How is far more subjective, in my opinion, the How is definitely more subjective. It isn’t a tick box when 
you read down these statements, the statements are there to give you indicators. And more importantly, read the 
negative indicators. But I very much concentrate on “what does that statement really mean and what does that 








   Strategic 
Objectives 
~ ...so it’s making sure that they’re setting achievable but challenging objectives; things that they can come in, 
work on easily...that they can do it every day on a daily basis. (Manager) 
~ My advice to people is not to come out with 17 objectives because that line says “deliver all objectives set”, give 
yourself half a chance here! (Operations Manager of Commercial Support) 
~ My Partners I don’t tend to give all five to, because some Partners only work two days. (Manager) 
   Ignoring 
prescriptions 
~ Not every Partner has done that, not every SM has done that, but rather than say to somebody “you’ve delivered 
the majority: you’re developing”, because nobody likes the developing word, they’re stuck here [Good]. 
(Operations Manager) 
~ I had some Objectives set that were realistic [unlike previous ones], ones that I could go for and I just went 
from there. (Manager) 
~ you need to be able to look at actually “maybe you’re not hitting that target but this is the evidence and this is 
examples of what you’ve done to really try and focus on it.”Because if you’ve got all that then there’s no reason 
why you can’t be in this section [Good/Very Good] because you’re showing that you’re being proactive about it 
and you’ve done all these things, and it’s just not quite hit the mark yet, or maybe you’ve moved it forward a little 
bit but it’s still negative, or something like that. (Manager) 
   Doing things at 
home 
~ ...we can go over to the manager and say; “look I need half and hour to go off and do something,” but then 
you’ve got all your customers so you can’t just leave them...I usually end up more often than not doing it at home, 
or I end up coming in early. (Selling Partner) 
~ ...I read over some of the [My Performance] stuff at home... (Selling Partner) 
~ ...so the information is out there now with our Partner intranet...it’s a wonderful thing and you can find out as 




















~ repeated use of phrases such as; "common sense," "obviously" and bring "right" to do something in a particlar 
way. 
~ ...it’s not that I’m going by the [My Performance] book, I’m just doing what I do and it seems to be the John 
Lewis way...So I don’t feel like I’m reading anything to say this is what you do...we have Love to Sell training 
courses...and I go to these meetings and sit there thinking “mmhm, mmhm, sorry, what are we learning?” 
Because that’s what we do. (Selling Partner) 
~ I’m going to start working in different departments to try and get more knowledge, I quite fancy going into fitted 
kitchens, it’s still furniture and it’s still within my department but it’s a different area altogether and I quite fancy 
getting trained up in there, not even because it’s ticking off a box in here, it’s just something I want to do, and 
when it comes to staff shortages, which we’ve been struggling with this part fortnight, there’s someone easily can 
then step in and say; “well, I can help you out on Tuesday, Wednesday.” And I’d like to be able to do that for 
someone else as well. (Selling Partner) 
~ Yeah, yep, there will be people that will, like I personally would do that [take on extra jobs that others haven’t 
done], I just personally would, I’m not trying put myself up there or anything but I honestly would, but there are 
people that just see it as 9 to 5. (Selling Partner) 
   Self-interest ~ So now I know exactly what I need to do to take a step up… it allows you to know what you need to do to go 
forward. (Manager) 
~ ...she’s met up with us all on a one-to-one as well, if she hasn’t done everyone she’s certainly working through 
the list to meet up with everyone, to sit and have a coffee and, “what do you want from John Lewis?” So we’ve all 
had that talk with our own Section Manager as to how we can progress our own careers within the business. 
(Selling Partner) 
~ I don’t like it...but...you have to, it’s part of your job to sell the business so selling a credit card is just part and 
parcel of what you’ve got to do. So I think everybody realises that it’s just what you’ve got to do, regardless of 








    Others' 
persuasion 
~ Obviously Partnership Card is something that should be everyday…that’s what they’re kind of pushing and 
wanting you to do at the moment...You just know [it's what to do], I’ve been here 21 years it’s kind of drummed in. 
(Selling Partner) 
~ I guess it depends on how they’ve been moulded in the department, some people have problems with their 
Saturday kids where they come in, they just chat, they’re not here to work, you ask them to do stuff and they don’t 
do it. Well mine are fine because they know how I work, they kind of mould into your shape, you know? (Selling 
Partner) 
~ ...there were a couple of individuals who didn’t see the benefit in doing a PDP, they just wanted to turn up and 
do the job and weren’t really interested...but it was just a case of saying to them, "well look, you’re interested in 
turning up and doing the job, this is part of the job." It clicked quite quickly then...So just checking they 
understand that this is part of the job, so if you’re not embracing this then potentially it could be said that 
actually, you’re not turning up and doing the job, you’re missing a part of the job. (Manager) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
